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ABSTRACT 
Almost twenty million Muslims live in Europe. These Muslims make up diverse ethnic, 
linguistic, and cultural communities, many of which are struggling to define their role 
within Europe‘s secular societies and the role of their religion in this environment. The 
concept of Euro-Islam is one option to promote a new European form of Islam that helps 
Muslim citizens and immigrants integrate into Europe‘s civic and political fabric. This 
study shows that the concept of Euro-Islam is still under negotiation and diversity across 
Muslim communities complicates the negotiation process. Conceptions of Euro-Islam 
vary from a pure embrace of secularism to new forms of Islamism. The acceptance of 
core European values, such as democracy, tolerance, and pluralism, are essential 
prerequisites for acceptance of Euro-Islam by Europeans, but many Muslims view their 
situation as that of exclusion, characterized by low levels of education, high 
unemployment, and societal discrimination. They face governments that seek to dialogue 
with Muslims while simultaneously pursuing increasingly assimilative immigration 
policies. Muslims in Europe have developed organizational networks to represent their 
opinions and interests as well as to express their identity. On the one hand, these 
organizations naturally reflect the diversity of the communities they represent. On the 
other hand, these organizations are all but representative for all Muslims living in Europe. 
Therefore, their role in the promotion of Euro-Islam is limited. This thesis proposes a 
rethinking of current immigration policies, intensified discourse among Muslims over 
Euro-Islam, and open dialogue between Muslims and others, where secularism does not 
become an excuse for discrimination and integration is distinguished from assimilation. 
This policy requires Europeans to rethink their own identity and the role they want 
religion to play in society. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
You can’t ask people to give up their religion; that would be absurd. 
Religions may be illusions, but these are important and profound 
illusions. And they will modify as they come into contact with other ideas. 
This is what an effective multiculturalism is: not a superficial exchange 
of festivals and food, but a robust and committed exchange of ideas – a 
conflict that is worth enduring, rather than a war.1 
Approximately fifteen to twenty million Muslims live in Europe.2 The perception 
of Muslims by Western Europeans is often dominated by a fear of Islam as an expanding 
religion seeking to dominate Europe. A recent opinion poll in Germany, for example, 
shows that 33% of German, non-Muslim citizens are seriously afraid of an expansion of 
Islam, while another 39% after all are slightly afraid of such an development.3 Similar 
observations can be made in other European countries like Great Britain or the 
Netherlands. The permanent presence of large Muslim communities, however, is an 
irreversible fact. Statements by European heads of state, for example by German 
president Christian Wulff, who stated that Islam has become a part of Germany, indicate 
that Europeans are aware of this development.4 The perception of Muslims by non-
Muslims in Europe, however, is still dominated by a lack of understanding as well as 
broad generalizations and stereotyping of Islam. Moreover, differences of Islamic and 
                                                 
1 Hanif Kureishi in Sam Cherribi, In the House of War: Dutch Islam Observed (Oxford:  University 
Press, 2010), 217. 
2 For the purpose of this thesis, the term Europe refers only to the countries listed in Figure 1 where 
Muslims are a minority of less than 10%. Due to the fact that some European nations do not collect data 
on their citizens‘ religion, more accurate data concerning the Muslim population in Europe are not 
available. The provided numbers reflect the variety of data as identified in a review of relevant literature. 
A recent Pew Research Center study estimates that approximately 17 million Muslims live in Western 
Europe (Pew Research Center, Muslim Networks and Movements in Western Europe (Washington: Pew 
Research Center, 2010), 5). 
3 ―Islam in Deutschland bereitet Sorgen,‖ Infratest dimap, accessed November 01, 2010. 
http://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/umfragen/aktuell/islam-in-deutschland-
bereitet-sorgen/.  
4 ―Wulff: Islam gehört zu Deutschland,‖ Der Tagesspiegel (October 03, 2010), accessed May 20, 
2011. http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/wulff-islam-gehoert-zu-deutschland/1948760.html.  
 2 
Islamist organizations are often not understood. However, for their part, Muslims have 
to contribute to a better relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims as well. 
Islamic scholars like Tariq Ramadan and Bassam Tibi, who want to change 
European perception of Islam and, at the same time, achieve an improved integration of 
their fellow Muslims into Western European societies, have introduced a concept of 
Euro-Islam. Although the interpretation of Euro-Islam by these scholars differs 
significantly, the name suggests that Muslims in Europe need to share a common 
understanding and interpretation of their religion and the role it plays in the secular 
environment of Western Europe. This would imply that there is an active discourse by 
Muslims on the national as well as European level, enabling an exchange of their 
understanding of Islam‘s role in Europe and their experience as Muslims in this non-
Muslim environment. Much more, it assumes Muslims and their organizations will 
cooperate on the European level to achieve a widely accepted definition of Euro-Islam 
and to promote this new form of Islam. 
The aim of this thesis is to evaluate these underlying assumptions by answering 
the following research questions: First, what are the main characteristics of Euro-Islam: 
is it a cohesive, integrating concept or are there different schools of thought? Does Euro-
Islam propagate a secular understanding of the role of Islam in Europe, or is it actually 
as some scholars argue a specific form of Islamism?5 
To succeed, this new form of Islam will have to be accepted by the majority of 
Muslims in Europe. Thus, we have to take a closer look at Muslim populations in 
Europe and ask what Muslims in Europe have in common. Do they share common 
interests and values that would support the development of a new, cohesive, European 
form of Islam compatible with modern, secular societies in Western Europe?  
Finally, it must be analyzed whether organizations of Muslim communities in 
Europe could support the propagation of Euro-Islam. Ayatollah Ghaemmaghami, an 
Iranian scholar and former imam in the German city Hamburg, argues that it is 
                                                 
5 Yunis Qandil, ―Euro-Islamists and the Struggle for Dominance Within Islam,‖ in The Other 
Muslims: Moderate and Secular, ed. Zeyno Baran (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 55–70. 
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necessary for Muslims in Europe to organize. Organization, he continues, will enable the 
Muslim minority to communicate their concerns and interests to European governments, 
and European law makers would know whom to address and thus could focus on a 
limited number of representative organizations rather than dealing with an anonymous 
entity.6 We therefore have to ask how Muslims in Europe are organized, nationally and 
internationally. What are the goals and objectives of these organizations, and how 
supportive are these organizations to the development of a European form of Islam? 
An analysis of Muslim communities and organizations in Germany, Great 
Britain and the Netherlands shows that Euro-Islam is more of an intellectual construct 
that is under negotiation rather than something that is embraced by the majority of 
Muslims in Europe. The ethnic, national, cultural and religious diversity of Muslims in 
these three countries makes the negotiation process complex. The demographic 
development and the social status of resident Muslims, however, require some form of 
change to help them improve their current social position. That this also requires 
significant changes in policy and public opinion in European countries is another result 
of this analysis. Thereby, the acceptance of Europeans to have become immigration 
countries seems to be more important than the theoretical construct of applied 
immigration policies. It is the struggle over daily issues and the routinely transaction of 
Muslims with non-Muslims that will form the identity of Muslims in Europe that might, 
finally, define a European form of Islam.  
Muslims themselves have already developed a widespread network of 
organizations to transport their demands to their governments. Yet, the overall landscape 
of Muslim organizations is as diverse as the Muslim communities in each country. 
Overall, the establishment of Euro-Islam as a special form of Islam in Europe—
integrative, tolerant, and widely accepted by Muslims, as well as non-Muslims—is 
possible, but will require time, dedication, and the will of all involved. 
                                                 
6 S.A. Hosseini Ghaemmaghami, Europäischer Islam oder Islam in Europa? Erfahrungen und 
Ansichten eines Ayatollahs in Europa (Berlin: Verlag Hans Schiller, 2010), 130. 
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B. IMPORTANCE 
Today, the Muslim population in Europe is a minority within approximately 500 
million Europeans. Several estimates, however, predict a shift in the demographics of 
Europe. The estimates vary from a 15% to more than 50% Muslim population in Europe 
by 2050.7 This development is caused mainly by the differences in birth rates of Muslim 
and non-Muslim families in Europe.  
The growing fear among non-Muslims of an expansion of Islam and growing 
Islamist influence has to be understood within the context of demographics in 
combination with several incidents over the last decade. The most alarming incidents 
have been the attacks of 9/11, the Madrid and London terrorist bombings in 2004 and 
2005, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the murder of the Dutch director Theo van Gogh 
in 2004, and the tumult around the Mohamed cartoons published in a Danish newspaper 
in 2006.  
 
Table 1.   Muslims living in Europe 8 
                                                 
7 Michael Radu, Europe’s Ghost: Tolerance, Jihadism, and the Crisis in the West (New York: 
Encounter Books, 2009), vi, 39. 
8 Pew Research Center, Muslim Networks, 5. 
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From the Muslim perspective, many feel discriminated against and not accepted 
by their host nations. This applies especially to second- and third-generation Muslim 
immigrants, many citizens of the countries they live in. Undoubtedly, they often face 
societies that do not accept their culture and traditions. Moreover, their chances in the 
job market in many European countries are worse as compared to those of non-Muslims 
applying for the same jobs with the same qualifications. Finally, in many European 
countries Muslims recognize that Christian communities enjoy benefits (tax benefits, 
access to public schools etc.) provided by the state that Muslim communities currently 
are denied.  
Although the influence of Islamist groups in Europe has so far been limited, the 
situation and developments described above shape an environment that could lead to a 
much greater influence of Islamists in Europe. Therefore, the question occurs whether 
the development of a new form of Islam, namely Euro-Islam, will be merely a form of 
Islamism, as scholars like Yunis Qandil argue.9  
To discuss this question, we must define the nature of Islamic or Islamist 
thought. What does Islamism in Europe really mean? The current attitude of many state 
officials in Europe, to lump Islamists together and define them indiscriminately as 
undemocratic and a threat to Europe, seems to be of little help and diminishes the 
positive influence of many Muslim organizations on the integration of Muslims in 
Europe. European governments need to identify the goals and objectives of Islamic and 
Islamist organizations and the rationale for their decision making in order to craft 
policies to counter radical Islamists or dialog with those that look for peaceful 
coexistence. Europeans should be aware of the landscape of Islamic and Islamist 
organizations and the levels of cooperation among them.  
C. CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT 
When European politicians discuss the subject of integration, they need to speak 
from a common understanding. However, the policies European countries apply to 
                                                 
9 Qandil, Euro-Islamists, 55–70. 
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accommodate immigrants differ significantly. Thus, a definition of what integration 
really means and the alternative routes Muslim communities in Europe could take, to 
define their future presence in Europe, is required. This will ultimately allow the 
assessment of how supportive these organizations will be to promoting a Euro-Islam that 
facilitates successful integration. 
1. The Concept of Integration 
Chris Lee argues that current sociological theories of integration mostly build 
upon classical assimilation theory.10 Scholars of this classical theory define assimilation 
as ―the social process that brings ethnic minorities into the mainstream of the life of a 
host nation. ‖11 If we follow this definition, Muslims in Western Europe ultimately 
would have to give up their own identity. Today, most European countries reject such a 
policy of assimilation. It is regarded as discriminatory and opposed to the values of 
liberal democracies. The policies that have been applied since the first significant 
streams of immigrants to Europe after World War II can be categorized as follows: 
- The assimilation model according to classical assimilation theory. This model 
can be best explained by the old saying ―when in Rome, do as the Romans do.‖ 
Assimilation means full compliance with the values and beliefs of the host society 
accepting that this is the only way it should be done while in Rome. Deviations from 
mainstream values and beliefs are restricted to the private sphere and the minority is 
fused with the majority. This makes the preservation of personal values and beliefs 
extremely difficult, if not impossible. Thus, the assimilation of Muslims in Europe 
would mean more or less a kind of Christianization or secularization of Islam. Publicly, 
the majority of European nations reject this model, and the same applies to the Muslims 
themselves. However, as will be shown, strong tendencies towards assimilation can be 
observed in Europe. The development of a European form of Islam will not be possible, 
however, if Europeans follow the approach of assimilation. 
                                                 
10 Chris Lee, ―Sociological Theories of Immigration: Pathways to Immigration for U.S. Immigrants,‖ 
Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment 19 (2009): 732. 
11 Ibid. 
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- The ethnic minorities model institutionalizes space for the preservation of 
cultural identity and some degree of pluralism. Most supporters of integration promote 
this approach to immigrant accommodation. Not only does the application of this model 
allow immigrants to preserve their cultural identity, it also includes real dialogue and an 
exchange of values and beliefs. This dialogue will result in a core of values that are 
accepted by all and form the basis for peaceful coexistence, although immigrants might 
have to give up more than the larger host society. Returning to the old saying, this 
approach suggests that maybe the Romans can learn from others, who do differently. 
Although many European countries officially seek to integrate immigrants under the 
ethnic-minority model, they may struggle with the question of how to accomplish this. 
The options are assimilation, integration and appeasement based upon exaggerated 
political correctness. To develop Euro-Islam in the framework of the ethnic minority 
model would offer the best chances for success. 
- The guest-worker model foresees only a temporary presence of immigrants in 
the host nation. Societies that have applied the guest worker model tend to tolerate a 
certain degree of cultural diversity. Some argue that foreign residents may even be 
encouraged to maintain their original cultures to facilitate their eventual return.12 This 
model evolved in the 1960s when Germany and other Western countries called 
immigrants into the country to provide labor. Because the arrangement was thought to 
be temporary, immigrants were left on their own outside of the work environment and 
allowed to pursuit their values and beliefs so long as it was private. Thus, the Romans 
did as they always do, and so did the immigrants but privately. 
- The concept of multiculturalism is interpreted variously. Some view it as a 
special form of the guest worker model, while others use the term as part of the ethnic-
minorities model. Recently, it has become a synonym for cultural relativism which 
allows the existence of Muslim entities in European societies as independent enclaves. 
What distinguishes it from the guest-worker model is its spurning of the host nation‘s 
                                                 
12 John Rex, Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State: Working Papers in the Theory of 
Multiculturalism and Political Integration (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1996), 51. 
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national identity as hegemonial culture.13 Despite different interpretations by different 
groups, for the purpose of this thesis, multiculturalism will be understood as cultural 
relativism, which, in the worst case, can become a form of appeasement to avoid any 
impression of alleged assimilation. Moreover, in contrast to the guest-worker model, the 
host society is often more willing to accept the intrusion of foreign values than to 
preserve its own. 
The main difference among these models lie in the degree of dialogue and the 
exchange of values and believes, as depicted in Figure 1. 
To guide the analysis as to whether Euro-Islam can be a vehicle to successful 
integration, Integration will be defined on the basis of the ethnic-minority model as the 
process of accommodating immigrating minorities in a host society, enabling them to 
participate actively in the social, political, cultural, and economic processes of the host 
society, and allowing them to preserve their cultural and religious identity as Europeans 
under the laws of the host society, in a process of exchange and dialogue. 
 
Figure 1.   Immigration Models 
                                                 
13 Bassam Tibi, Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: Democratic Peace and Euro-Islam 
versus Global Jihad (New York: Routledge, 2008), 177–178. 
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This process of integration is determined by several, often interdependent, 
factors. Susanne Worbs defines these factors as the existence of social networks to 
accommodate immigrants, the influence of family relations and marriage, immigrant 
biographies and future prospects, and their political orientation, religious socialization, 
attitudes, identities, and use of media.14 Moreover, the self-image of the host country 
plays an important role, as Dilmar Hussain points out.15 He argues that Germany, for 
example, historically had a notion of blood descent and external threats as basis of 
national identity. Chris Lee talks about contextual factors such as the policies of the host 
society, as well as societal values and biases, as influential factors in integration.16 Thus, 
integration is not a one-way road but a mutual process that involves migrants and the 
host society equally.17 
The definition of the concept of integration and the factors that influence 
integration establishes a conceptual framework to which the concept of Euro-Islam has 
to be compared. But success of integration is not guaranteed. The growing number of 
Muslims in Europe could take different routes, which should be briefly outlined. 
2. Possible Routes for Muslims in Europe 
Islam and Europe, in general, belong to two different conceptual categories: one 
refers to religion and the other primarily to geography. However, both are also relevant 
to the definition of culture and values. Muslims in Europe are no longer just migrants. 
After the first significant groups came to Western Europe in the 1950s, they stayed; and 
today, the second, and even third, generations of these former migrants live in every 
                                                 
14 Susanne Worbs, ―The Second Generation in Germany: Between School and the Labor Market,‖ 
International Migration Review 37, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 1011–1038. 
15 Dilmar Hussain, ‖The Holy Grail of Muslims in Western Europe: Representation and Their 
Relationship with the State,‖ in Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in Europe and the 
Middle East, ed. John L. Esposito and F. Burgat (New Brunswick: Rutges University Press, 2003), 222. 
16 Lee, ―Theories of Immigration,‖ 734. 
17 Mathias Rohe, ―Islamismus und Scharia,‖ in Integration und Islam (Nürnberg: Bundesamt für 
Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2006), 120. 
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European country. Which route these Muslims take is still to be determined. Mathias 
Rohe defines five possible roles Islam could play in the future of Europe.18 
The first, but largest group of Muslims is simply accepting the European legal 
and social framework without any theoretical reflections on that topic. They are more 
concerned with their economic situation, political participation, education and other 
issues of daily life than the role their religion should play in the societies of Europe.  
The second approach—the ex-Muslim approach—makes the choice between 
secular democracy and adherence to Islam inevitable. Necla Kelek formulates the main 
proposition of this approach as follows: ―For me, Islam as a Weltanschauung and a 
system of values cannot be integrated into the European societies. …  It lacks the 
institutional, structural and theological prerequisites for that. … . Islam is not capable 
of integration, whereas the single Muslim as a citizen is.‖19 This approach has to be 
considered a form of assimilation as described above. Thus, most likely, Muslims in 
Europe will reject this dramatic approach.  
The exclusivist approach is as dramatic as the ex-Muslim approach, but its 
intension is reverse. Representatives of this approach reject European norms and values, 
demanding the supremacy of Islamic norms as a whole.20 While the vast majority 
restrict themselves to argumentative activities, their fundamental rejection of Western 
values leads to further radicalization. Groups like Khilavet Devleti, Hizb al-Tahrir, or 
Tablighi Jamaat promote this approach.21 The consequences of this approach for Europe 
would be dramatic and change European societies fundamentally. It is a form of 
multiculturalism that comes in the form of appeasement if Europeans accept it. 
Representatives of the traditionalistic approach reject exclusivist, or we can also 
say extremist, ideology and tactics. Traditionalists share a common understanding 
                                                 
18 Mathias Rohe, ―Islam and the Democratic State Under the Rule of Law – and Never the Twain 
Shall Meet?‖ in Islam & Europe: Crises are Challenges, ed. Marie-Claire Foblets and Jean-Yves Carlier 
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010), 222–230. 




especially of social norms and gender issues. They mostly cooperate with non-Muslims 
and ―are ready to integrate into the given order, but maintain a very traditional position 
towards gender-related issues and in matters of orthopraxy.‖22 The concept of dar al-
‘ahd plays a significant role for the traditionalists since it obliges Muslims to obey the 
law of the land of residence. This could enable a peaceful coexistence of Muslims in 
Europe though it would be far from achieving real integration. Integration, as understood 
by this group as well as by the extremists, is confused, often willingly, with 
assimilation.23 Actually, accepting the traditionalistic approach would be a form of 
multiculturalism falling short of real integration. 
Another group, which could be called integrationists, calls for substantial 
integration of Muslims into European societies. Integrationists ask their fellow Muslims 
to fully respect European values, principles, and laws while maintaining a Muslim 
identity within the given freedom of religion in Europe.24 It is an application of the 
ethnic minorities model of integration in the form of pluralism. This is an approach that 
meets the definition of integration in the understanding of this thesis. Thus, it is the route 
Euro-Islam should follow in order to achieve a peaceful coexistence of Muslims and 
non-Muslims based on acceptance and respect. 
                                                 
22 Rohe, ―Islam and the Democratic State,‖ 225. 
23 Nezar AlSayyad, ―Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: On the Discourses of Identity and Culture,‖ in 
Nezar AlSayyad and Manual Castells, Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in 
the Age of Globalization (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), 19. 
24 Rohe, ―Islam and the Democratic State,‖ 226. 
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Table 2.   Possible Routes of Muslims in Europe25 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
To get an answer to the questions above, the term ―Euro-Islam‖ will first be 
defined by means of a literature review on this subject. Next, a study of Euro-Islam, as 
defined by two of its most prominent proponents (Tariq Ramadan and Bassam Tibi), 
will indicate whether there is a common understanding of this term or whether different 
understandings exist. The findings of this case study will enable a determination as to 
what form of Euro-Islam will most likely be accepted by European Muslims and non-
Muslims. Finally, this analysis will reveal the main characteristics of Euro-Islam and the  
 
                                                 
25 The group of Muslims, who do not reflect on the theory of secularism and the future role of Islam 
in Europe, has not been listed because they are not represented in Muslim organizations in the 
understanding of this thesis. 
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necessary preconditions for its successful establishment. This is the yardstick Muslim 
communities and organizations will be measured with to predict whether they support 
the concept of an integrative Euro-Islam. 
With up to twenty million Muslims living in Europe, Islamic and Islamist 
organizations exist in every European country. Their activities and focus run from urban 
communities to the national and European level. To analyze the objectives and policies 
of all these organizations would go far beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, the 
research question will be answered by applying a comparative case study of Muslim 
organizations in three European countries: Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, 
focusing on those organizations assumed most influential.  
The three countries studied are well suited for a comparative case study that is 
representative for Western Europe:  
All three host a significant large Muslim population. Approximately 4.3 million 
Muslims live in Germany (5.3%),26 2.9 million in Great Britain (4.6%),27 and almost 
one million in the Netherlands (5.8%).28 All three states are democratic, members of the 
European Union, and participate, or have participated in military operations in Iraq or 
Afghanistan, which is of special interest for many Muslims in Europe. So far the 
common ground. 
By contrast, the Muslims in these countries originate from different regions of 
the world (Turkey, North Africa, the Gulf region, Central Asia, and Southeast-Asia), and 
the integration policies of these countries are different. Two of the countries (Great 
Britain and the Netherlands) have a colonial legacy in the Muslim world, with the 
heritage of Great Britain having a much longer-lasting impact. This composition of the 
case study allows us to analyze the influence of a variety of factors on the possible 
development of a coherent form of Euro-Islam. 
                                                 
26 Sonja Haug, Stephanie Müssig, and Anja Stichs, Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland (Nürnberg: 
Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2009), 11. 
27 Pew Research Center, Muslim Networks, 5. 
28 FORUM, Institute for Multicultural Affairs, The Position of Muslims in the Netherlands: Facts 
and Figures (Utrecht: FORUM, Institute for Multicultural Affairs, 2010), 8. 
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Like most organizations, Islamic and Islamist organizations do not act in 
isolation; they interact with non-Muslim society in a common environment defined by 
political, economic, social, technological, environmental, and legal factors. For example, 
Anouar Boukhars argues that radicalization of Islamists could evolve from a lack of 
political representation,29 and Francis Fukuyama points out that globalization driven by 
the Internet and increased mobility change the face of Islamism.30 To be successful, 
organizations have to respond to their environment. The same applies to the 
implementation of a new concept like Euro-Islam. If Euro-Islam is to allay the fears of 
Western Europeans and build a bridge between Muslims and non-Muslims, it needs to 
address the needs of Muslims as well as non-Muslims.  Muslim organizations could play 
a significant role in the promotion of this new concept. Whether they will be able and 
willing to play this role is the question that has to be answered. 
E.  THESIS OVERVIEW 
Including this introduction, the thesis contains five chapters. 
Chapter II will provide a brief review of the literature on Euro-Islam, definition 
of the terms ―Islamic‖ and ―Islamist,‖ and analysis of the concept of Euro-Islam, as 
defined by two of the main proponents. The construct of identity, which plays a crucial 
role in the concept of integration and Euro-Islam, will be described. Findings will serve 
as the yardstick for our analysis of Muslim populations and organizations in Germany, 
Great Britain, and the Netherlands. 
The Muslim population of these countries is analyzed in Chapter III: Where they 
come from, their religious roots and the current situation in their host countries. 
Relationships with the three host countries will be assessed, especially as to how the 
hosts seek to integrate Muslim communities and how that influences Muslim identity.  
 
                                                 
29 Anouar Boukhars, ―Islam, Jihadism, and the Depolitization in France and Germany,‖ International 
Political Science Review 30, no. 3 (2009): 298. 
30 Francis Fukuyama, ―Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy,‖ Journal of Democracy 17, 
no. 2 (April 2006): 11. 
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Findings will be compared, enabling the evaluation of the chances that Euro-Islam will 
have to address the needs and concerns of Muslims and be widely accepted by Muslims 
and non-Muslims. 
Chapter IV addresses Muslim organizations in Germany, Great Britain, and the 
Netherlands to identify their objectives and agendas, how these organizations are 
influenced, and whether they are integrated into a wider network. This analysis will 
permit to identify the role Muslim organizations can play in the promotion of Euro-
Islam. 
Finally, Chapter V summarizes the findings of the previous chapters. Moreover, 
recommendations will be made to the direction Euro-Islam should take to achieve better 
integration while enabling Muslims to retain an identity as European citizens believing 
in Islam. Finally, the factors European governments should take into account to adjust 
their integration policies will be highlighted. 
 16 
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II. EURO-ISLAM: WHAT DOES IT MEAN? 
Euro-Islam is still a contested concept under development. At its core, however, 
it seeks to support an integrative process to be ―more inclusive of religious-ethnic 
minorities, to maintain law and order, to avoid radicalization and to make sure that 
Muslims are properly familiarized with and incorporated in the ethos of the European 
countries in which they live.‖31 This form of Euro-Islam seeks to maintain a Muslim 
identity that must be developed in the specific context of secular Western Europe. The 
acceptance of core European values, like democracy, tolerance and pluralism, are 
nonnegotiable prerequisites for acceptance of Euro-Islam by Europeans. 
 
Figure 2.   Pillars of Euro-Islam 
The fact that Euro-Islam is still a contested concept requires further research in 
the current process of reaching a definition. Before an analysis of the concept of Euro-
Islam and its pillars—as depicted in Figure 2—can be conducted, it is first necessary to 
define Islamism and the differences between Islamist and Islamic organizations. This 
distinction is necessary to analyze whether the different representatives of Euro-Islam 
actually mean Euro-Islamism when they talk about this concept. It is also necessary to 
                                                 
31 Sara Silvestri, ―Moderate Islamist Groups in Europe: The Muslim Brothers,‖ to appear in Political 
Islam, ed. K. Hroub (London: Saqi books), 49, accessed November 10, 2010. http://www.sara.silvestri. 
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analyze Muslim organizations and their aim and objectives. Afterwards, the concept of 
identity, which plays an important role in the concept of Euro-Islam, will be addressed. 
Based on these definitions the concept of Euro-Islam and its different schools of thought 
will be analyzed. 
A. WHAT IS “ISLAMIC” AND WHAT IS “ISLAMIST?” 
As stated in the introduction, the differences between Islamist and Islamic are 
often not understood by Western politicians, the media and the public. According to 
Mohammed Ayoob, Islamism or political Islam has to be understood as ―a political 
ideology rather than religion or theology.‖32 Islam as a religion serves as an instrument 
to achieve political objectives. What is characteristic of Islamism is that its proponents 
borrow from Islamic traditions, the Qur’an and the hadith, while simultaneously 
separating them from the social, economic, cultural, and political context they were 
developed or written in.33 What all Islamist groups have in common, Robbert Woltering 
points out, is ―the desire to ‗Islamize‘ society‖ and a ―conviction that sooner or later the 
realm of politics will have to be altered fundamentally.‖34 Bassam Tibi, among others, 
argues that Islamists seek to establish Islamic rule and a competitive model of 
globalization. Moreover, he argues, Islamists blame the downfall of Islam on Europe. 
Therefore, the Islamization of Europe through immigration would be a rational, logic 
goal to overcome the weakness Islam finds itself in.35 Another important concept of 
Islamism is the unity of Islam, describing a global umma of believing Muslims where all 
spheres of society are entirely permeated by Islam.36 Islamism, however, does not 
necessarily imply the use of violence. Islamists may engage in violent activities but also 
in political discourse and dialogue. 
                                                 
32 Mohammed Ayoob, The many Faces of political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World 
(Michigan: Michigan University Press, 2008), 2. 
33 Ibid., 3. 
34 Robbert A. F. L. Woltering, ―The Roots of Islamist Popularity,‖ Third World Quarterly 23, no.6 
(2002): 1133. 
35 Tibi, Political Islam, 171. 
36 Eberhard Troeger, ―Islam oder Islamismus? Argumente zu seiner Beurteilung,‖ Institut für 
Islamfragen, special edition no.5 (2005): 3. 
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Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, an organization or ideology will be called 
Islamist if it seeks to gain political influence or control so as to apply principles based on 
the Qur‘an and the hadith to all spheres of life and to base jurisdiction on shari’a law. 
The promotion of a global umma and the universality of Islam are additional 
characteristics of organizations and ideologies that will be defined as Islamist. Members 
of Islamist organizations see themselves, first and foremost, as Muslims. They share a 
Muslim identity rather than an identity as Europeans believing in Islam. 
Islamic organizations, in contrast, are those organizations whose members are 
influenced by Islamic values but who draw a clear line between religion and other 
spheres of life. The identity of these Muslims is influenced by their spiritual relationship 
with God and the obligations that sustain this relationship (prayers, spiritual rituals etc.). 
Islamic organizations, in the understanding of this thesis, are understood to be secular. 
Where organizations are addressed in more general terms or if their orientation 
remains unclear, the term Muslim organization will be used. 
B. THE ROLE OF IDENTITY 
Another important construct is that notion of identity. ―The term identity 
typically refers to social labels given to individuals as members of a group. This may be 
self-designated or assigned to individuals themselves or by others.‖37 E. H. Erikson 
defines identity as ―a subjective sense of an invigorating sameness and continuity.‖38 By 
definition, sharing an identity declares an individual to be an element of a larger group 
with whom he identifies through religion, ethnicity, or nationality. Scholars like Kathryn 
Woodward argue that identity is increasingly built upon multiple factors—nationality, 
ethnicity, social class, or gender to name a few. Some of these factors may even 
contradict themselves. Often, Grossberg points out, the logic of difference, individuality 
and temporality form an individual‘s identity.39 Elham Manea argues that identity is a 
                                                 
37 AlSayyad, Muslim Europe, 17. 
38 Erik H. Erikson, ―The Concept of Identity in Race Relations: Notes and Queries,‖ Daedalus 95,  
no. 1, The Negro American – 2 (Winter, 1966): 147. 
39 AlSayyad, Muslim Europe, 17. 
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construct of fantasy where we choose some components of our identity and ignore 
others even knowing that our choice is often not truly rational.40 Moreover, a person‘s 
identity is not fixed. It changes according to the living environment, opportunities to 
work and education, as well as length of residence in a foreign environment.41 
Among others, Saira Yamin has analyzed factors that contribute to identify and 
cites ten that are highly influential.42 For the concept of Euro-Islam religion, of course, 
is of special importance. Yamin argues that religion as a component of identity will play 
the most important role ―in conditions that politically and economically discriminate 
against and marginalize religious communities‖43 and encourage members of these 
communities to base their identity especially on their religion. In her study of the 
relationship between religious identity and the causes of religious violence, she defines 
fourteen elements that determine the causal relationship between religious identity and 
group violence. Not surprisingly, these elements are similar to those factors we have 
previously defined as important to the integration process. 
Identity in Europe, however, is still dominated by ethnicity.44 Once a foreigner, 
always a foreigner. That is the brief conclusion of Elham Manea when it comes to the 
role of ethnicity in the perception of identity in Germany.45 By contrast, Muslims‘  
 
 
                                                 
40 Elham Manea, Ich will nicht mehr schweigen: Der Islam, der Westen und die Menschenrechte 
(Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 2009), ibook-Version. 
41 Nahid Afrose Kabir, Young British Muslims: Identity, Culture, Politics and the Media 
(Edingburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 200. 
42 Saira Yamin, ―Understanding Religious Identity and the Causes of Religious Violence,‖ South 
Asian Journal of Peace Building 1, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 7. 
43 Ibid. The fourteen elements, she has identified, are historical grievances or trauma, economic 
disparity, skewed political participation, collective religious history, the role of religious leadership, 
religious sites or territory, religious texts and traditions, religious pseudo speciation, media portrayal, 
negative communication, insecurity, mistrust and suspicion, demographic factors, internal and external 
alliances. 
44 Bassam Tibi, ‖Muslim Migrants in Europe: Between Euro-Islam and Ghettoization,‖ in Nezar 
AlSayyad and Manual Castells, Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the 
Age of Globalization (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), 32. 
45 Manea, Ich will nicht mehr schweigen. 
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identity, Tibi points out, is an identity of persons from different cultures who share the 
same faith.46 This is one of the challenges that have to be overcome to successfully 
promote Euro-Islam. 
C. EURO-ISLAM: THE CURRENT STATUS OF SCHOLARLY 
DISCOURSE 
I argue against polarization and suggest a Euro-Islam as a strategy for 
peace within Europe to replace the exclusion which is inflicted by 
Europeans on Muslims and which contributes to their defensive response 
of self-ethnicization.47 
This statement by the Syrian professor Bassam Tibi puts the main objectives of 
the concept of Euro-Islam in a nutshell. However, the idea of Euro-Islam is rather new 
and a clear, widely accepted definition of this term does not exist. More important, it is 
still disputed whether something like Euro-Islam actually exists. Before the different 
interpretations of Euro-Islam by Bassam Tibi and Tariq Ramadan—influential, although 
contradictory, promoters of Euro-Islam—will be analyzed, a brief review of the existing 
literature on Euro-Islam and Islam in Europe will shed some light on the persisting 
opinions on the value of Euro-Islam. 
Islam in Europe has been a topic of scholarly interest for several decades.48 The 
literature relevant to this thesis is endless, and the subjects covered highly diverse. A full 
representation, thus, will not be made, as it would add little value in answering the 
overarching question of what the role of Muslim organizations in the promotion of Euro-
Islam will be.  
The relevant literature can be divided into several groups, with the orientation of 
authors varying from Western populists to Islamist radicals to serious scholars of 
religion and political science. One group—taking a hard-liner position—asks for an end 
                                                 
46 Tibi, ―Muslim Migrants,‖ 37. 
47 Tibi, Political Islam, 189. 
44 Jocelyne Cesari, ―Islam in the West: From Immigration to Global Islam,― Harvard Middle Eastern 
and Islamic Review 8 (2009): 149. 
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of tolerance and dialogue through government sponsored conferences.49 Others follow a 
more moderate path, but still reject any tendency towards Islamization. Ayann Hirsi Ali 
and Afshin Ellian, for example, state that ―citizenship of a democratic state means living 
by the laws of the country‖ which is a fundamental prerequisite if any democracy is to 
exist. Moreover, Ellian argues ―the fruits of the European enlightenment must be 
defended, with force if necessary.‖ Necla Kelek‘s understanding of Islam, as a 
Weltanschauung and a system of values that cannot be integrated into the European 
societies (whereas single Muslims, as citizens, can be),50 is another example of this type 
of strong resistance to the growing influence of Islamism in Europe. What all of these 
scholars have in common, is a call for a Muslim enlightenment.51  
A second group of scholars gives detailed analysis and provides 
recommendations for Muslim communities in Europe to define their future role. 
Representatives of this group are Bassam Tibi, Tariq Ramadan, and Ayatollah S. A. 
Hosseini Ghaemmaghami. These Muslims approach the concept of Euro-Islam from 
different perspectives. Bassam Tibi offers the perspective of a secular Muslim scholar. 
Ramadan and Ghaemmaghami, by contrast, view Islam as a comprehensive religion 
covering all aspects of life. 
Another group of scholars, including Lawrence Rosen,52 Michael Radu,53 and 
Oliver Roy,54 share the conclusion that, for now, we are talking about Muslims in 
Europe rather than European Muslims; but they more or less leave open what the future 
of Muslims will or should look like. Roy argues that Muslims in Europe currently try to 
individualize and reconstruct their identities along differing patterns, which undermines 
the idea of Euro-Islam or a homogenous Muslim community in Europe. Sara Silvestri 
                                                 
49 Udo Ulfkotte, SOS Abendland: Die schleichende Islamisierung Europas (Rottenburg: Kopp 
Verlag, 2010), 367–368. 
50 Rohe, ―Islam and the Democratic State,‖ 223. 
51 Ian Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam: Liberal Europe, Islam and the Limits of Tolerance (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2007), 29. 
52 Lawrence Rosen, The Culture of Islam: Changing Aspects of Contemporary Muslim Life (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2006), 156. 
53 Radu, Europe’s Ghost, 27. 
54 Oliver Roy in Rosen, The Culture of Islam, 155. 
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points out that, initially, any attempt to negotiate issues and the rights of Muslims in 
Europe usually triggered interference from diplomatic representatives of Muslim 
countries. Therefore, she argues, Muslims in Europe had no chance to express their 
concerns and claims.55 Monda, as an extreme example, argues ―there is no such thing as 
Islam.‖ She argues that there would be a core set of ideas and principles which is known 
as Islam, and referred to by all Muslims, but that Islam cannot be called a concept, faith 
or ideology that has ―inherent qualities that result in general consequences and 
determine what all Muslims think and feel.‖ In her perception, ―Islam only exists as the 
sum of all Muslims.‖56 This understanding of Islam may be disgraceful to Muslims, but 
needs to be highlighted to describe the environment a future Euro-Islam would evolve 
in. 
However, Roy, among others, does not reject the idea of Euro-Islam in total. In 
his opinion the evolution of Euro-Islam is an endogenous process of concrete interaction 
between European Muslims and non-Muslim societies. What the result of this process 
might be, he leaves open: radicalism, liberalism, or humanism?57 Jytte Klausen comes to 
the same conclusion when she argues that it is very much under negotiation what Euro-
Islam will look like and that it is not certain what the outcome, ten years from now, 
might be.58  
Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, Euro-Islam will be understood as the 
process of developing Islam in a European context, and not as a status that has already 
been achieved. 
This brief literature review should be sufficient to indicate that the concept of 
Euro-Islam is very much under negotiation. What is important to note, as Ayatollah 
Ghaemmaghami points out, is that drive to develop a specific form of European Islam is 
                                                 
55 Sara Silvestri, ―Public Policies towards Muslims and the Institutionalization of ‗Moderate Islam‘ in 
Europe: Some critical Reflections,‖ in Muslims in 21st Century Europe: Structural and Cultural 
Perspectives, ed. Anna Triandafyllidou (New York: Routledge, 2010), 47. 
56 Anshuman A. Mondal, Young British Muslim Voices (Oxford: Greenwood World Publishing, 
2008), 183. 
57 Oliver Roy, ―Euro-Islam: The Jihad within?‖ The National Interest (Spring 2003): 73. 
58 Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford 
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only demonstrated by a religious, intellectual elite, while the acceptance of the majority 
of Muslims is missing.59 The analysis of Muslim communities in Germany, Great 
Britain and the Netherlands in Chapter III will give an answer as to whether 
Ghaemmaghani is right. For the time being, we will focus on two prominent 
representatives of Euro-Islam. Their definition of this concept will provide a guide 
through the subsequent analysis of Muslim communities and organizations in this case 
study. 
D. THE EURO-ISLAM OF BASSAM TIBI 
For Bassam Tibi, Euro-Islam is presently just a vision that has not become 
reality.60 He offers criticicism that it is inflationary to speak of a European Islam, which 
is far from being a reality and only a concept embraced by some enlightened Muslims in 
Europe.61 So far, he agrees with Rosen, Radu, Roy, and even Ghaemmaghani.  
Tibi focuses his interpretation of Euro-Islam on the persistent commonalities 
between Muslim and non-Muslim European civilizations and follows an overall secular 
approach.62 His Euro-Islam is characterized by ―cultural modernity‖ and a degree of 
tolerance that ―goes beyond the Islamic tolerance restricted to Abrahamitic believers.‖63 
Tibi also rejects the notion of Europe as da’wah, which obliges Muslims to spread Islam 
among the population.64 At the same time, he rejects the notion of dar al-Islam (the 
house of Islam) and dar al-harb (the house of war).65 Tibi argues that it is no sign of 
moderation if scholars like Tariq Ramadan speak of Europe as dar al-Islam or dar al-
Shahada (the house of Islamic belief), but rather, a hint to Islamization.66 What Tibi 
                                                 
59 Ghaemmaghami, Europäischer Islam, 119. 
60 Bassam Tibi, ―Der Euro-Islam als Brücke zwischen Islam und Europa,‖ www.perlentaucher.de, 
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61 Tibi, Political Islam, 180. 
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calls for is not monoculture or multiculturalism but a plurality of cultures. 
Monoculturalism, he argues, leads to assimilation and discrimination while 
multiculturalism is based on cultural relativism or even nihilism.67 
Tibi argues that the necessity for change is a condition sine qua non for 
successful integration of Muslims in Europe. He clearly states that the Europeanization 
of Islam can only be accomplished if ―change and religious reforms are admitted by 
Muslims.‖68 This reform has to be managed by the Muslims in Europe themselves. The 
installation of imams by Muslim governments, like Iran or Saudi Arabia, in European 
mosques is therefore a major obstacle to the development of a specific Euro-Islam.69  
But Tibi aims his critique also at the Europeans themselves. With reference to 
the Muslim philosopher Ibn Khaldun, who lived in the fourteenth century, Tibi 
complains of a lack of commitment of Europeans to their ―civilizational core values‖70 
which should inspire Islamic thinking. His desire to incorporate European values into 
Islamic thought is based on the precedent of the Hellenization of Islam between the 
ninth and the twelfth centuries, which, in his view, ―gave birth to medieval Islamic 
rationalism.‖71 Cultural diversity, he continues, needs limits, which are to be defined in 
a discourse between Europeans and immigrants over common, basic values.72 Identity 
plays a major role in this understanding of Euro-Islam, whereas identity in Europe is 
often based on ethnicity rather than values. While migrants have to change, he also asks 
for a ―de-ethnization of European identity‖ which, for him, ―is a prerequisite for the 
feasibility of Euro-Islam.‖73  
Euro-Islam, Tibi explains, should by no means be an adjustment to Christian 
values, but it should also be clear that jihad and shari‘a are not alternatives to European 
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law.74 The most pertinent strategy for him is politics of integration that differ from both 
multi-culturalism and assimilation.75 Tibi‘s Euro-Islam is based on five pillars: (1) 
democracy according to Western understanding, (2) secularism and rejection of shari‘a, 
(3) individual human rights, (4) tolerance in the modern understanding of this term, and 
(5) recognition of pluralism in a civil society.76 The clear implication for Tibi is that 
there is only one law for all. That means no shari‘a law in Europe for Islamic minorities 
in any area of law, including family law.77  
Not all scholars who support Tibi‘s idea of Euro-Islam reject the notion of 
shari‘a as fundamentally as Tibi does. It has to be emphasized that shari‘a cannot be 
reduced solely to the stoning of women or death penalties for those who convert from 
Islam. This is the prevailing image, Westerners have of shari‘a. But shari‘a in many 
ways defines core elements of Islam that a believing Muslim, whether secular or 
Islamist, cannot reject.78  
Rohe states that the ―shari‘a is far from being a legal textbook. In fact, it is a 
highly complex system of rules for deriving and applying Islamic norms in a particular 
context in time and space.‖79 It heavily relies on interpretation and conclusion. Reason 
plays an important role in this process of interpretation and conclusion, with ritual 
obligations alone exempted to the application of reason. Nevertheless, in contrast to 
shari‘a, European law is set up positivistic.80 The Bosnian Muslim Ernes Karic 
interprets the shari‘a as a set of rules with moral goals and a state, which provides a 
sufficient social structure and aims for social and economic justice or promotes human 
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rights, as Islamic.81 Thus, the future concept of Euro-Islam has to take the different 
notions of shari‘a into account. However, its role has to be restricted to a secondary role. 
Nevertheless, with his definition of Euro-Islam, Tibi is very much in line with 
the definition of other scholars who have picked up his ideas. Eric Brown, for example, 
hopes that European Muslims will develop a solution to radicalism, one that combines 
religious fidelity with an allegiance to the principles, institutions, and sovereignty of 
liberal democratic governments.82 Ian Buruma argues that the only chance for a peaceful 
future is for European Islam to accommodate itself to liberal democracy.83 Moreover, 
Aydin, Halm, and Sen support Tibi‘s thesis that the development of Euro-Islam is a 
process and emphasize the importance of the five pillars of Euro-Islam as defined by 
Tibi.84 
Elham Manea is another representative of this school of thought. Although she 
does not use the term ―Euro-Islam,‖ her notion of the future of Islam in Europe is similar 
Bassam Tibi‘s. As far as integration is concerned, she demands that violations of human 
rights be clearly announced and sees integration as the responsibility of the integrating 
society as well as the integrated group. In her understanding, Islam, or religion, is not 
the essential obstacle to integration but it can become a problem if immigrants insist on 
the application of shari‘a law or if religion is used to keep immigrants apart from the 
host society. Finally, she views equal opportunities for immigrants, fairness, openness, 
and rhetorical clarity, as further prerequisites for successful integration.85 She argues 
correctly that no religion has been receptive to new ideas and values from the very 
beginning. For example, no religion initially treated men and women as equal; this 
openness came over time and was a result of struggle. A ―humanist Islam,‖ as she calls 
it, has to reflect upon the historical and social context, traditions, and broader 
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Weltanschauung of the people.86 Her concept of a humanist Islam consists of four 
elements: a humanist identity, rational religion based on the freedom to choose, open 
mindness, and gender equality.87 
In summary, Tibi‘s concept of Euro-Islam is far from being Islamist. Elements of 
Euro-Islam as characteristics for the school of thought that has evolved around him are: 
- Clear commitment to democracy and human rights in a Western understanding 
- Secularism 
- Restriction to the relevance of shari‘a to rituals of religious service 
- Tolerance towards other religions 
- Religion as a matter of free choice 
- Recognition of pluralism and a rejection of assimilation and multiculturalism 
- Identity based upon common values rather than ethnicity and nationality 
- Reduction of foreign influence by Muslim countries 
- Initiation of a Muslim discourse on the role of Islam in Europe  
- Equal opportunities for Muslims and non-Muslims 
- Gender equality 
E.  TARIQ RAMADAN’S DEFINITION OF EURO-ISLAM 
While Bassam Tibi is well known, especially in Germany, Tariq Ramadan has 
emerged as one of the most listened to and respected figures among young Muslims in 
French- and English-speaking Europe. Among Western scholars, some of Ramadan‘s 
positions and statements are highly controversial. The number of publications by Tariq 
Ramadan almost equals the number about him, which are mainly critical. Eric Brown, 
for example, calls Ramadan a ―ubiquitous Swiss Islamist intellectual and political 
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activist.‖88 He argues that Ramadan embodies the internal contradictions within 
mainstream Islamism today. For Ralph Ghadban, Ramadan‘s Euro-Islam is a step 
towards the Islamization of Europe.89 He argues that Ramadan‘s understanding of 
integration is to integrate Europeans into a global umma, and not to integrate Muslims 
into European society. Ghadban bases his assessment on several contradictory and 
ambiguous statements by Ramadan.90 Caroline Fourest concludes in her book ―Brother 
Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan,‖ that Ramadan is not a person who seeks a 
real modernization of Islam.91 Bassam Tibi, finally, considers Ramadan a ―rival within 
Islam in Europe.‖92  
Others assert that the reluctance to engage with Ramadan‘s ideas, independent of 
his intention, is just ―a lack of ideas on how to deal with migration and integration.‖93 
Sarah Wildman argues that Ramadan offers ―Muslims a path of integration‖ and ―a way 
to feel at home in Western democracies that allows for the full expression of Islam.‖94 
To quote another well known-scholar, Oliver Roy points out that Ramadan has been 
excessively demonized. In his opinion, he is not the ―evil guy‖ many think.95 But what 
is Ramadan‘s position on the preconditions of Euro-Islam, defined above, and why has 
he been so heavily criticized? 
Tariq Ramadan bases his approach to Euro-Islam on a detailed interpretation of 
the Qur‘an and sunna within the context of Western European societies. In his book 
―Western Muslims and the Future of Islam‖ Ramadan explains his understanding of 
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Euro-Islam, although he does not use this terminus technicus.96 Despite the obvious 
differences within the Muslim world, Ramadan talks about ―the universe of Islam‖ 
which is defined by ―the oneness of the points of reference and the diversity of their 
lived manifestations.‖ For him, there is one Islam.97 The road to that oneness is a 
―struggle, a jihad that goes without saying, but for principles, not against people, and if 
the people around one, willingly or unwillingly, forget the principles, the struggle 
consists in reminding them of those principles and making them apply them.‖98 This 
wording can be interpreted in different ways. What remains clear is that Ramadan sees 
the need to remind Muslims in Europe of their faith, which is not a bad thing per se. 
Ramadan calls upon his fellow Muslims to stop understanding themselves as a 
minority.99 From his writings three guiding principles for Muslims in Europe can be 
derived: (1) the Islamic sources allow Muslims to live in the West; (2) Muslims are 
under the authority of an agreement whose terms must be respected as long as the terms 
do not force Muslims to act against their conscience; and (3) if a clear conflict of terms 
of reference occurs, a specific study should be carried out by Muslim jurists to formulate 
a legal opinion (fatwa).100 Here, Ramadan points out that Europe, in general, is a benign 
environment for Muslims. Moreover, he asks fellow Muslims to respect the rules of the 
societies they live in. Where Muslims should see a conflict of Islamic obligations and 
the rules of society, new ways should be found. This falls within the definition of Euro-
Islam as stated above. The only question is how Ramadan defines the new ways. 
Ramadan tries to base the legitimacy of reform on the basis of Islamic writings 
interpreted in the contemporary context of Muslims living in a non-Muslim 
environment.101 For him maslaha, ijtihad and fatwas are the basic tools to link the 
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universal principles of Islam to social realities that change over time.102 Ramadan 
considers all aspects of society, including religion, science, philosophy and ethics, 
education, economics and ecology.103 He even seeks to find new ways derived from 
Islamic writings to approach medicine, contraception, abortion, euthanasia, organ 
transplantation, AIDS, arts, entertainment and the media.104 He calls to end to 
discrimination against women at work and at home and asks women to become more 
actively involved in changing their role in society.105 His call for a moratorium on 
stoning and physical penalties in 2005 led to harsh criticism in the Arab world. He also 
looks for intellectual, political, and financial independence from Muslim countries,106 
which would very much favor the development of a new, independent form of Euro-
Islam.  
Also Ramadan‘s statements on the role of shari‘a give no evidence of radical 
intentions. Ramadan does not reject shari‘a in total, like Tibi does, but is one of many 
Muslim scholars who argue that shari‘a provides guidance on all aspects of human 
existence. He acknowledges that shari‘a raises serious concerns in the Western world.107 
Nevertheless, for him, ―shari‘a is not only the expression of the universal principles of 
Islam but the framework and the thinking that makes for their actualization in human 
history.‖108 He clearly refers to the different meanings of shari‘a and points out that 
shari‘a is ―the work of human intellect.‖109 Therefore, it is not written in stone, and 
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Muslims are required to reflect on what is written. In contrast to Tibi‘s radical rejection 
of shari‘a, Ramadan‘s interpretation is more in line with other scholars, as described 
above. 
The question arises why so many scholars question Ramadan‘s intentions. In his 
analysis, Ramadan repeatedly refers to al Qaradawi and the European Council for 
Fatwas and Research (ECFR), which indicates a possible connection to the Muslim 
Brotherhood.110 This might not be surprising taking into account that Tariq Ramadan is 
the grandson of Hassan al Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, and may 
indicate that Ramadan‘s understanding of Euro-Islam is more Islamist than it appears at 
first glance. 
When he states that the true universality of Islam consists in the ―principle of 
integrating the good, from wherever it may come, which has made it possible for 
Muslims to settle in, and make it their own‖111, it seems Ramadan actually reverses the 
concept of integration and makes integration of a minority fully dependent on putting 
their priorities first. This looks like an understanding of integration as a process wherein 
only what suites one‘s own purpose is acceptable. Ramadan‘s subsequent definition of a 
two-step approach adds even more doubts to his understanding of integration. First, he 
argues that we must distinguish which dimensions of Western life are already 
―Islamically based‖ and can be ―truly‖ called their (Muslims) own. In the second stage, a 
―systematic work of selection‖ has to be undergone in order to ―delineate from within 
the West the limits of the public good and to identify the margins available for maneuver 
between the situations in which we are free to act in accordance with our conscience and 
the more rare situations where we (the Muslims) must find possible legal adaptation 
through ijtihad and fatwa.‖112 These statements underline Gadbahn‘s analysis that 
Ramadan‘s understanding of integration would seem to be the integration of Europeans 
into a global umma, and not the integration of Muslims into European society. Although 
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this understanding of integration does not totally contradict the meaning of integration in 
the framework of the ethnic minority model, it puts a question mark behind Ramadan‘s 
understanding.  
While these positions alone do not meet our definition of Islamism, Ramadan‘s 
positions in the field of politics and economics make it clear that Ramadan follows a 
political and, therefore, Islamist agenda. If we look only at Ramadan‘s opinion of 
democracy, the differences in Ramadan‘s and Tibi‘s Euro-Islam become even clearer. 
Ramadan refers to the differences in the democratic models of Europe and the U.S. and 
argues that each society (including a Muslim one) should be free to find a model of 
democracy that is most appropriate to its history, culture, and collective psychology.113 
Generally, this is a very reasonable proposition. If Ramadan applies it to the definition 
of democracy in Muslim countries—for example in the Middle East—Ramadan is 
absolutely right. If he seeks to propagate a specific Islamic understanding of democracy 
applicable to Muslims living in Europe, it seems his commitment to the model of 
European democracy is questionable. His argument that a Muslim society should be free 
to find its own model of democracy seems to neglect the fact that European society is 
not Muslim. His charge that modern democracies fail to respect their own values and 
that reform of these societies is necessary 114 cannot be fully denied. If he uses this 
observation to call for a change in Western democracy, however, he puts himself in a 
confrontational position. On the other side, Europeans should not ignore Ramadan‘s 
propositions. A dialogue between Muslims and Europeans could also engage in 
discussions about values in a broader sense. 
But Ramadan‘s ideas of economic changes sound ambivalent, too. He condemns 
neo-liberal economics as a system that has brought injustice, death, and destruction to 
the people.115 Moreover, politics and religion, in his opinion, cannot be totally  
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separated. The question is to know what the relationship and interdependence between 
religion and politics should be. However, he points out that, even in Islam, there is a 
difference between politics and religion.116 
Ramadan‘s call to establish a broad national and international movement to 
bundle all forces for a critical resistance, the proposal to develop alternative sources of 
media, and to mobilize all available resources for a ―campaign‖ in the name of higher 
values are further examples of his ambivalent position.117 With statements like ―we 
cannot extol democracy for ourselves and silently allow our governments to deal with 
the most sinister dictators. We cannot want peace and denounce violence and at the 
same time stand passive before the most fearful and deadly terror of an economic order 
that is responsible for the deaths of forty thousand people every day,‖118 he, on one side, 
correctly assesses the failures of the West. On the other side, he draws conclusions that 
offend many in the West. 
In summary, we can conclude that Ramadan‘s approach is not Islamic in 
accordance with the definition of this term in the framework of this thesis. It has Islamist 
elements but also calls upon the reformation and renewal of Islam in a specific European 
context. Although his call for change by Muslims in Europe and more independence 
from the Muslim world are in line with Tibi‘s definition of Euro-Islam, a look at the 
characteristic elements of Tibi‘s Euro-Islam, as defined above, shows that Ramadan has 
clearly chosen a different path than what his position is, finally, remains unclear. 
Nevertheless, Ramadan‘s call for increasing the importance of Muslim 
organizations in Europe is supported by many other scholars. Ayatollah 
Ghaemmaghami, for example, argues that it is necessary for Muslims in Europe to 
organize to enable Muslims to communicate their concerns and interests to European 
governments. European lawmakers would have the benefit of knowing whom to address 
and could focus their attention on a limited number of representative organizations 
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rather than deal with an anonymous entity.119 Thus, the establishment of a cooperative 
landscape of Muslim organizations is a component that has to be added to the 
characteristics and prerequisites for a successful Euro-Islam. 
F.  CONCLUSION 
This excursus into the current discourse on the concept of Euro-Islam clearly 
shows that this concept is still under development and its outcome unclear. The school 
of thought that has evolved around Bassam Tibi seems to be more promising and less 
threatening to secular societies, at least from the European perspective. For Muslims, by 
contrast, some elements of Tibi‘s concept of Euro-Islam might be too far reaching. 
Tariq Ramadan‘s concept describes a form of Euro-Islam that might be more 
acceptable to Muslims but rejected by most Europeans. Nevertheless, for a Euro-Islam 
to be acceptable by both groups, Ramadan‘s proposals should perhaps not be rejected by 
Europeans out of hand. He seeks for a reform of Islam, too. If Euro-Islam is to really 
stipulate a dialogue and discourse over values, Ramadan‘s ideas cannot just be put aside. 
To ignore him would endanger the credibility of the process of developing a widely 
accepted form of Euro-Islam. More important, his propositions have to be challenged 
instead of ignoring them. 
If Euro-Islam seeks to build a bridge between Muslims in Europe and their host 
societies, the following elements have to be viewed as essential prerequisites for 
successful development of Euro-Islam:  
- Clear commitment to democracy and human rights in a Western understanding 
- Secularism 
- Restriction to the relevance of the shari‘a to rituals of religious service 
- Tolerance towards other religions 
- Religion as a matter of free choice 
- Recognition of pluralism and a rejection of assimilation and multiculturalism 
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- Identity based upon common values rather than ethnicity and nationality 
- Reduction of foreign influence by Muslim countries 
- Initiation of a Muslim discourse on the role of Islam in Europe, facilitated by 
Muslim organizations 
- Equal opportunities for Muslims and non-Muslims 
- Gender equality 
How far current Muslim communities and organizations can go in supporting a 
peaceful coexistence characterized by respect and tolerance and in making it become a 
reality is the subject of the following analysis.  
 37 
III. THE MUSLIM POPULATION IN GERMANY, GREAT 
BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS 
Euro-Islam seeks to build a bridge between Muslims in Europe and the societies 
they live in. The outcome of this process will be determined by a variety of factors, as 
described in Chapter I, but centers around the key role of identity, as laid out in Chapter 
II. To analyze the potential success of Euro-Islam, one has to look at both Muslims and 
their host societies. The factors that will be examined in analyzing Muslim communities 
and interactions in Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands can be grouped into 
three spheres:120  
- The ―personal trajectory‖ of individual Muslims, which is described by their 
individual experiences and aspirations. By investigating where Muslims come from, 
what their national and religious roots are, and what their situation looks like today, this 
thesis seeks to address the sphere of personal trajectories. 
- The ―domestic context‖ in which Muslims live, which influences their mindset 
and opportunities for participation. The domestic context includes the options for role 
definition and participation that society offers Muslims and is mainly defined by the 
integration and immigration policies of the state and its relationship with the church. 
Opportunities for Muslims to preserve core cultural and religious values as elements of 
their identity—for example through education—are of high importance. 
- The ―social-class dimension,‖ which includes social mobility, school 
performance, political awareness, and participation in society. This will be subject to 
analysis by looking at how Muslim communities develop demographically and what 
their social status looks like. Of course, this dimension is closely linked to the personal 
trajectories of individual Muslims and will, therefore, be analyzed in concert. 
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Finally, ―ideas, impressions, and encounters from the past have considerable 
impact on apprehension and understanding in the present.‖121 Thus, an analysis of the 
Muslim presence in the countries studied has to start in the past.  
A high degree of diversity among Muslims is evident in the three countries, 
stemming from differences in ethnicity, nationality, and ideology. Initially, the Muslim 
presence in Great Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands was assumed to be temporary. 
The policies that were applied to accommodate these ―guests,‖ however, differed. While 
Britain and the Netherlands accommodated their guest workers and provided 
opportunities to maintain their cultural and religious identity, the German approach was 
to leave them on their own. So long as all viewed the presence of Muslim guest workers 
as temporary, the role of identity and the demand for integration were not an issue. With 
the presence of Muslims becoming permanent, and demographic development making 
this presence more visible, different perceptions and ideas about the Muslim presence 
collided. With Germany being the extreme case, all three countries were unprepared to 
accommodate their new citizens. Today, Muslim communities are mainly characterized 
by poor education, higher unemployment and the sense of being excluded and 
discriminated against. Over the last decade, these governments have increased their 
dialogue with Muslim communities, but their policies have become more assimilative 
than integrative. 
As a consequence, young Muslims often appeal to religion to define an identity 
that differentiates them from the rest of society—a society they perceive as 
discriminatory. Ethnicity and nationality also play a role in this formation of identity. 
The preconditions for promoting Euro-Islam are, therefore, rather unfavorable, as 
identity is based less on values that Muslims and others may share, but on ethnicity, 
nationality (or ancestral nationality), and religion; and the high diversity among Muslims 
makes mutual understanding even more complicated. Moreover, imams in local 
mosques still come from abroad and espouse specific foreign national ideologies, or 
foreign Islamist movements. The specific needs of Muslims living in the context of 
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secular European societies are often not understood by these imams. All this is not 
promising for the future of Euro-Islam. What is surprising, however, is that, despite 
different approaches to accommodating their Muslim communities over a long time, the 
situations these communities and their residential countries find themselves in are 
almost identical.  
A. GERMANY 
With more than four million Muslims living in Germany, this group is one of the 
largest in Western Europe. The identity of these Muslims has been shaped by changes in 
the immigration policies of the German state and the space and opportunities that 
German legislation now provides for preserving Muslim religion and culture as core 
elements of their identity. Demographic developments have made Islam more and more 
visible to the public, and Muslims feel more confident in making their religion visible. 
However, the exclusion and discrimination perceived especially by young Muslims 
hinders the development of an identity based on shared values. For disaffected Muslims, 
Islam provides a distinct identity and a feeling of belonging. Foreign governments, 
especially Turkey, influence their expatriates, emphasizing the impression that many 
Muslims prefer an identity of being different. However, initiatives like the German 
Islam Conference (Deutsche Islam Konferenz, DIK) and progress in fields such as 
religious education in public schools and Islamic courses for future imans in German 
universities signal a change in the state‘s attitude and gives hope for Euro-Islam. 
1. Muslims in Germany: Where Do They Come from and How Does 
Their Life Look Today? 
Today approximately 15.3 million migrants live in Germany, of whom 7.3 
million came as guest workers or asylum seekers. The rest came as re-settlers, mainly 
from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.122 
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Out of the approximately 7.3 million guest workers and asylum seekers, 4.3 
million are Muslims, almost half of whom have German citizenship.123 The great 
majority comes from Turkey, but as Figure 3 shows, the Muslim community is far from 
homogenous. Here it is important to note that the German Turks are equally divided into 
ethnic Turks and Kurds. Most of the Muslims living in Germany are Sunni (74%), 7% 
are Schi‘a, and 13% Alevi,124 who play a distinct role among Muslims in Germany. 
Alevi emphasize their difference from other Turkish immigrants and consider 
themselves more modern and open-minded.125 
 
Figure 3.   Origin of Muslims in Germany126 
What are the consequences of this ethnic and religious distribution for the 
development of a widely accepted Euro-Islam? The high degree of national, ethnic, 
cultural, and religious heterogeneity, reinforced by differences in language, do not make 
the development of Euro-Islam impossible, but the effort to overcome all these 
differences will be significantly higher than with a more homogenous group. The 
potential higher influence of Turkish immigrants is, to a certain extent, limited, due to 
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the subdivisions mentioned above. What makes the role of Muslims of Turkish 
background important is the strong influence of the Turkish government. Appearances 
by the Turkish president Erdogan in front of thousands of Turks in German sports arenas 
undermine a Euro-Islam that is based on a context-specific identity and weaken the 
chances of successful integration.127 Thus, the starting point for development of Euro-
Islam with regard to Germany draws a mixed picture. 
Today, 98% of Muslims in Germany live in Western Germany. The largest 
communities can be found in the major German cities, especially Berlin, Hamburg, 
Cologne, and Frankfurt. In contrast to many other European countries, a sizeable 
Muslim community lives in rural areas.128 
Within the cities, however, Muslims are not broadly intermingled with the 
German population. More often, they live in urban districts where they sometimes have 
become the majority. Within these districts, for example, in Berlin Neukölln and 
Kreuzberg, religious, cultural, economic, and often political networks have evolved. 
These districts are often characterized by high levels of unemployment and poverty. The 
unemployment rate for all legally resident immigrants (16.9%) in February 2009 was 
more than double that of German citizens (7.8%) with Turks suffering the most.129  
The distribution of Muslims among age groups is of special important because, 
as will be shown later, the identity of older Muslims in Germany differs significantly 
from that of the younger generation. The average Muslim living in Germany is 30 years 
old, and the group of children and adolescents not older than 25 is disproportionally 
large.130 This latter group is still in an initial phase of defining their identity. Therefore, 
they are much more responsive to their environment. These young men and women 
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perform significantly worse in school and in the job market than other youth groups.131 
Their poor education directly influences their chances of employment and participating 
in society in general. If these problems are not addressed, there is a danger that the 
feeling of exclusion and discrimination can become permanent. 
But, it would be stereotyping to point only to the limitations of Muslim social 
mobility. There is also a significant group that actively contributes to the German 
economy and society. Politicians, like Cem Özdemir—the chairman of the German 
Green Party—or Aygül Özkan—the first Muslim minister of a federal state—are among 
prominent examples. Several members of the German federal parliament (Bundestag) 
and state parliaments (Landtage) are Muslim, and involvement in town councils and 
other regional or communal political institutions is even higher. 
For the development of Euro-Islam, the socio-demographic situation of Muslims 
in Germany marks another factor with mixed influence. On one side, the fact that youth 
make up a significant portion of the Muslim population offers opportunity to invest in 
the future. The identity of these young Muslims plays a very important role and will be 
analyzed later. On the other side, the concentration of Muslims in specific districts with 
closed communities is an obstacle. This concentration can hamper any discussion with 
non-Muslims over the role of Islam. Moreover, the poor performance of young Muslims 
in school and on the labor market limits their opportunities for active participation in 
society. 
2. Muslims in Germany and Their Relationship With the State 
The relationship between religious groups and the state is one of the most 
influential factors in the integration of these groups into broader society, especially 
when they are in the minority. The relationship between the state and religion, as defined 
by Koningsveld, can be threefold: a complete fusion of state and religion; a total 
separation of the two parties; or a union, which can mean official recognition by the 
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state, an official state religion, or partial recognition.132 In Germany, the relationship 
between religion and state is of the first form: separation. The most important regulation 
with regard to religious affairs is Article 4 of the German constitution, which grants 
freedom of belief and obliges the state to ensure this right.133  
However, certain privileges may only be enjoyed if religious communities meet 
certain criteria. Those that meet these criteria get the status of an ―officially recognized 
religious corporation‖ (Körperschaft des Öffentlichen Rechts, KÖR). KÖRs are allowed 
to conduct religious education in public schools134 and are entitled to governmental 
subsidies and representation in the media or governmental institutions like the military. 
Moreover, they enjoy a tax-benefits scheme whereby the state collects and distributes a 
special tax (Kirchensteuer). To become a KÖR, a religious community needs to meet 
membership numbers and a program that gives assurance of its permanence.135 
Additionally, organizational structure is required and the goals and objectives of the 
organization have to be in full compliance with German basic law. So far, only Christian 
churches and Judaism have gained the legal status of such a recognized faith.136 
Islam, as a whole, has so far been denied the status of KÖR. Thus, Muslim 
organizations mainly rely on public registration as a voluntary association 
(eingetragener Verein, e.V.) which is more easy to achieve but does not provide the 
benefits and prestige of a KÖR.137 The denial of KÖR status is a major point of 
contention for Muslims in Germany, and rightly so. The specific nature of Islam as a 
religion without central authority and, therefore, lacking a hierarchical structure like that 
of Christian churches cannot be a permanent barrier to access to the state-sponsored 
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benefits other religions enjoy. If Euro-Islam is to increase integration, legal barriers that 
discriminate against certain religions based on organization have to be removed. 
a. Phases of Immigration and German Immigration Policies 
The immigration of Muslims to Germany was the consequence of a labor 
shortage in Germany in the 1960s and the subsequent reunification of families of guest 
workers on German soil. These guest workers were, on average, poorly educated, from 
rural areas, and recruited for semi- or unskilled jobs in the heavy industry and 
construction sectors. This influx of migrants was initially considered temporary. Based 
on agreements between the Turkish and German governments in 1961, Turkish 
immigrants were sought for a period of two years. Bilateral agreements with Morocco 
(1963) and Tunisia (1965) followed. The majority of Germans expected their guest 
workers to assimilate, but both assumptions—the temporary nature of the visit and their 
assimilation—turned out wrong.138 The Swiss writer Max Frisch, asked about the issue 
of immigrants in Western Europe, said, ―We were looking for workers, and we got 
people.‖139 This quote perfectly demonstrates the erroneous predictions not only of 
Germans, but also of many other western Europeans in the 1960s and explains why, in 
the beginning, Germany was not prepared to integrate its guest workers. More 
important, Germans sought to leave them separate from German society. Thus, the 
Germans followed the guest-worker model, described above.  
The attitude of Germans towards their guest workers changed over time. 
While it sometimes turned out in favor of the Muslims in Germany, often it had the 
opposite effect. Labor unions, for example, initially resisted the incorporation of guest 
workers. With increasing numbers and common interests, however, migrants were 
welcomed. As Lubeck argues, the labor interests brought about the first form of migrant 
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political participation in Germany.140 A shift in a less positive direction occurred in 
1973, with the oil crisis and the subsequent economic crisis, when guest workers were 
seen as a threat to jobs and a burden to the welfare state.141 Thus, the influx of guest 
workers came to an end, but their numbers were replaced by family members, especially 
wives and children, who sought to join their husbands and fathers. In 1983, the German 
government tried to reverse the development and even promoted the return of guest 
workers to their home countries by granting a return premium.142 
Consequently, Germany handled the issue of very restrictive citizenship. 
Until 1999, Article 116 of the German constitution defined citizens as persons who hold 
German citizenship, a spouse or descendant of persons who were settled in the German 
Reich, or a refugee with German ethnicity.143 Thus, citizenship was exclusively granted 
based upon ethnicity or descent from German blood relatives. After some incremental 
changes, the definition of citizenship changed fundamentally in 2000. German 
citizenship can now also be gained by birth in Germany, if at least one parent has been 
resident in Germany for a minimum of eight years with an unlimited residence 
permit.144 These changes indicate that Germany is adjusting to its role as a country 
characterized by immigration. 
Today, public opinion with regard to Muslims in Germany is divided into 
two main parties, one of them anti-Islamic and the other is rather ―philo-Islamic,‖ as 
Bassam Tibi calls it.145 This division is a dispute between those who reject foreign 
influence on German culture and propogate ―Islamophobia,‖ on the one side, and 
multiculturalists on the other side. Stereotypes and the historical legacy of Islamic-
Europeans conflicts have led a large group of Europeans, including Germans, to 
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continue to view Islam as a threat and a problem.146 These stereotypes became stronger 
after the Rushdie affair, 9/11, and the war in Afghanistan. The fact that foreigners are 
overrepresented among receivers of state welfare, which is repeatedly brought up in the 
German media, adds to resentment against foreigners, especially Muslims.147 
As a result of increasing Islamophobia, the growing number of 
immigrants staying permanently in Germany, and a subsequent discussion over the so-
called Leitkultur, the German government made additional amendments to citizenship 
legislation in 2007. Language tests and, as of 2008, tests on the candidates‘ knowledge 
of the cultural, political, and historical background of Germany were implemented. 
Applicants who pass the test gain a right to citizenship after six or seven years, 
depending on their achievements in Germany. The application of the test, however, 
varies in the different federal states.148  
Germany is searching for its own way to successfully deal with 
immigration and integration. In 2006 the German government launched an initiative, the 
DIK that included the five biggest Muslim organizations in Germany, individual Muslim 
scholars, and the German Ministry of the Interior as well as representatives from the 
state and local level. This conference seeks to coordinate the dialogue of Muslims with 
the government and to achieve increased participation of Muslims as citizens in 
Germany. Among the fifteen Muslim representatives, a significant number is composed 
of secular scholars of Islam, which led to complaints by the Muslim organizations 
involved over a perceived minority position or underrepresentation compared to the 
secular individual Muslims.149 Moreover, everybody who was not invited to the 
conference challenged its composition. This dispute over the composition of the DIK 
has finally led to a withdrawal of one of the largest Muslim organizations, which will be 
explained in Chapter IV. 
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In summary, the German state provides limited space and opportunities 
for Muslims to preserve their cultural and religious identity as an element of public life. 
It is considered appropriate for Muslims to push these aspects into private or smaller 
local entities outside the wider scope of society. For the prospect of Euro-Islam, this is a 
significant shortfall, as Muslims will feel discriminated against and excluded, with the 
consequences to their development. Besides these general integration and immigration 
policies, three additional aspects of Muslim life are of special interest: the opportunities 
for religious education, the role of religious leaders, and the role of the media.  
b. Education 
According to Article 7 of the German constitution, religious education is 
a compulsory subject in public schools, to be taught in cooperation between the state and 
religious communities. The religious community, however, has to be a recognized faith 
(KÖR). Thus, religious education comparable to that offered for Christian children has 
been a longstanding aim of Muslim organizations, and the legal status of Islam 
communities as KÖR has been a major issue.  
Due to the fact that education is the responsibility of the federal states, 
the regulation and the status of Islamic classes varies throughout Germany. Discussions 
and ideas around such courses reach back to the 1970s.150 North Rhine–Westphalia 
started a project in 1986 in which Islam was the subject of a curriculum for Turkish 
students in their mother language.151 Some other states followed North Rhine–
Westphalia, and currently Islamic classes are taught in nine states in different forms. 
None of these programs, however, has achieved the status defined by Article 7. There 
are just a few exceptions. The constitution of Berlin and Bremen do not account for 
religious education in accordance with Article 7. The exception is defined in Article 141 
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of the constitution.152 Moreover, since 2008, the Alevi communities in North Rhine–
Westphalia, Hesse, and Bavaria have been granted the right to conduct religious 
education in compliance with Article 7 of the constitution.153 In 2009, some hundred 
communal Shi‘a organizations founded an umbrella organization, the Dachverband 
Islamische Gemeinschaft der schiitischen Gemeinden Deutschlands, with the self-
perception as a religious community that meets the requirements of a recognized faith. 
This organization may soon be granted the privilege of providing religious education in 
the schools. As Miachel Kiefer argues, the desire to conduct classes on Islam in German 
schools might lead to a kind of building of confessions.154 In 2009, the DIK generally 
agreed to implement Islamic classes in the German language, and the conference of 
ministers for education was tasked to develop such. This, however, is still missing.155 
Despite the issue of the legal status of KÖR, progress has been achieved 
in the field of religious education. This is good news for the promotion of Euro-Islam. If 
religious education is carried out away from the privacy and the restricted zones of 
madrassahs and mosques, the importance of religion for Muslims becomes more visible 
and can support the necessary discourse over its role in society. Moreover, the 
perception of discrimination can be significantly reduced. But who are the ones 
responsible for the religious education of Muslims outside public schools? 
c. The Role of Imams 
Approximately 2,500 imams are found in the mosques and Muslim 
communities in Germany. Their social and educational background differs significantly. 
While graduates from universities in Turkey and the Middle East are at the upper end of 
the scale, others have been trained in courses run by Muslim organizations in Germany 
or are even autodidacts. Some have the status of a state employee, like those employed 
by the Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institution of Religion (Diyanet Isleri Türk Islam 
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e.V., DITIB), an organization of Turkish Muslims that is funded by the Turkish 
government. Others stay only temporarily as tourists who have to leave after three 
months. An increasing number, however, was born in Germany, has German citizenship, 
and leaves Germany to study in Turkey or the Middle East.156 
Significant developments in imam education are underway in Germany. 
Based on recommendations of the parliamentary research service, the German 
government decided in February 2011 to sponsor the implementation of Islamic courses 
at five German universities, assigning several million Euros to fund these programs. The 
first courses are supposed to start in autumn 2011. What the German government seeks 
is improved integration. The new form of imam they are looking for should fulfill 
multiple responsibilities—not only the traditional obligations of prayers, but also as 
teachers, pastors, commissioners for extremism, partners in dialogue with non-Muslims, 
special representatives for integration, advisors, etc.157 The decision to launch these 
programs, however, immediately raised questions in the German public over its legality. 
The objective of these courses, as indicated by the German minister for education 
Schavan, is to avoid radical Islamists‘ influence on the education of imams in Germany. 
But it is questioned whether state sponsorship does not violate the legal obligation of 
neutrality in questions of religion. Moreover, it is argued, this decision would open the 
door for other religions like Hinduism and Buddhism to get state funding, too.158 
But critique did not come from the German public only. Muslim 
organizations are skeptical about the mingling of religious responsibilities and 
integration. Nevertheless, the fact that these programs have been established and are 
funded by the government, are a significant achievement towards the status of KÖR. 
However, some Muslim organizations want more. They want to get a vote on the 
matriculation of candidates and the syllabus.159 
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Moreover, the implementation of these programs raises other, even more 
substantial questions. Who will be the instructing professors and what is their authority 
and expertise? Who will be their future employers after graduation? Do Muslims adhere 
to their authority and accept them? These are just a few questions that require answers. 
For the future of Euro-Islam, the role of imams in Germany is a mixed 
picture. The attempts to educate imams in Germany can accelerate the development of 
Euro-Islam if these new imams really form a new generation who seek to interpret Islam 
in their specific context. This, to a large extent, will be dependent on the syllabus of the 
responsible universities, as well as their academic staff. The fact that more and more 
imams in Germany have been born in the country is another supportive factor. However, 
the strong influence of imams coming from abroad, without knowledge of German 
language and society, could limit the chances of Euro-Islam, especially if these imams 
are sponsored by foreign governments or organizations. 
d. The Influence of the Media 
Media in Western societies are, in general, highly influential and 
powerful. The coverage of Islam by the German media focuses on issues of violence 
rather than broad coverage. Kai Hafez points out that almost every second Islam-related 
article or commentary mentions terrorism, violence in the family, or violence against 
members of other religions.160 This coverage is counterproductive to achieving further 
integration of Islam as an accepted religion. But how do Muslims themselves seek to 
utilize the media for their purposes?  
Both public TV channels and radio stations, ZDF and ARD, broadcast 
shows especially for Muslims, as well as for a broader audience on issues of Islam and 
Muslim life in Germany. These shows are run by Muslims and much more balanced 
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than the wider media landscape.161 Especially the ZDF has launched an intensive 
campaign to provide unbiased information on Muslims and Islam in Germany. 
But there is also a variety of real Muslim media. Especially Turkish 
newspapers, radio stations, and satellite TV target a Turkish audience in Germany. The 
biggest Turkish newspapers, Milliyet, Sabah, Zamam, Türkiye and Hürriyet have their 
own offices and printing facilities in Germany. While articles on politics and the 
economy are coming from Turkey, some pages are dedicated to news by journalists in 
Germany. These newspapers are close to the Turkish party AKP162 (Sabah), the Gülen 
movement (Zamam), or owned by the conservative media holding Ihlas. The messages 
of these Turkish media are sometimes ambivalent, but they have more a nationalist and 
much less an Islamist touch. Kai Hafez even argues that their influence is less significant 
than thought. Often Turkish media are chosen for cultural and language reasons, rather 
than to emphasize the separation and development of a parallel society.163 
In summary, the relationship of Muslims with the German state is 
ambivalent as to the potential to develop a European form of Islam, as the Muslim 
community in Germany is diverse. It took a long time for Germany to accept the 
permanent presence of Muslims. The fact that Islam still suffers significant legislative 
disadvantages compared to Christian churches, the ambivalent role of the German 
media, and the less-than benign attitude of large parts of the German public, may over 
time, become an obstacle to the development of Euro-Islam. On the other side, the 
establishment of a forum for dialogue and engagement in the education of imams are 
positive signs. As far as Muslims themselves are concerned, the influence of foreign 
media and imams could distract them from the need to shape the future of Islam in 
Germany by German Muslims themselves. 
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3. The Identity of Muslims in Germany 
In an opinion poll in 2006, 66% of Muslim German citizens considered 
themselves primarily Muslims rather than German citizens.164 Other polls show another 
interesting development. According to a survey of the Islamic Archive in 2002, 82% of 
Muslims in Germany want to stay in the country.165 With the number of Muslims in 
Germany growing, Muslims have been encouraged to identify themselves more and 
more with their Islamic roots and to promote their traditions. Islam has become 
increasingly visible in the public square.166 Therefore, an identity, ostensibly based on 
religion, seems to play a major role for Muslims in Germany.  
The development or redevelopment of a Muslim identity has encouraged many 
Muslims to follow behaviors rooted in tribal tradition and an individual or group 
interpretation of the Qur‘an. Where Muslims confidently promote these traditions, they 
often encourage Germans in their biases and prejudices about Islam.167 Other evidence 
that Muslims now promote their Muslim identity with more self-confidence and, at the 
same time, provoke partial resistance from their host society is the increasing number of 
mosques, which are moving from the backyards of housing areas in Berlin or Cologne to 
more visible places. The visible expression of Muslim identity, however, is a recent 
phenomenon. It evolved over time, with significant differences among the different 
generations of Muslims in Germany. 
The countries of origin of the first Muslim immigrants in the 1960s were 
predominantly Muslim societies. First-generation immigrants usually did not make a 
psychological break with the culture of their birth and tried to transfer traditional 
                                                 
164 Pew Global Attitudes Project, Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns about 
Religious and Cultural Identity. Few Signs of Backslash from Western Europeans (Washington: Pew 
Research Center, 2006). 
165 Cherribi, In the House of War, 52. 
166 Ibid.,194. 
167 In Germany, prejudices about Islam are often related to arranged marriages and honor crimes. 
Arranged marriages make up half of the total within the Turkish community (Radu, Europe‘s Ghosts, 66). 
As far as ―honor‖ killings are concerned, forty-five murders were known between 1996 an 2004 (Radu, 
Europe‘S Ghosts, 69). 
 53 
practices to Germany.168 In a traditional Muslim society, an individual‘s identity is 
given by his parents and social environment, including tribe and kin, the local imam, or 
even the political structure of the state. Identity, therefore, is not a matter of personal 
choice, but defined by conformity to a set of externally determined social rules. The 
rules are highly localized in accordance with the traditions, customs, and practices of a 
specific place.169 After immigration, the experience of life as a minority in the context of 
political, cultural, and religious pluralism imposed a challenge to early immigrants when 
their broader environment no longer supported their identity. Muslim practice was 
forced into the privacy of the home and the local community. Religion mainly served as 
a response to the loss of past common references and established social bonds.170 The 
contact with the new environment led to a behavior of self-preservation and the 
formation of group identity.171 This conservatism and a lack of pressure from the 
German government to adapt to the new environment emphasized this development. 
Many scholars argue that an overemphasis on political correctness has encouraged 
Muslim immigrants to segregate themselves from the rest of society.172 For the first 
generation of immigrants, identity was a significant obstacle to integration. However, 
due to their initial status as temporary guest workers, that seemed not to be an issue.  
More than the older generation, the younger is struggling with the question of 
whether to adapt itself to the realities of their new homeland, return to their roots and the 
traditions of their parents, or find their own way.173 Locally born Muslims treat Islam 
more as a social or cultural tradition than as a demanding faith.174 As the cultural legacy 
associated with the country of origin diminishes, younger Muslims conceive of their 
religion less in terms of family and tradition and more in terms of individual belief. This 
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attitude often is dominated by a kind of shopping mentality: they choose which tenets of 
their religion they will recognize and which they will ignore.175 Jocelyn Cesari describes 
their relationship with Islam as a source of ethical and moral values without direct 
influence on their social and public behavior.176 For them, identity becomes a matter of 
choice. But what are the reasons that this new generation seems to form their identity on 
the basis of Islam? 
Many of the younger Muslims find themselves caught between two worlds. On 
the one hand, they often have limited knowledge of their fathers‘ home countries. 
German Turks visiting Turkey, for example, are despised as allemanci (the 
Germanizeds).177 On the other hand, they are greatly limited in their opportunities in 
Germany.178 Here, they often believe that they are victims of particular forms of 
discrimination because they are Muslims and, therefore, express their concern in terms 
of cultural or religious ―identities of origin.‖179 
Finally, family strategies often dominate individual life plans. Thus, individuals 
acquire a marginal identity and positioning in relation to both cultures of reference. 
Second-generation Turkish adolescents face a reference-group problem. Where they 
assert the validity of their own individual perspectives, they find themselves rejected by 
their minority communities and subject to pressures to conform to German culture and 
society.180 For them, Islam serves as a source of solidarity and a unifying bond, as it did 
for their parents.  
To analyze Muslim identity in Germany purely in terms of different age groups 
would be simplistic. Besides the well-known, general theological diversity and 
decentralization of Islam around the globe, in Europe, Muslims are additionally 
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ethnically splintered, as described above. The country of origin and ethnicity are 
essential factors influencing the formation of identities.181 Ethnic Turkish immigrants, 
for example, tend to maintain traditional attitudes vis-à-vis Kurds, Arabs, and Iranians. 
They avoid mixing with Muslims from other countries. This tendency, of course, is 
encouraged by language differences. Radu points out that Muslim communities in 
Europe are increasingly caught between their common characteristics (religion, social 
pathologies, and perceived discrimination) and their ethnic, sectarian, and social 
differences.182 The clashes between Turkish and Kurdish groups in Germany in the 
1990s emphasized the meaning of ethnic identity, which often seems dominant over 
religious identity. In general, the Turkish population in Germany is highly 
heterogeneous. This heterogeneity is reflected along different lines, namely ethnicity 
(Turks and Kurds), origin (rural or urban), religion (Sunni, Shi‘a, or Alevi), the degree 
of modernity as well as religiosity, and finally their status (German or Turkish 
citizenship).183  
In conclusion, the Muslim identity provides compensation for perceived 
discrimination in Germany, and Islam, in some respect, serves as ―religious 
citizenship.‖184 However, while legal citizenship in Germany nowadays might be easier 
to gain, the acceptance of Muslim immigrants by the German host society is a different 
matter. National identity in Germany, as in many other countries of Europe, still remains 
more blood- and soil based, accessible only to those ethnic groups who initially 
populated the land.185 Moreover, national identity has always been socially constructed, 
―revolving around history, symbols, heroes, and the stories that a community tells about 
itself.‖186 Unfortunately, many Europeans, including Germans, still link the crossroads 
of European history and Islamic history with the siege of Vienna and the Crusades, 
emphasizing a war-prone relation. 
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With regard to the development of Euro-Islam, the fact that the majority of 
Muslims in Germany are young and still have not found their role in society offers 
opportunities to start something new that is embraced by the youth and can improve 
their situation. This, again, highlights the importance of improving the relationship 
between Muslims and the state to overcome the deficiencies described above. While this 
gives hope, German society must be aware that young Muslims are at a crossroad. 
Whether they will choose the way into society, to a large extent, is also influenced by 
the attitudes and policies of German society and politics. It is time that Germany accept 
the presence of Islam as a fact. 
B. GREAT BRITAIN 
The ethnic, national, and religious background of the majority of Muslims living 
in Great Britain is different from that in Germany. The challenges for the promotion of 
Euro-Islam, however, are similar. Muslims in Britain face the same situation of social 
deprivation. Concentration of Muslims living in specific urban districts is even stronger 
in the United Kingdom (UK) than in Germany. Muslims share a feeling of 
discrimination and often the discrimination is real. But the British chose a different 
approach in the beginning. While Germany followed the guest-worker model, the British 
early on applied a model of multiculturalism and were eager to offer their immigrants 
space to maintain their cultural and religious individuality. Moreover, the British have 
no concept of officially recognized faiths. Despite the Church of England‘s being a state 
church, Muslim communities enjoy rights that Muslims in Germany do not enjoy, like 
Islamic schools funded by the state. The fact that the outcome, nevertheless, is similar in 
Germany and the UK raises the question whether immigration policies really matter.  
1. The Way of Muslims Into Great Britain and Their Situation Today 
According to the last official census in Great Britain, approximately 1.6 million 
Muslims lived in the country in 2001. According to a study of the Pew Research Center  
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in 2010, approximately 2.869 million Muslims live in Great Britain,187 which makes 
Islam the second largest religion in Britain.188 Today, almost one-half of these Muslims 
are British-born189 and the majority are British citizens.190 
The largest ethnic groups of Muslims living in Great Britain are Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi, Indian, and other Asian ethnicities.191 But nationality is no guarantee for 
homogeneity within these groups. While Bangladeshis are the most homogeneous ethnic 
group, Pakistani communities identify themselves much more with the specific region 
they come from, like Punjab or the Afghan border.192  
 
Figure 4.   Origin of Muslims in Great Britain193 
Due to the fact that Muslims in Britain are largely coming from South Asia, most 
of them follow Sunni strains of Islam. Two groups are of special importance amongst 
the Sunni Muslims in Great Britain, namely the Deobandi and Barelwi, both of them 
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originating from colonial India. In the early days of Muslim migration to Britain, 
Deobandis became influential. The original Deobandi ethos of protecting and preserving 
religion, which was so characteristic of Deobandi ideology in colonial India, attracted 
Muslims in Britain who sought to protect their religious identity.194While Deobandis 
show a higher ability to institutionalizing, numerical support in Britain is much stronger 
for the Barelwi ideology. It is estimated that about 50% of all British Muslims hold a 
general Barelwi worldview.195 One of the major characteristics of the Barelwi school of 
thought is a particular devotion towards the Prophet Muhammad. Thus, they were at the 
forefront of protests against Salman Rushdie‘s novel The Satanic Verses in 1988. But 
they lacked the organizational structure of the Deobandis, and therefore were not able to 
institutionally profit from the protests.196 
As in Germany, the ethnic, religious, and national background of Muslims in 
Great Britain shows the same diverse nature. The implications for the future of Euro-
Islam, in this respect, are the same. The Pakistanis‘s emphasis on specific regions within 
the country just adds another level of diversity.  
Today, the demographics of Muslims in Great Britain show a trend that is very 
similar to developments in Germany. Birth rates are significantly higher and the Muslim 
population, on average, is much younger. The average age of Muslims in Britain is 
twenty-eight, thirteen years below the national average. Compared to white children 
(25%), rates of child poverty are especially high for Pakistanis (60%) and Bangladeshis 
(72%).197 This high rate of poverty translates directly into a lack of education, with 
approximately one third of British Muslims of working age having no qualifications.198 
Thus, in 2004, Muslims in the UK had the highest male unemployment rate, at 13%, 
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compared to 4% of Christian men. The unemployment rate of Muslim women at 18% 
was about four times the rate for Christian and Jewish women.199  
Their economic inactivity is shaped by a number of determining factors, 
especially gender and age. Indian Muslims are twice as likely to be unemployed as 
Indian Hindus, and more Indian Muslims than Pakistani Muslims are likely to have full-
time jobs. Compared to men of other faiths, Muslim men are more likely to be employed 
in spheres with little career progression, such as taxi driving and restaurant work. Of 
course, to explain the employment situation of Muslims in Britain solely as a result of 
religious factors would be absolutely misleading.200 Some call the situation Muslims 
find themselves in an ―ethnic penalty.‖201 While immigrants were drawn into Britain in 
times of economic prosperity, like many minorities, they were the first ―victims‖ of 
economic crisis. Overall, however, the bad economic situation many Muslims face in 
Britain is a matter of structural deficiencies.  
 
Figure 5.   Muslim Population in British Cities.202  
One important structural factor is a concentration of Muslims in particular urban 
districts where they constitute a local majority and dominate the neighborhood.203 This 
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concentration has been caused mainly by three factors. First, Muslims have settled in 
those British towns and cities where there was a need for labor and, therefore, the best 
prospects for employment.204 Second, their concentration in particular streets and 
neighborhoods has been reinforced over time by the desire to live close to extended 
family members or community facilities such as mosques.205 Finally, reluctance of real 
estate owners to sell or rent their premises to immigrants additionally forced them, 
especially Muslims, into certain urban districts—another example of the ethnic penalty. 
However, there are also multiple examples of successful integration of Muslims 
in Britain. Just the fact that several mayors in London have been Muslims and that 
Muslims are members of parliament in the House of Commons and the House of Lords 
shows that Muslims are willing to actively participate in the social and political life in 
Great Britain. 
As stated above, the demographic development and social status of Muslims in 
Germany and Great Britain, is, on average, absolutely comparable. Although the degree 
of concentration of Muslims in certain districts of British cities is higher than that in 
Germany, implications for the development of Euro-Islam can be considered identical. 
2. Muslims in Great Britain and Their Relationship With the State 
Compared to Germany, the role of the church is different in Britain. The Church 
of England, as its name suggests, is a state church. Thus, the relationship between 
church and state has always been strong.206 On the other side, as will be shown, 
recognition of faith as a means to gain certain privileges is unknown in Britain, which 
offers Muslims more opportunities than in Germany. 
From the early significant migration of Muslims to Britain onwards, the British 
approach to integration preferred multiculturalism to assimilation, allowing immigrants 
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to maintain cultural identities and customs. However, linguistic pluralism and an 
expansion of religious schools were explicitly rejected in the beginning. It was only later 
that the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB)207 brought up the issue of Muslim schools 
and Islamic education.208  
The immigration of Muslims to Great Britain occurred in phases. The phase from 
1945 to the 1970s was the most significant, taking the scale of Muslim migration to 
Britain into account, and had the strongest implications for society. But this was not the 
beginning of Muslim settlements on the island. Unskilled Muslim laborers came to 
Britain as part of the colonial enterprise, and in the 19
th
 century a distinctive Anglo-
Muslim community had begun to emerge.209 The development of this community was 
mainly caused by the need to run the empire, which demanded teachers of Eastern 
languages and culture to educate politicians, military, scholars, and entrepreneurs.210 
After World War II, the influx of Muslims into Britain accelerated. First, 
Muslims who had served in the British military were demobilized in Britain and some 
did not return to their home countries.211 Then the economic growth and need for labor 
dragged migrants from the Muslim world to Britain. These were usually male, often 
single, and ―they suffered hardship in living and working conditions on the assumption 
that they were only transient settlers.‖212  
This stream of Muslim immigrants continued into the 1960s and was also 
enforced by several developments in the Muslim world, like increasing decolonization 
and the creation of Pakistan as an independent state in 1947, which caused significant 
numbers of refugees. Moreover, educational ambitions drew Muslim students to Great 
Britain.  
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The construct of the commonwealth and the British Nationality Act of 1948 
facilitated the pull of Muslim immigrants to Britain after World War II. Commonwealth 
citizens could vote and stand as candidates in local and national elections, and children 
born in Britain acquired citizenship by birth.213 This added to the attractiveness of 
migration to Britain. But strong domestic resistance forced the government to change 
immigration policies. The Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, which was later 
amended as the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968, passed measures to restrict the 
entry and settlement of non-white people. Subsequently, the Immigration Act of 1971 
totally changed the legal basis for immigration of Muslims from the Commonwealth to 
Britain. Before the 1971 Act came, immigrants from Commonwealth countries could 
settle in Britain under a voucher system. Afterwards they had to enter the country on the 
basis of work-permits. Immigration to Britain was subsequently limited, through 
continuously more restrictive immigration laws. Thus, already in the late 1960s and 
1970s, women and children, especially from South Asia, became the largest group of 
immigrants, and permanent family settlement began to replace temporary male 
residence. In 1964, women and children represented two-thirds of all incoming migrants 
from Pakistan.214 
With the first substantial wave of Muslims migrating to Britain coming to a halt, 
a new phase of Muslim immigration began in the 1970s, which was not so much driven 
by economic motives. This phase included persons who may have been anything from 
refugees to international traders to highly skilled professionals, and who stemmed 
mainly from Turkey and the Middle East. Their educational background was diverse, but 
often predominantly middle class and professional. Later, London as a cosmopolitan 
center also attracted members of the rich and professional classes of the Middle East.215 
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Finally, asylum-seekers from Algeria, Bosnia, Somalia, and Kurdistan came to Britain 
during the last two decades of the twentieth century.216 
With a growing number of immigrants, discrimination in Great Britain became a 
major issue, which the government thought to counter with the enactment of the Race 
Relations Act of 1976.217 This anti-discrimination legislation established the basis of 
multiculturalism. However, the protection of minorities on the basis of this legislation 
was based upon ethnicity. As members of ―ethnic‖ groups, Jews and Sikhs were offered 
protection by the law, but not Muslims, given the multiethnic and transnational nature of 
their faith.218 This has become a major point of complaint for Muslims in Britain and an 
issue that still has not been resolved.  
Over time, multiculturalism has increasingly come under critique. Especially 
after the northern British riots in the summer of 2001, involving young Muslims of 
Pakistani origin, 9/11, and the 7/7 bombings, but already starting with the Rushdie affair 
and the development of large Muslim communities as enclaves in British cities, 
multiculturalism was criticized. Critics argued that multiculturalism has helped 
segregation of Muslim communities in the UK and division within British society. 
Kenan Malik, among others, argues that ―multiculturalism as a political ideology has 
helped to create a tribal Britain with no political or moral center, where many groups 
assert their identity through a sense of victimhood and grievance,‖219 which will be 
analyzed later in more depth. 
Despite this harsh criticism of multiculturalism, a survey by the BBC after the 
July 2005 London bombings showed that 62% of the general public and 87% of 
Muslims still held favorable vies of multiculturalism. At the same time, 58% of those 
asked thought that people who immigrate to Britain should adopt their values and 
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traditions and the way of life. Only 28% of Muslims agreed with this statement.220 This 
survey shows that there seems to be a major difference in the understanding of the 
concept of multiculturalism by Muslims and others in the UK. 
This strongly corresponds with a BBC survey suggesting there is more 
assimilation in the public‘s understanding of multiculturalism than most would like to 
admit. With the statement by the current British prime minister, David Cameron, that 
multiculturalism has failed,221 there now seems to be an official renunciation of this 
concept, and where British immigration and integration policies will go is under 
negotiation. Already the incidents described above had initiated a series of legislative 
changes. In 2004, a new citizenship ceremony for Britain and an oath of allegiance, as 
well as language tests, were implemented. Often these regulations came as anti-terrorism 
acts, like the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2000, the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Bill of 
2001 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005.222 
However, dialogue still plays an important role in the relationship between the 
British government and Muslim communities. But it is centered around 
counterterrorism. The idea that successful integration of Muslims can only be achieved 
through dialogue has been identified in Britain much earlier than in Germany. What both 
countries have in common is their demand for Muslims to speak with one voice. In 
Great Britain, as in Germany, Muslims tried to meet this demand by founding umbrella 
organizations. Their role in the dialogue will be analyzed in Chapter IV.  
The Inner-City Religious Council (ICRC) was the first government-sponsored 
forum for multi-faith representation and consultation on a national level and was 
founded in 1992 by the Department of Environment, the Church of England, and the 
Interfaith Network for the UK (IFNUK). This council funded projects in religious 
communities as a part of urban regeneration. Today the Department of Communities and 
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Local Government is maintaining the dialogue with the Faith Communities Consultative 
Council (FCCC) as the successor of the ICRC.223 IFNUK is an organization promoting 
interfaith dialogue. It was founded in 1987 and represents several Muslim organizations 
in Britain: the British Muslim Forum (BMF), MCB, the Mosques and Imam Advisor 
Body (MINAB), Islamic cultural centers, Jamiat-e-Ulama Britain, the World Islamic 
Mission, and the Islamic Foundation.224 Meanwhile, several other institutions and 
forums have been implemented.225 
The fact that many government initiatives are run under the Preventing Violent 
Extremism (PVE) program sometimes limits the effectiveness of these initiatives and 
their outreach. Government-sponsored dialogue, brand-marked as anti-terrorism 
initiatives, might be of limited use in promoting a new understanding of Islam in the 
form of Euro-Islam. The change in government policies has brought British immigration 
policy on a course that is very similar to Germany‘s. Whether this has consequences for 
the identity of Muslims in the UK has to be assessed later. Historically, however, the 
state offered Muslim communities more space to define their own role in society. As in 
the case of Germany, the three areas of education, the role of imams, and the influence 
of the media will be analyzed for further insight into the relationship of the British state 
and Muslims living in Britain. 
a. Education and Muslim Schools 
In contrast to Germany, in Great Britain any religious organization has 
the right to create private schools and, while obliged to meet certain requirements and 
standards, can also receive the status of a ―voluntary aided school.‖ Voluntary aided 
schools have to conform to a state-issued curriculum and to be open to all students. So 
far, only a few Islamic schools have achieved this status.226 The establishment of 
Muslim schools was not initially foreseen in the concept of British multiculturalism. 
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Only as the number of Muslim children grew significantly in the 1960s did Muslims 
begin to campaign for recognition of their particular needs and preferences, from 
changes in school uniforms and meals to single-sex classrooms and the end of 
swimming classes. The curricula themselves remained untouched.227  
Currently, there are 115 fee-paying Muslim schools in Britain and seven 
state-funded schools. Approximately 3% of Muslim children in Britain are educated in 
fee-paying, independent Muslim schools. These privately funded Islamic schools are 
regularly inspected by the government.228 Less than 0.5% of Muslim children are 
educated in state-funded Muslim schools.229 Additionally, supplementary schools are 
often based in mosques, madrasas or private homes. Besides homework support and 
social projects, their main role has been teaching the basics of Islam, including Arabic. 
Many Muslim children in Britain between the ages of five and fourteen years spend up 
to two hours a day at their local mosque or other form of supplementary school.230 This 
is of some importance for the development of Euro-Islam. If supplementary education is 
held privately, it is difficult to ensure standards and qualified personnel. In recent years, 
a number of concerns have been expressed by Muslim educationalists about home-based 
religious education with regard to the teaching and learning methods and the 
qualifications of teachers and imams.231 
In comparison to the German education system, the British approach 
offers more opportunities to maintain a Muslim identity. These opportunities are not 
only limited to religious classes in public schools, but even enable Muslims to run their 
own Islamic schools. A potential danger of a parallel education system, the disregarding 
of core values of British society, is ameliorated through permanent inspections and an 
obligatory core curriculum that applies to all schools in Britain. In this respect, Britain 
has put Islam almost at the same level as Christianity. 
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b. The Role of Imams 
As in Germany, imams in British mosques are predominantly foreigners. 
In 2007, 83.7% of imams in Britain were of South Asian origin and 8.5% were from 
other countries. Only 8.1% were born and educated in Britain. As Gilliat-Ray points out, 
these numbers confirm, ―mosques remain in the control of first-generation migrants, 
who continue to prefer the services of imported rather than homegrown imams.‖ 232 
However, nearly half of British imams, she discovered, are under forty years of age. 
Nearly a quarter has been in Britain for over ten years, while 31.3% have been in Britain 
for six- to and ten years. The largest group arrived within the past five years.233  
Imams play an important role, especially, with regard to their influence 
on the young. As in Germany, government officials would like to see imams become 
community leaders, addressing not only religious topics, but also social, educational, 
and political issues,234 and to serve as interlocutors between Muslim and other 
communities.235 
The competence and education of imams has, therefore, become a matter 
of debate and public policy, with the government playing an increasingly active role.236 
One element in this process of open debate, and also a partner for the government in its 
intention to influence the role of imams in Britain, is the Mosques and Imam Advisory 
Board (MINAB), established in 2009. The MINAB is a self-regulatory body 
representing many Muslim constituencies, such as the MCB, Muslim Association of 
Britain (MAB) and the British Muslim Forum (BMF).237 The body seeks to be an 
independent, non-sectarian entity acting as a national voice for imams, to facilitate 
accreditation, provide training and guidance, and promote best practices. In the setting 
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up of the MINAB, the home office provided financial support,238 which continues under 
PVE funding. This financial dependence on the government has raised skepticism by 
some British Muslim organizations of the government‘s intentions, which are perceived 
as having an agenda.239 Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that the members of the 
MINAB represent their organizations‘ opinions and attitudes. What influence these 
organizations might have will be subject to analysis in Chapter IV. 
If we look at the establishment of Euro-Islam, the increasing focus on the 
education of imams is of high importance. Taking their role as multiplier into account, it 
is essential that a common understanding of the role of Islam in Britain be promoted 
among this group. The demographic increase in Muslims is an important factor, with the 
majority coming from youth whose identity is still under development, and who could 
be positively influenced by imams. The major influence of imams from abroad could 
hamper this discourse, as it does in Germany.  
c. The Influence of the Media 
More so than in other European countries, tabloid newspapers, like The 
Sun, are powerful institutions in the landscape of British media. They are at the forefront 
in ―othering‖ Muslims in Britain.240 It is especially the influence of this medium that has 
fed Islamophobia in Britain and has caused young Muslims especially to view the 
British media as hostile to Islam, with tabloids emphasizing stereotypes and negative 
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In return, foreign and national Muslim media shape Muslims‘ opinions 
about contemporary issues. 242 According to recent research, Muslims prefer ―to learn 
about national and international current affairs from a distinctive Islamic 
perspective.‖243  
Important media for Muslims in Britain are the Muslim News, the Muslim 
Weekly and the Islam Channel, as well as local radio stations and websites such as 
www.IslamOnline.net or www.mpacuk.org. Increasingly, the websites of Muslim 
organizations and blogs mold the opinion of Muslims, especially the young.  
A detailed analysis of these media is beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
Muslims in Great Britain have established a more British-based media landscape than 
have Muslims in Germany. This could be good news for the development of a new form 
of Islam, because these media can play an important role in discussions over the future 
role of Islam in Europe. This discourse in the Muslim media may be less influenced by 
foreign governments and organizations than it might be in the Muslim media in 
Germany. Unfortunately, some of these media have come under critique. The Islam 
Channel, for example, was accused of breaking the broadcasting code after broadcasting 
a program that advocated marital rape and violence against women, and this was not the 
only time the channel was condemned for breaking broadcasting guidelines.244 
In summary, the situation in Great Britain shows obvious similarities to 
the situation in Germany, with similar influence on the development of Euro-Islam. The 
major difference, however, is the higher degree of freedom, combined with certain 
privileges, Muslims enjoy in Great Britain. This has led to a much more self-confident, 
and, in some limited cases, even more radical Muslim community in Britain. Thus, the 
question can be raised whether different integration policies actually matter. If not, what 
are the reasons for the current lack of integration? To answer this question would require 
further research, and maybe can only be answered in hindsight. 
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3. The Identity of Muslims in Great Britain 
 For the early immigrants to Britain in the 1960s, religion usually just provided an 
important personal and collective resource and a way of participating in communal 
life.245 The performance of rituals, mosque attendance, and fasting during Ramadan 
established a semblance of community for the older generation, which provided a 
feeling of stability and support in an unfamiliar environment. Thus, the first generation 
of Muslims in Britain was actually less religious than often assumed.246 But the identity 
of first-generation Muslims in Britain was not defined simply through adherence to a 
religion. For some, ethnicity was the important factor, and led to further division within 
the group of Muslim immigrants. Pakistanis, moreover, defined themselves not only as 
Pakistani, but as natives of the region they came from. This bond with their place of 
origin was underpinned with close family ties. The families ―back home‖ had clear 
expectations that remittances would continue and substantially improve their standard of 
living.247 Although the self-perception of Muslim residence has changed to permanent, 
ethnicity still plays an important role—not only from the perspective of the native 
British population, but within the Muslim community itself.  
How do Muslims in Britain identity themselves today? Consistent with other 
surveys, an opinion poll conducted by ICM Research in February 2006 demonstrated 
that 91% of Muslims felt loyalty towards Britain.248 In a survey by the Growth from 
Knowledge National Opinion Poll in 2005, 49% of the survey group responded to the 
question, ―Britain: my country or their country?‖ that it was their country. In the same 
survey, the question whether they felt more belonging to Britain or to Islam often led to 
confusion because two in five stated that nation and religion were not mutually  
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exclusive but complementary.249 Other surveys, in contrast, show that a significant 
number of young Muslims feel that Islam is ―the more fundamental aspect of their 
identity.‖250 
Considering the results of the polls and the analysis of Muslim social status and 
relationship with the state, it becomes clear that British Muslim identity is formed as a 
result of pressures from the outside and inside, as many scholars have indicated.251 
Especially the identities of young Muslims are unstable because influencing factors are 
continuously changing.  
Some scholars argue that younger British Muslims are particularly prone to an 
identity conflict.252 Islam as a source of identity for young Muslims, however, is not 
purely evidence for piety. Much more, it is ―the logic of difference that makes people so 
passionate about recognition and support for their religious community.‖253 It is a way 
to escape the deprivation and the conflict with the older generation of Muslims that is 
still dedicated to old traditions. Therefore, young Muslims in Britain turn to Islam as 
part of a wider strategy of empowerment.254 But often they choose different ways to find 
their role and position in British society. Some become secular and westernized. Others 
turn to religion. A third group just struggles to find its way, caught in between these two 
positions.255 What these young Muslims have in common is an appreciation of freedom 
in Western societies that they take for granted and want to utilize to negotiate the 
different ideas and values offered by their faith and British society.256 But Muslims in 
Britain do not necessarily want to conform to what others perceive as the acceptable way 
of being British. As stated above, they want to find their way themselves. Many perceive 
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religion not as purely a private matter. ―For them, being a Muslim is a public identity 
and it entails social, ethical, and political responsibilities.‖257 
The fact that young British Muslims negotiate their understanding under the 
influence of the society they live in, shaped by its values and beliefs, makes it evident 
that British have to clearly define their identity, too. ―Britishness,‖ in this respect, has 
become the term of reference. In the aftermath of the London bombings in 2005, Britons 
turned their minds back to what it means to be British. ―British‖ basically means three 
things: ―commitment to Britain and its people, loyalty to its legal and political 
institutions (especially the monarchy, the Church of England and Parliament), and 
respect of values and norms that are central to its way of life.‖258 
What does that mean for the development of Euro-Islam? Some scholars suggest 
that young Muslims are enthusiastic about finding an understanding and interpretation of 
Islam applicable to their specific situation in Britain. They argue that ―young British 
Muslims are on the move—spiritually, intellectually, philosophically, culturally, 
ethically and politically—and there is a dynamism among them that is not being noticed 
by the wider society.‖259  
This view into the development of identity, demographic development, and 
social status, as well as relationships with the British state, shows that this suggestion 
might be somewhat over-optimistic. Muslims in Britain, and not only the young ones, do 
not share a common Weltanschauung and attitude towards religion. Thus, to achieve a 
common understanding of the role of Islam in Britain seems to be more complex. With 
social deprivation, economic exclusion, and increasingly restrictive legislation, those 
Muslims who allegedly are so enthusiastic in finding their way as members of British 
society, could soon find themselves disappointed. 
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C. THE NETHERLANDS 
Several of the observations made for Germany and Great Britain also apply to 
the Netherlands. Thus, an analysis of the Muslim presence in this country can be 
abbreviated by drawing upon comparisons with Germany and Great Britain. 
In one aspect, however, the Netherlands is fundamentally different from these 
two countries. In no other country are the changes in immigration and integration 
policies and public opinion so dramatic as in the Netherlands. This is a dangerous 
development for the promotion of Euro-Islam, because the common basis for the 
establishment of a Euro-Islam of shared values could crumble. This may strengthen 
identities that are based on perceptions of exclusion and discrimination. 
1. National and Religious Roots of Muslims in the Netherlands and 
Their Situation in the Netherlands Today 
It might be argued that the Netherlands role as a colonial power in the Muslim 
world defines the relationship between the Dutch and Muslims. However, the 
Netherlands was not so much a colonial power as a trade nation. The Dutch feared that 
any strong engagement in missionary work or other provocation of Islam might hinder 
their commercial activities.260 Thus, business opportunities initially defined an almost 
benign relationship of the Dutch with Islam, although the Netherlands were still a 
colonial occupant. The benign attitude of the Dutch, however, prevailed when the first 
Indonesian Muslims came to the Netherlands after World War II.261  
After World War II, as in Germany and Great Britain, a phase of significant 
Muslim settlement began. First, it was Muslim soldiers in the Dutch army who 
supported or fought for the Dutch in the colonies.262 A large part of these former 
soldiers were Moluccans who left Indonesia with the Dutch in 1949. They did not plan 
to stay for long in the Netherlands, desiring an independent Moluccas to return to. This 
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never happened, and the Moluccans stayed.263 In a second phase, Muslims from Turkey 
and Morocco came to the Netherlands as guest workers in the 1960s and 1970s. This 
timeframe marks a significant phase in the immigration of Muslims to all three countries 
of this case study, with very similar implications for the Muslims and their new states of 
residence. Moroccan as well as Turkish immigrants came mainly from rural areas. Most 
of the immigrants came with special working contracts, imported to do specific jobs. As 
in Germany and Great Britain, this led to concentration of these Muslim immigrants in 
Dutch cities: Rotterdam, The Hague, Amsterdam, but also Gouda and Enschede.264 The 
first bilateral agreement to manage this guest worker ―program‖ was signed by the 
Moroccan and Dutch government in 1969, at a time when guest-worker immigration 
from Morocco had long begun.265 
Later on, additional workers came from Surinam and Indonesia. In contrast to 
Moroccan and Turkish guest workers, who were employed as blue-collar workers, 
Surinamese were mainly employed as nurses, civil servants, or teachers.266 The case of 
Surinam in some regards is unique. The former Dutch colony became an independent 
state in 1975. Many Surinamese saw better opportunities for their future in the 
Netherlands. Thus, before the new state of Surinam signed transnational arrangements 
with the Netherlands in 1980, about 300,000 Surinamese, 10% of whom were Muslims, 
left for the Netherlands.267 
In the most recent phase of immigration, Muslims came to the Netherlands as 
asylum seekers, especially from Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia, and other 
countries of the Middle East.268 
                                                 
263 Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 20. 
264 Cherribi, Dutch Islam, 67. 
265 Ibid., 68. 
266 Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 25. 
267 FORUM, The Position of Muslims in the Netherlands, 8. 
268 Martijn de Koning, ―Netherlands,‖ in Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Volume 2, ed. Jorgen S. 
Nielsen et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 367. 
 75 
Based on figures released by the government statistics office, Statistics 
Netherlands (BS), there were an estimated 907,000 Muslims in the Netherlands in early 
2009, which accounts for approximately 6% of the total population and 45% of all non-
Western Dutch migrants are Muslims.269  
 
Figure 6.   Origin of Muslims in the Netherlands270 
The majority of Muslims are Sunni, and approximately 40% of Turks have an 
Alevi background.271 These data draw a picture of the Muslim presence in the 
Netherlands that is similar to the situation in Germany and Great Britain. The 
implications for the development of Euro-Islam are, therefore, identical. Overall, it 
seems, the development of Muslim communities in European countries followed a 
similar pattern.  
Similarities can also be observed in the birthrate. With an average age of 25 
years, Muslims are significant younger than the rest of the Dutch population, which 
averages 38 years. Moreover, about 300,000 Muslims are younger than 18 years, while 
only 11,000 are older than 65 years.272 The same situation may already be observed in 
Germany and Great Britain. 
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As in Germany and Great Britain, the performance of young Muslims in school 
and the labor market has been a concern. A significant percentage of young Muslims 
leave school without any qualifications. A promising development, however, is marked 
by the growing number of young Muslims entering higher education, but overall, the 
native Dutch labor force is considerably better educated. The major factor that 
determines the underperformance of Muslims in education and on the labor market is 
language deficiency. Almost 20% of Moroccans and Turks claim to often or always 
have problems with the Dutch language. This difficulty also translate into a lower level 
of participation in the labor market, which was 55% and 51%, respectively, for Turks 
and Moroccans, compared to 69% among native Dutch. The lower average net income 
of Muslims is another outcome.273 Attempts by the Dutch government to overcome this 
situation were made in 1994 and 1997 through legislation that provided tax incentives to 
employers if they provided jobs to immigrants and tried to establish partnerships 
between the public and private sectors to reduce unemployment rates of immigrants.274 
Although these programs failed, it would be wrong to assume such programs irrelevant, 
but they have to be embedded in an overall integration policy that is bolstered with 
additional measures.  
Another factor that hinders the integration of Muslims is their preference for 
marriage with partners from the same background. Only approximately 10% of Turks 
and Moroccans in the Netherlands choose a native Dutch partner. The still-prevailing 
prejudice of arranged marriages among Muslims, however, does not apply to Turks and 
Moroccans in the Netherlands, who view marriage as a matter of free choice and not of 
arrangement and enforcement.275 
If, finally, the representation of Muslims in parliament and public office is 
considered an indicator of the potential for social mobility, the situation in the 
Netherlands is similar to that in Germany and Great Britain. So far, no Muslim has been 
appointed minister, while currently two state secretaries have taken office. In the house 
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of representatives, four Turks and three Moroccans can be found, and in the senate one 
out of the 75 senators is a Muslim. In the councils of the twelve provinces, about 3% are 
of Turkish or Moroccan origin, and in the 443 municipalities, Turks and Moroccans 
occupy about 230 seats out of more than 9,500.276 These figures show that Muslims 
engage in politics. With just 2%, their representation on the municipal level, however, 
does not reflect their share of the entire population. Taking into account that Muslims 
can vote in municipal elections, these figures show a certain degree of reluctance to 
engage actively and constructively in politics. However, as they achieve more 
representation in politics, the discourse of some Muslim organizations is putting more 
emphasis on their role as citizens in the Netherlands.277 
Overall, the analysis of the demographic structure of Muslims in the Netherlands 
and their current social and economic situation underlines the observations made for 
Germany and Great Britain.  
2. Muslims in the Netherlands and Their Relationship With the State 
Among the three countries of this case study, Dutch public and political opinion 
towards Islam and the presence of Muslims in the Netherlands has undergone the most 
obvious changes. For a long time, the Netherlands perceived itself as a role model for a 
tolerant society capable of including cultural and religious diversity.278 However, in a 
2005 report by the Pew Global Project, 51% of Dutch participants had unfavorable 
opinions about Muslims, and in a more recent nationwide survey, half of the Dutch 
considered Western and Muslim ways of life as contradictory.279 Several factors 
contributed to this development. The murder of Theo van Gogh, the subsequent burning  
 
                                                 
276 FORUM, The Position of Muslims in the Netherlands, 23. 
277 Cherribi, Dutch Islam, 77. 
278 Marcel Maussen, ―The Netherlands,‖ in Securitization and Religious Divides in Europe – 
Muslims in Western Euorpe after 9/11: Why the term Islamophobia is more a Predicament than an 
Explanation, ed. Jocelyne Cesari, Submission to the Changing Landscape of Citizenship and Security, 6th 
PCRD of European Commission (June 1, 2006), 103. 
279 Karina Velasco Gonzalez et al., ―Prejudice towards Muslims in The Netherlands: Testing 
Integrated Threat Theory,‖ British Journal of Social Psychology, 47 (2008): 667–668. 
 78 
of mosques in 2004, the Wilders movie Fitna, and Wilder‘s anti-Islamic comments in 
2008 are just a few, but very prominent, examples demonstrating that the relationship of 
the Dutch and their Muslim neighbors has changed.  
But opinions on Dutch immigration policies differ. In contrast to how the Dutch 
may perceive it, Thijl Sunnier argues that, regardless of its political agenda, the goal of 
immigration and integration policies was always assimilation.280 He views the Dutch 
policies as a ―path individual migrants had to follow in order to take fully part in the 
central institutions of Dutch society, regardless of ethnic differences.‖ This path was 
defined by educational programs and economic measures to overcome the inequality 
between migrants and native Dutch. Only in the 1980s, he continues, did the government 
adopt a political agenda that granted a certain degree of cultural autonomy.‖281  
Nevertheless, as described above, the Dutch initially held a positive view of 
Muslims in their country. The Dutch did not consider themselves an immigration target, 
being already an overpopulated, small state with bigger neighbors with greater capacity 
to accommodate foreign immigrants. Initially, migration into the Netherlands was only 
minimally regulated.282 When the first Muslim immigrants arrived, they faced a society 
with a form of organization that was starting to weaken in the 1960s, an organization of 
pillars (zuilen) based upon a composition of four prevailing ideological groups 
(richtingen), namely Catholics, Protestants, Socialists, and Liberals. These pillars 
formed a powerful civil society, consisting of organizations, schools and universities, 
unions, sports associations, and newspapers and broadcasting associations, all 
representing their own pillars, and the political arena was dominated by parties 
representing these pillars. The Muslims arriving in the Netherlands saw this system of 
pillarization (verzuiling) under pressure by various social and political processes, such as 
secularization.283 Muslim immigrants, however, tried to utilize this system of 
pillarization and organized themselves within this tradition. Some even argue that the 
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integration of Islamic and various other immigrant communities has brought about a 
kind of ―repillarization.‖284 Actually, Muslim immigration returned something to the 
Netherlands that the Dutch had already laid aside: a public role of religion. 
Freedom of religion and a separation of church and state are the principles of the 
state–church relationship in the Netherlands. In contrast to Germany, and closer to the 
British system, all religious denominations in Netherlands enjoy formal and legal 
equality and the role of religion is not recognition based.285 However, Christianity still 
plays a decisive and dominant role in Dutch society. Until the late 1970s, the Dutch state 
contributed financially to the establishment and maintenance of church buildings and 
even paid some of the pensions and salaries of religious personnel of Christian 
organizations. 286 In the constitutional reform of 1983, freedom of religion and equal 
treatment was defined more specifically, and privileges for the Christian church 
removed.  
With the growing influx of immigrants into the Netherlands, the government 
sought to improve their legislative framework to accommodate them. Between 1967 and 
1973, guest workers were officially given the status of temporary workers. In 1974, 
legislation intended to improve the social status of immigrants, treating them as 
members of a society that takes care (zorgmaatschappij), was passed. Additional 
immigration and integration legislation followed. In response, Muslims started to 
organize, which will be analyzed in Chapter IV. 
In the 1980s, the shift to strengthen immigrants‘ position through integration 
policies continued. These policies focused mainly on welfare policy,287 but additionally 
steps were also taken to give immigrants a voice. Since 1986, those immigrants who had 
legally lived in the Netherlands for at least five years got voting rights in municipal  
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elections.288 Moreover, measures were taken to allow for Islamic practice and rituals, 
like ritual slaughtering, calls to prayer on a par with the ringing of church bells, and 
Muslim festivals and dietary rules.289 
The 1990s marked a change of Dutch policies in a different direction. Although 
the provision of welfare still remained a major element, culturally, more emphasis was 
put on assimilation. In one consequential step, the Law on Civic Integration of 
Newcomers (Wet Inburgering Nieukomers) made civic-integration courses 
mandatory.290 However, a comparative study in 1996 still viewed the situation of 
Muslims in the Netherlands as most favorable as compared to other Western states.291 
The debate became more intense in 2000 following a newspaper article by Paul 
Scheffer, a social-democrat intellectual, on what he labeled the ―multicultural tragedy.‖ 
He argued that the Netherlands had turned a blind eye on many problems.292 In 
subsequent campaigns for the municipal and parliamentary elections in 2001 and 2002, 
the right-wing politician Pim Fortuyn built his political campaign on the failure of Dutch 
multiculturalism, which he claimed were based on naïve policies developed in a climate 
of political correctness. After Fortyn‘s assassination in May 2002, several members of 
his party, Lijst Pim Fortuyn, were elected to national parliament. As a consequence of 
this electoral success, politicians in the mainstream parties, such as Geert Wilders, Rita 
Verdonk, and Ayaan Hirsi Ali of the liberal-right party Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en 
Democraties (People‘s Party for Freedom and Democracy, VVD), appealed to a more 
polemical discourse on multiculturalism. The position that Islam constitutes a major 
problem for integration and a threat to Western civilization is prevalent among many 
Dutch politicians.293 Also asylum seeking became subject to discussion and, finally, the 
Aliens Act of 2000 made Dutch asylum law more restrictive by changing and reducing 
the possibilities for appeal and introducing an accelerated procedure for processing 
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applications. Human Rights Watch concluded that the Dutch government had taken up 
the most restrictive approach among Western European Countries.294 This did not, of 
course, affect Muslims only. 
The murder of the filmmaker Theo van Gogh in November 2004 precipitated 
violent attacks on mosques and Islamic schools, marking a sad climax to national 
tensions.295 Afterwards, Maussen argues, ―the political debate went wild, asking for 
measures like forbidding Islam, deporting second-generation Moroccan youth, or 
closing down all mosques.‖296 This is the situation in the Netherlands now.  
What makes the Netherlands extremely important in the future of Euro-Islam is 
the dramatic change in governmental politics and public opinion. Although similar 
developments can be observed in Germany and the UK, the degree of change is much 
more significant and radical in the Netherlands. This significance has been identified not 
only in the country itself, but all over Europe. The fact that it is a change for the worse 
for Muslims can affect their willingness to become more cooperative. This could be a 
blow for Euro-Islam. But the Dutch government has not stopped conversation with the 
Muslim community. By contrast, they have established a system that grants Muslim 
organizations the role of recognized entities with a right to consultation at all relevant 
ministries. Moreover, these organizations function as service providers for governmental 
institutions like the military or judiciary. This is another important difference from 
Germany and Great Britain, a difference that supports the promotion of Euro-Islam and 
will be explained in Chapter IV. 
a. Education 
Article 23 of the Dutch constitution defines freedom of choice in 
education. The Dutch education system consists of public and private schools, with 
private primary schools being financed from public funds according to the same  
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standards as public-authority schools. While these schools are free to apply their own 
educational methods and to decide upon extracurricular activities, the core curriculum 
has to meet obligatory standards defined by the government.297 
In the late 1980s, the first Muslim primary schools were opened in 
Rotterdam, The Hague, Eindhoven, and Amsterdam.298 In 1990, the Islamic Schools 
Governing Board Organization (ISBO) was established as an umbrella organization for 
Islamic primary and secondary schools.299 Today, 41 Islamic schools operate within the 
public education system and are state funded. Two of these schools are secondary, while 
the rest are primary. Non-Islamic schools in the Netherlands have to provide Islamic 
lessons on request.300 Reports and studies on these schools found that they do not 
obstruct integration.301 In the field of higher education, two Islamic universities can be 
found in the Netherlands: the Islamic University of Rotterdam, affiliated with the Gülen 
movement, and the Islamic University of Europe in Schiedam. Neither is recognized or 
funded by the government.302  
The educational situation in the Netherlands is identical to that in Britain, 
offering Muslims many opportunities to meet their own demands for education. The 
core curriculum guarantees the commitment to common values. With a look at 
demographic developments, the importance of education has to be emphasized, again. 
Better education will not only benefit the promotion of Euro-Islam, it will be a gain for 
the entire society. With the increasing share of Muslim population in the future, the 
Netherlands, like other countries in Europe, will be dependent on their Muslim 
communities to constructively contribute to the countries‘ well-being.  
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b. The Role of Imams 
Imams in Dutch mosques are mainly recruited from the countries the first 
generation of Muslim immigrants came from, with the majority coming from Turkey 
and Morocco.303 This is another characteristic the Netherlands share with Germany and 
Great Britain; but imam education in the Netherlands is already one step ahead. Two 
mainstream academic centers for imam training have operated since 2005: the Centre for 
Islamic Theology at the Free University of Amsterdam and the Theology Department of 
the University of Leiden. Both centers cooperate with the two largest Muslim umbrella 
organizations in the Netherlands, the Contact Organ Muslims and Government (Contact 
Organ Moslims Overheid, CMO) and the Contact Group Islam (Contactgroep Islam, 
CGI).304 The Free University of Amsterdam offers bachelor‘s degrees in Islamic 
theology, and a master‘s program in Islamic spiritual care. Leiden University offers 
bachelor‘s and master‘s degrees in Islamic theology.305 Additionally, imam-training 
courses are available at the InHolland College, designed in cooperation with a number of 
mosque organizations affiliated to the CMO.306 Special civic integration courses that are 
mandatory for imams have been in place since 2002.307 
The role of imam education in the Netherlands is controversial. While a 
majority support the programs, mainly following the rationale of the German 
government, Muslim organizations and imams have doubts. The main concern is that 
four years to study at a Dutch university would be not sufficient to educate a future 
imam up to a level where he can be an accepted imam by Muslim communities.308 This 
criticism has to be taken seriously, but it should not restrain the Dutch government from 
further developing these programs. Imams can play a key role in the promotion of Euro-
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Islam. To be able to do that, they have to understand the requirements of the European 
context. What has to be avoided, is any impression of indoctrination and oppression of 
key Muslim values in the education of imams. This would discredit any attempt of 
promoting Euro-Islam. 
c. The Influence of the Muslim Media 
Muslims in the Netherland have installed an impressive media landscape. 
Until 2010, two antagonistic Muslim media companies broadcasted especially for 
Muslims in the Netherlands: the Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Company (Nederlandse 
Moslim Omroep, NMO) and the Dutch Islamic Broadcasting Company (Nederlandse 
Islamitische Omroep, NIO). Their broadcasting licenses expired in 2010, and five 
organizations applied for broadcasting licenses for 2010 to 2015. The Netherlands 
Foundation for Muslim Broadcasting (Stichting Moslim Omroep Nederland, SMON) 
was licensed and later joined by the Broadcasting Company Universal Muslim 
Association (Omroep Universele Moslim Associatie OUMA). The SMON was an 
initiative of several Moroccan and Surinamese organizations in the Netherlands. OUMA 
appeared to wish to focus on Muslims as Dutch citizens and less on the migrant 
perspective, as they claim SMON did. Nevertheless, in order to benefit from the 
SMON‘s broadcasting license, they joined SMON and formed the Muslim Broadcasting 
Organization to address young Muslims. Other organizations that applied for the license 
are the Foundation Muslim Broadcasting Company, the Dutch Islamic Media, and the 
Foundation Cooperation Islamic Umbrella.309  
Besides broadcasting stations there are also a variety of Muslim print 
media. The Al Nisa Maandblad, under the responsibility of the Muslim women‘s 
organization Al Nisa, publishes two magazines for children (Anti Wa Anta) and young 
women (As Siroata). The Zaman Nederland is a newspaper published by the Gülen 
affiliated Time Media Group. The Ahmadiyya Muslims‘ main newspaper is Al-Islaam,  
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while Expliciet is an Hizb ut Tahrir affiliated media. Momtazah Publishers is 
responsible for ―Wij Moslims.‖ Recently, Muslims make increase use of Internet blogs 
like ―wij blijven hier‖ at www.wijblievenhier.nl.310 
The importance of media in the promotion of Euro-Islam has already 
highlighted above, and the space the Dutch government offers for Muslim media is a 
valuable contribution to Euro-Islam. Licensing these media enables the Dutch 
government to avoid broadcasting of programs that contradict the overall aim of 
successful integration. 
3. The Identity of Muslims in the Netherlands 
The similarities of Muslim communities in Germany, Great Britain, and the 
Netherlands have almost identical implications for the development of Muslim identity 
in these countries. In 2006, for example, 60 to 70% of Muslim Moroccans and Turks 
claimed to feel at home in the Netherlands.311 At the same time, two thirds of religious 
Turks and half of religious Moroccans identify more with their country of origin than 
with the Netherlands.312 
A majority of Turks and Muslims believe that Dutch people‘s perceptions about 
Islam are too negative.313 Although most Turks and Moroccans consider themselves 
Muslims, there are significant differences in religious behavior and attitudes, and the 
number of Turks and Muslims who describe themselves as Muslims but do not visit a 
mosque has increased.  
The first Moroccan migrants became socially, religiously, and linguistically 
disoriented. With this came a feeling of alienation. While returning for summer leave to 
Morocco, the rest of the year was viewed as a ―time when one was so forgotten, or  
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overlooked by the Europeans, that one forgot oneself, that one began to doubt one‘s very 
existence.‖314 For the identity of first-generation guest workers, Islam played the same 
role as for Muslims in Germany and Great Britain. 
With regard to young Muslims, the same conflict of identity can be observed as 
is evident in Germany and Great Britain. Surprisingly, however, the most integrated 
members of the Moroccan Muslim community in the Netherlands paradoxically have the 
most negative perception of Dutch society.315 
In summary, the development of Muslim identity in the Netherlands followed, 
and still follows, the patterns of Muslim immigrants in Germany and Great Britain. For 
the establishment of Euro-Islam, that can be good news. The congruence in the 
development of identities based on similar experiences can facilitate conversation on the 
future of Islam in Europe. People that have experienced the same things might come to 
the same conclusions. An overemphasis of ethnic identity and nationality, however, 
could counteract this sameness of experiences and undermine the development of Euro-
Islam. Moreover, an identity that is based on negative experiences will, most likely, not 
be supportive for the integration of Muslims in Europe. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the Muslim communities in the three studied countries shows 
significant similarities in the situation Muslims face. Perceived discrimination and social 
exclusion are the prevailing feelings among many Muslims in these countries. 
One important observation is the fact that, despite their allegedly secular nature, 
these states generally offer religion the space it needs. Rohe even argues that these 
countries ―open a broad space for religious belief and life regardless of whether the 
religion of the majority or of a minority is at stake.‖316 This, as the analysis has shown,  
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is not totally the case. While these states open their societies to all religions, the way 




Table 3.   Muslim Communities in Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands 
The way government policies have developed in Germany, Great Britain, and the 
Netherlands initially differed, but these differences have increasingly narrowed down. 
Great Britain and the Netherlands, from the beginning, offered Muslim communities 
more freedom and rights than Germany.  
Hence, it is surprising that all three states currently face a very similar situation, 
which suggests that other factors—as scholars quoted in Chapter I have stated—might 
be more important for successful integration than the concepts and policies governments  
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seek to follow. This has important consequences for the development of an integrative 
Euro-Islam. The major implications of the Muslim presence in the three countries for the 
future of Euro-Islam can be summarized as follows: 
- Muslim communities in Europe are not a homogenous entity. They are split 
based on ethnicity, nationality, language, sectarian beliefs, legal and social status, and 
age. These differences can hinder the required discourse of Muslims over the future role 
of their religion in their current country of residence and, even more, on the European 
level. 
- Government policies become increasingly assimilative. As Monda says, 
―reform comes to stand in as a code for ―become like us,‖ which in turn expresses a 
desire for annihilation, for the outright victory of our ideas over theirs. If that is how the 
battle for hearts and minds comes across then it is no wonder that Muslims become 
defensive.‖317 The imminent struggle Europeans themselves face with regard to their 
own identity plays an important role in this current process of changing policies towards 
immigrants and especially Muslims. If this tendency cannot be overcome, the mutual 
acceptance of core values and, thereby, the foundation of Euro-Islam can be endangered. 
- The influence of foreign governments and organizations in mosques and over 
the media still binds many Muslims to their former home countries and discourages 
them from finding their own way in the new environment. 
- Steps to facilitate the education and training of imams, to ensure religious 
education at schools, etc., send a positive signal to Muslims in Europe that their host 
societies accept them. However, close links of such initiatives to anti-terrorism programs 
raises concern amongst Muslim communities that what looks as acceptance, on the first 
view, is only a result of pure rationality and self-interest. 
- Muslims have to overcome structural deficiencies, especially their 
concentration in specific city districts. This, of course, requires support by the host 
countries, too. 
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- That the Muslims in this case study are mainly young offers opportunities to 
invest in the future. Their current social status, their situation on the labor market, and 
the tendency to stay among themselves, however, can be a serious obstacle to integration 
and the development of Euro-Islam that facilitates the process of integration. Further 
exclusion from more active participation, as it is currently the case, can steer young 
Muslims in directions that will not benefit anybody. This, however, is not an observation 
solely applicable to Muslims. As especially German history shows, if people feel 
excluded, disappointed, and left alone, they might turn to alternative options that could 
have severe consequences. 
A failure to overcome these shortfalls, described above, can finally put the 
possibility of constructing Euro-Islam, with its different pillars, at risk. Muslims cannot 
solve these problems individually, facing strong societies and institutions in their current 
countries of residency. They have to organize. Therefore, the following chapter will be 
devoted to analyze the role Muslim organizations could play to promote Euro-Islam. 
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IV. MUSLIM ORGANIZATIONS IN GERMANY, GREAT 
BRITAIN, AND THE NETHERLANDS 
The preceding analysis of Muslim communities, their relationship with the state, 
and the development of Muslim identity provided little evidence that the development of 
Euro-Islam is underway, and pointed out the difficulties this development faces. For any 
progress to occur, many scholars view the role of Muslim organizations as critical.318 
Muslim organization can channel the interests of Muslims to governments and wider 
society, facilitate discourse among Muslims and with society, and provide support for 
Muslims to escape their current social and economic exclusion. Therefore, the question 
arises of how representative Muslim organizations are and how supportive they can be 
in defining and establishing Euro-Islam, as defined in Chapter II.  
Analysis of Muslim organizations in the countries studied draws an ambivalent 
picture. High diversity, the influence of foreign governments and movements, partial 
animosities between organizations, and differing perceptions of the future role of Islam 
in Europe characterize the landscape of Muslim organizations in Germany, Great 
Britain, and the Netherlands, suggesting that these organizations seek rather to utilize 
old patterns of identity than to shape a new one. Therefore, these organizations play a 
more separating than unifying role. Moreover, only a minority of Muslims feels 
represented by these organizations. Often, Muslims only use the facilities of 
organizations to fulfill their religious, ritual obligations. Finally, governments and 
societies view many Muslim organizations with suspicion, which is sometimes justified. 
In this respect, the role of the elder generation, which still obtains leading positions in 
many Muslim organizations, is of high importance. Fortunately, a new string of Muslim 
organizations and think tanks is coming to the forefront. Currently, however, the more 
conservative umbrella organizations seem to dominate the scene of Muslim 
organizations, promoting the definition of identity based on ethnicity, nationality, or 
ideology, and not on citizenship as a European Muslim. 
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On the European level, the organizing of Muslims is less significant. Especially 
those organizations that are founded on the ideology of Islamist movements, like the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Milli Görüs, seem to be more organized. The same applies to 
the organizations that fall under the regime of the Turkish diyanet—the Turkish 
governmental organization responsible for religious affairs. Otherwise, activities by a 
wider Muslim community are mainly limited to specific projects, for example to 
guaranteeing the right to halal food and ritual slaughtering. Thus, a mature 
institutionalization of Islam in Europe can, currently, not be observed. 
In general, Muslim organizations can either evolve in a top-down approach, 
initiated by the government, or from the bottom up, as an outcome of a ―strong civil 
society mobilization and social capital among Muslim communities.‖ Here, the state 
takes a mainly supportive role. Often, however, organizations are formed in a mixed 
approach.319 In German, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, the first Muslim 
organizations were mosque communities. These communities evolved from the bottom 
up, from the desire of immigrants for sanctuary in a foreign environment. Later, foreign 
governments sought to gain influence over their expatriates through organizations 
established in a top-down approach. Finally, umbrella organizations were established to 
facilitate the mutual demand for dialogue between Muslims and the governments. 
Though, governments often played the more demanding role, these umbrella 
organizations were formed in a mixed approach. The analysis of Muslim organizations 
in the studied countries will focus on these umbrella organizations. Starting with 
umbrella organizations, links to other organizations will be analyzed to shed light on the 
nature of the umbrella organization and its objectives. It must be mentioned that some 
scholars argue that these organizations tend to aim towards mobilizing the state to 
intervene in the community on their behalf—for example by funding educational and 
cultural activities that endorse their ideology—rather than being willing to bring the real  
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interests of the Muslim grassroots forward.320 Nevertheless, in the current landscape of 
Muslim organizations, these umbrella organizations have the widest outreach and are the 
most influential. 
Clearly radical groups, however, will not be analyzed. Their role in the 
development and propagation of Euro-Islam is clear. Moreover, they represent an 
absolute minority and exercise very limited influence on the wider Muslim community. 
Unfortunately, they often dominate the public perception of Muslim organizations. 
Nevertheless, they do not require further consideration in the framework of this thesis. 
A. GERMANY 
Despite the large number of Turkish Muslims, the figures shown in Chapter III 
clearly show that the community of Muslims in Germany is a rather heterogeneous 
group. This heterogeneity becomes even clearer when it comes to the representation and 
organization of Muslims in Germany. Only 20% of Muslims in Germany participate in 
religious societies or communities and the largest umbrella organizations only partially 
represent the more than 2,400 local communities and mosques in Germany.321  
This is the first indication that Muslim organizations in Germany lack the 
legitimacy to speak for all Muslims in the country. Moreover, analysis shows that some 
of the largest organizations oppose the policies of the German government and have 
stopped participating in institutional dialogue. On the other side, some organizations 
have established a wide and deep network of sub-organizations and associations for 
outreach into the grassroots level. This type of network could facilitate a wider discourse 
on Euro-Islam. Unfortunately, these networks are maintained by those organizations that 
have stopped their engagement with the DIK or promote an understanding of Islam that 
seems incompatible with Euro-Islam as understood in this thesis. Moreover, the strong 
influence of the Turkish, Iranian, and Saudi Arabian governments on some organizations 
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limits their role in defining a European–Muslim identity. The influence of the Turkish 
government, especially, strengthens the role of nationality as the basis of identity. 
Overall, the promotion of Euro-Islam in Germany is likely to stem more from 
individuals than organizations. 
The largest Muslim organizations in Germany are the Turkish-Islamic Union of 
the Institution of Religion (Diyanet Isleri Türk Islam e.V., DITIB), the Central Council 
of Muslims in Germany (Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.V., ZMD), the 
Islamic Council in Germany (Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland e.V., IRD), 
and the Association of Islamic Cultural Centers (Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren 
e.V., VIKZ).322 Since 2007, these four organizations seek to coordinate their policies 
towards the German government in the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany 
(Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland, KRMD). Under the umbrella of the 
KRMD, the four organizations initially engaged with the DIK, the forum for dialogue 
between Muslims and the German government. In 2010, however, the IRD was 
suspended from the DIK, due to investigations by German law-enforcement agencies on 
the IRD‘s member organization, Milli Görüs. The same year, the ZMD withdrew from 
the DIK and harshly criticized the DIK as totally ineffective.323 The Muslim 
organizations that complete the DIK are the Alevi Communities Germany (Alevitische 
Gemeine Deutschland e.V., AABF),  the Islamic Community of Bosniaks in Germany 
(Islamische Gemeinschaft der Bosniaken in Deutschland e.V., IGBD) and the Central 
Council of Moroccans in Germany (Zentralrat der Marokkaner in Deutschland e.V., 
ZMaD).  
The absence of the IRD and the ZMD in the DIK signals different messages, 
indicating a friction among Muslim organizations in Germany, but also suggesting that 
the form of dialogue in the DIK is lacking the necessary degree of openness and 
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willingness. However, with the IGBD—affiliated with the IRD and ZMK—the two 
organizations have a kind of spokesperson in the DIK.  
A closer look at some of these organizations will provide more insight into the 
role they might play for the promotion of Euro-Islam. 
1. The Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institution for Religious Affairs 
(DITIB e.V.) 
The DITIB is the largest Muslim organization in Germany and is sponsored by 
the Turkish diyanet. It is therefore often called the ―spokesman of the Turkish 
government.‖324 On the other side, the DITIB stands for the separation of state and 
religion as a principle of the Turkish state. The Turkish government provides support in 
order to maintain a close relationship with and influence on its expatriates, as well as to 
counteract the fundamentalist tendencies among some Turkish Islamist activists. The 
support comes mainly in the form of funding and imams for mosques.325 The 
organization has 130,000 members and runs almost 900 mosques.326 DITIB imams stay 
in Germany for three to five years. They often do not speak German and are unaware of 
the characteristics of German society, although DITIB recently has engaged with the 
German Goethe Institute and other organizations to improve this situation.327  
Politically, the organization officially restraints from any activities, and political 
events are forbidden in the facilities of the DITIB.328 Nevertheless, via the DITIB, the 
Turkish government appeals to the religious identity of Turkish immigrants but 
emphasizes even more the role of Turkish nationality.329 Thus, the DITIB has a clear 
political role. 
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Overall, the activities of the DITIB focus on a dialogue between Turkish 
Muslims and German society. The organization fully accepts the German constitution 
and the concept of democracy. In its publications it calls for tolerance and respect. 
Through its affiliated youth organization, the DITIB Jugend, it seeks to educate young 
Turkish Muslims to enhance their own identity and respect other cultures as well. To 
facilitate this process, the DITIB runs sports teams, music education, and support 
programs for students. Moreover, the DITIB has initiated a program of ―envoys for 
dialogue‖ (Dialogbeauftragte). These envoys engage with wider German society and 
cooperate with schools, kindergartens, and the police.330 Through the Research Center 
for Religion and Society (Forschungszentrum für Religion und Gesellschaft), the 
organization seeks to gain further insight into the perception of religion in society.331 
Controversial is the DITIB‘s attitude towards Alevi living in Germany, which will be 
analyzed later. 
For the promotion of Euro-Islam, the DITIB currently cannot be considered as 
playing an active role. Although the organization propagates a moderate, secular form of 
Islam, the huge influence of the Turkish government seems to prevent the DITIB to 
obtaining a reformist role and emphasizes the importance of national identity. Only if 
empowered by the diyanet might the role of the DITIB change; then, however, it can 
play a major role, because Turks are the largest group among Muslims in Germany. 
Nevertheless, the DITIB‘s value lies in its attempts to improve the social status of 
Turkish Muslims, helping change the persistent feeling of being excluded and enabling 
young Turks to identify with their residence in Germany as German citizens. Only if 
their potential successes are linked solely to the DITIB, and consequently to the Turkish 
state, could the outcome be an even more nationalistic identity.  
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2. Association of Islamic Cultural Centers (VIKZ) 
The VIKZ is a former member organization of the ZMD, with about 20,000 
members. The VIKZ is linked to the Turkish Süleymanci movement—a Sufi movement 
that is supposed not to pursue any form of political Islam. The organization emphasizes 
its commitment to the German constitution and its support of democracy, respect, and 
tolerance. In its understanding as a Sufi organization, the VIKZ emphasizes the spiritual 
aspect of religion and relationship with God.332 
Although the VIKZ engages with the DIK, its activities mainly look inwards, 
focusing on youth education in the Sufi school of thought. Thus, one of the main 
activities of the VIKZ is the operation of student hostels (Schülerwohnheime).333 
According to the VIKZ the organization represents some 300 mosques and so-called 
education groups (Bildungsvereine).  
The education activities of the VIKZ have often been subject to criticism. 
Scholars like Ursula Spuler-Stegemann argue that education at the VIKZ student hostels 
focuses solely on Islamic education and the propagation of an extreme conservative 
understanding of Islam. Spuler-Stegemann argues that these hostels are a major obstacle 
to integration and promote the separation of young Muslims from German society, in 
contrast to the organization‘s own statements. Moreover, the VIKZ has tried repeatedly 
to operate hostels illegally, and teachers at public schools report of strong anti-Semitism 
and anti-Americanism among children living in VIKZ hostels.334 Based on assessments 
like this, some conservatives in 2008 called for an observation of the VIKZ by the 
Verfassungsschutz.335 The organization itself emphasizes that the hostels are to facilitate 
homework supervision and improve the future chances of young Muslims on the job 
market. The overall aim allegedly is integration rather than separation. The VIKZ points 
out that all personnel at their facilities speak German and many are ethnic Germans. A 
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2010 study by a German education scientist, on behalf of the VIKZ, emphasizes the 
value of the VIKZ, arguing that homework supervision and support in school 
performance is priority number one for the VIKZ, while religious objectives only come 
second.336 
In summary, the VIKZ cannot be really called a promoter of Euro-Islam. The 
form of Islam promoted by the VIKZ has to be called rather conservative, totally 
dedicated to the school of thought of the Süleymanci movement. This will promote a 
rather ideology-based identity. Although allegations of indoctrination of young Muslims 
in the VIKZ‘s facilities exist, it has to be pointed out that the organization is still 
engaged in dialogue not only through the DIK, but also in local activities, although 
limited in number. Its allegedly inward orientation, nevertheless, suggests that the VIKZ 
seeks only to pursue its own way than to invest in a wider discourse on the role of Islam 
and possible reform. The allegations and suspicion concerning the VIKZ, moreover, 
illustrate that the role of Muslim organizations in the promotion of Euro-Islam might be 
limited. Euro-Islam will be accepted by Western society only if it can claim legitimacy. 
This might be endangered if Muslim organizations are not trusted. A lack of trust, 
however, can also result from a lack of knowledge on the side of Western societies. 
3. Alevi Communities Germany (Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Fedrasyonu, 
AABF) 
The group of Alevi in Germany has to be regarded as an exception. First, Alevi 
view themselves not as Muslims but as a separate, independent religious community,337 
and many Sunni and Shi‘a Muslims share this view. Second, in contrast to other Muslim 
organizations, the AABF has achieved the status of a religious corporation, KÖR, as 
defined by the German constitution.  
The program of the AABF, which was founded in 1991, reads like the concept of 
Euro-Islam: full equality of men and women, rejection of shari‘a, tolerance, and 
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pluralism are guiding principles. According to the AABF, the organization represents 
130 member organizations and local Alevi communities with some 100,000 members.338 
Moreover, the AABF has women‘s and youth organizations. 
An important issue for the AABF is the relationship of Alevi living in Turkey 
with the Turkish state. Although more than 20 million Alevi live in Turkey, the 
government does not officially recognize Alevi and, according to the AABF, seeks to 
force them into Sunni Islam. Also in Germany, the diaynet tries to influence the Alevi 
community through the Cem-Foundation, which aims at converting Alevi to Sunni 
belief.339 This causes severe and harsh criticism of the Turkish government, as well as 
the DITIB, by Alevi living in Germany. 
But Muslim organizations in Germany are also subject to criticism by the AABF. 
The IRD, for example, is regarded as an umbrella organization that represents 
organizations like Milli Görüs, which is under investigation by the Verfassungsschutz.340 
Therefore, the AABF rejects any cooperation with the IRD and criticizes any form of 
cooperation of German officials with this organization. 
In conclusion, the AABF could be regarded as a role model of an organization 
that promotes an integrative Euro-Islam; some call them the ―forgotten role model for 
integration.‖341 Its objectives and values are fully compliant with the definition of Euro-
Islam. However, the perception that they are an independent faith, minimizes their 
influence on the wider Muslim community. 
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4. The German Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD) 
The ZMD, founded in 1987, is an umbrella organization that currently represents 
nineteen member organizations and about 300 mosques.342  
In 2002, the ZMD released an ―Islamic Charta‖ to demonstrate the compatibility 
between Islamic principles, as understood by the ZMD, and German democracy. In this 
charter, the ZMD affirms its commitment to German law and human rights and rejection 
of theocracy.343 Critics of the council, however, argued that some of the statements in 
the charter are ambiguous and vague.344 With regard to elections, for example, the 
charter claims political neutrality, but at the same time states that Muslims will vote for 
those candidates that show the greatest comprehension of Islam.345 For supporters of the 
council, that must sound like a directive. Other points of critique, however, seem rather 
exaggerated. To give the ZMD additional credit, it has to be noted that the organization 
has launched an initiative among young Muslims to promote the role and importance of 
the German constitution. This initiative has been highly welcomed by the German 
president and Muslim politicians like Cem Özdemir.346 
In its publication and public statements, the ZMD propagates a role of Islam that 
is compatible with Euro-Islam. Even more important, the ZMD claims to promote the 
development of a European-Muslim identity, formed in the contemporary context of 
Muslims living in Europe.347 The diversity of its member organizations, representing 
Sunni as well as Shi‘a and Muslims from Turkey and the Middle East, gives additional 
hope that the ZMD could become a promoter of Euro-Islam. However, the ZMD‘s 
withdrawal from the DIK suggests that the ZMD might have a different understanding  
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of integration and the role of Islam in Europe. Moreover, the diversity of its member 
organizations makes the role of the ZMD more ambivalent, as the following analysis of 
two of its member organizations will show. 
a. The Islamic Society of Germany (Islamische Gemeinschaft in 
Deutschland e.V., IGD) 
The IGD was founded in 1958 by Hassan al-Banna‘s personal secretary 
and son-in-law, Sa‘id Ramadan, the father of Tariq Ramadan. After the oppression of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Ramadan moved to Germany. Thus, it is not 
surprising that the IGD is supposed to be the most important Brotherhood-affiliated 
organization in Germany,348 allegedly with links to the Egyptian Brotherhood. 
The IGD follows a strategy of political and social participation to create 
the required space for its supporters to follow a way of life that is in compliance with the 
Qur‘an and Sunna. For this purpose, the IGD runs its own schools349 and kindergartens 
and also keeps close links with the Muslim Youth in Germany (Muslimische Jugend in 
Deutschland, MJD).350 Other IGD affiliated organizations are the Society of Muslim 
Arts and Social Scientists (Gesellschaft Muslimischer Geistes- und 
Sozialwissenschaftler, GMGS), the Muslim Student Association in Germany 
(Muslimische Studenten Vereinigung in Deutschland e.V., MSVD) and the Islamic 
Council (Islamisches Konzil). The latter is thought to be funded and influenced by the 
Saudi government,351 but has not been very active in public recently. The MSVD, 
through its 35 branches at German universities, offers the IGD access to young Muslims. 
Overall, the relations of the IGD with other Muslim organizations are highly complex 
and difficult to access. Besides the relationships described so far, the IGD is also 
supposed to be highly linked to the groups of Islamic Centers, like the Islamic Center 
Munich. These centers are frequently used by the IGD to host seminars, conferences and 
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other events.352 Moreover, the IGD is widely connected and interlinked with Islamist 
organizations on the European level through its membership in the Brotherhood-
affiliated Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE). 
It is important to note that the IGD publicly denounces its relationship 
with the Muslim Brotherhood and even strongly rejects any affiliation with it. However, 
several factors strongly indicate that the IGD is a direct offshoot of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. First, several senior leaders of the Egyptian Brotherhood, including its 
former murshid, Mohammed Akef, have spent extensive time in the Munich mosque led 
by the IGD. The fact that Sa‘id Ramadan founded the ISG speaks for itself.353 
Another interesting person in this respect is the former IGD president 
Ibrahim El-Zayat. Vidino calls him ―a quintessential New Western Brother.‖354 El-
Zayat, however, denies his membership in the Brotherhood, or any affiliation with this 
organization.355 He admits that the IGD has ―roots in the Muslim Brotherhood,‖ but 
clearly states that the IGD is not led or dominated by the Brotherhood.356 Even the 
official Brotherhood webpage, Ikhwanweb, called El-Zayat a ―member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood‖ until El-Zayat requested that the statement be changed357 Therefore, we 
should have enough indications that El-Zayat is at least a supporter of the Brotherhood. 
Interestingly, El-Zayat is also a board member of the company that controls and 
manages Milli Görüs mosques throughout Europe.358 These links between the IGD and 
Milli Görüs indicate a wider network of Islamist organizations. 
Members of the IGD such as El-Zayat play an important role in other 
ZMD membership organizations, too. Among these organizations are the GMGS, the 
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Islamic Council, the MSVD, and the charity organizations Muslime Helfen (Muslims 
Help) and Islamic Relief.359 This widespread linkage of the IGD, as well as its role in the 
FIOE, suggest that the organization actually strives for a wider common understanding 
of the role of Islam among Muslims in Europe. But is the IGD‘s understanding 
compatible with the definition of Euro-Islam? 
The activities of the IGD draw an inconclusive picture. On the one hand, 
until 2010, the IGD was actively involved in the DIK though the ZMD. On the other 
hand, in 2009, members of the IGD were accused of supporting terrorism.360 Moreover, 
the IGD-affiliated youth organization MJD has been harshly criticized by the 
Verfassungsschutz. In a manual for instructors, the aim of the courses is defined as 
teaching the students to identify the ―falsehood of Western governments, which support 
tyrannical Muslim leaders. …  Therefore, the students should feel a need to change the 
current political status quo (in the West and Muslim countries).‖361 Based on statements 
like this, it is no surprise that the Verfassungsschutz views allegedly Brotherhood-
affiliated organizations, including the IGD, as pursuing objectives that are not in 
compliance with the German constitution.362 
Official statements on the IGD‘s webpage, however, draw a different 
picture. In a press declaration on 11 January 2010, Samir Falah, the new president of the 
IGD, confirmed the IGD‘s commitment to a dialogue between all groups of society and 
the integration of Muslims into the ―society of the majority.‖363 In the Friday prayers, 
which are also published on the IGD webpage, clear commitments are made to German 
national laws and the rejection of tradition-based behaviors like arranged marriages.364  
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Overall, the IGD seems to be an Islamist organization that will not 
actively contribute to the development of Euro-Islam. The rhetoric used by some IGD-
affiliated organizations and the role individuals play in the organization, at least, put 
question marks behind the IGD‘s possible commitment to a ―new‖ form of Islam. 
Moreover, the influence of the FIOE, which will be analyzed later, makes the IGD‘s role 
as a promoter of Euro-Islam questionable. Identity, as propagated by the IGD, seems to 
be a matter of an Islamist ideology. 
b. Islamic Centre Hamburg (Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg, IZH) 
In the past, the IZH was assumed to be a centre of Iranian, Islamist 
thought, openly sponsored by the Iranian government. Publications of the organization 
allegedly praised the achievements of the Iranian Revolution.365 The IZH is still an 
organization with direct and open links to the Iranian government and is viewed, along 
with the Iranian embassy, as the most important official Iranian representative body in 
Germany. The imam heading the IZH has to be a recognized Muslim scholar, appointed 
by the Iranian supreme leader. 
With the appointment of Ayatollah Ghaemmaghami in 2004, the IZH 
chose an almost reformist way. Ghaemmaghami was praised as a reformist and a 
promoter of an ―Islam of reason.‖366 In his book ―European Islam or Islam in Europe?,‖ 
Ghaemmaghami gives evidence of his reformist approach. In the preface of this book, 
Udo Steinbach—the director of the German Orient Institute—appreciates 
Ghaemmaghami as an Islamic scholar who seeks to reestablish trust as a basis for 
peaceful coexistence and a European form of Islam.367 The IZH, for example, hosts 
Christian–Islamic seminars.368 Under the umbrella of the IZH, a youth and a women‘s 
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organization can be found. With the youth organization ―Schöne Aussicht‖ the IZH also 
addresses young Muslims on Islamic education and the definition of group identity.369  
The current head of the IZH, Ayatollah Ramezani, is thought to have 
turned back to a less reformist path. Ramezani allegedly views his role as an official 
representative of the Iranian Republic as his first priority.370 Therefore, it seems the 
support of Euro-Islam by the IZH has come to an end. Ghaemmaghami, however, until 
recently was head of the newly formed Islamic Society of Shi‘a Communities in 
Germany (Islamische Gemeinschaft der schiitischen Gemeinden in Deutschland e.V., 
IGS). The IGS has now become the legitimate representative umbrella organization of 
all Shi‘a communities in Germany.371 However, with Ghaemmaghami leaving and 
Ramezani becoming an influential person, it seems that this organization also follows 
the path of the IZH. 
The role of the IZH under Ghaemmaghami shows that even an 
organization that is clearly controlled by a foreign government can play a key role in the 
promotion of Euro-Islam. It is speculation, but under Ghaemmaghami, it might have 
been possible to promote a new identity of Shi‘a Muslims in Germany. Whether this 
chance has been missed has to be subject to future analysis. 
This brief analysis shows the variety of positions represented by the 
member organizations of the ZMD. Thus, despite its supposed intent, the ZMD might 
face some hard times in achieving its objective of developing a special European form of 
Islam—at least, a Euro-Islam that is compatible with the definition in this thesis. The 
nature of the ZMD as an umbrella organization of totally different organizations seems 
to be ideal approach to Euro-Islam, especially if the intra-organizational discourse on the 
future role of Islam in Europe is embedded in a dialogue with the wider German society. 
With its decision to leave the DIK, the ZMD, unfortunately, has taken a decision that is 
less promising. 
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5. The Islamic Council in Germany (Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, IRD) 
The IRD represents about 30 member organizations372 with some 40,000 to 
60,000 members. The largest organization of the IRD is the Islamic Community Milli 
Görüs (Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüs, IGMG), which has between 30,000 and 
57,000 members. Not surprisingly, the IRD is considered a Milli Görüs-dominated 
organization, and many of the other organizations represented by the IRD are thought to 
be heavily influenced by the IGMG.373 
In public, the IRD follows the path of all major Muslim organizations in 
Germany, espousing a commitment to the German constitution, pluralism, and 
secularism. What the IRD emphasizes in its program is its commitment to protecting 
Islam against false accusations and discrediting. In the perception of the IRD, 
discrimination against Islam is the predominant attitude in Germany.374 
The fact that the IGMG is the dominant organization in the IRD invites more 
insight into the aims and objectives of this organization. 
a. Milli Görüs 
Although Milli Görüs is not a direct offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
it can be considered closely linked to the ideology of the Brotherhood and, in Germany, 
has formed a quasi-alliance with the IGD. Milli Görüs was founded in the 1960s by the 
former Turkish prime minister Necmettin Erbakan. The movement‘s main message is 
one of ―social justice‖ and strong Turkish identity, both linked to strict adherence to the 
vision of Islam as a comprehensive system.375  
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In the understanding of Milli Görüs, a state based on democracy seems to 
have only a metaphorical meaning.376 The Verfassungsschutz estimates that more than 
300 mosques and local associations in Germany are controlled by Milli Görüs and 
considers the organization anti-democratic.377 However, not everybody who visits an 
IGMG mosque sympathizes with the political goals of the organization, and imams of 
IGMG mosques often constructively engage in dialogue with the local non-Muslim 
community.378 As will be shown later, activities of the IGMG are not limited to Turkey 
and Germany, and the perception of the IGMG in other countries differs from its 
perception in Germany. 
Through a network of mosques and organizations the IGMG is able to 
exercise its influence on Muslims in Germany without becoming visible. Organizations 
like the Institute for International Pedagogy and Didactic (Institut für Internationale 
Pädagogik und Didaktik) and the Center for Islamic Women‘s Studies and Promotion of 
Women (Zentrum für Islamische Frauenforschung und Frauenförderung) claim to be 
independent. However, the family relationships of members of this organizations and 
members of the IGMG suggest that these organizations belong to the same umbrella 
organization.379 Also most of the Islamic Federations are presumed to center around the 
IGMG.380 
The IGMG follows a path similar to the IGD. This does not make it a 
promising candidate for the promotion of Euro-Islam. More important, the German 
branch of IGMG seems to promote an identity that is based on Islamist ideology. This, 
again, makes its role very similar to the IGD. 
This analysis of Muslim organizations in Germany is but a small 
impression. The results as applied to the potential of promoting Euro-Islam are 
ambivalent, for different reasons. Analyzing a larger number of Muslim organizations 
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would not add much to answering the overall question of this thesis, but would only 
underline the high degree of diversity among Muslim organizations, such as the Islamic 
Society of Shia Muslim Communities in Germany or the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat, the 
Fettah Gülen Movement, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat and Jama’at al-Adl wal-Ishan. 
What is missing in Germany is an organization with significant outreach 
that could promote a new understanding of the role of Islam in Germany. The AABF 
looks like an ideal candidate, but its acceptance by the larger Muslim community in 
Germany seems to be limited. The question will be whether the landscape of Muslim 
organizations in Great Britain and the Netherlands will be as diverse, and its support for 
Euro-Islam as ambivalent, as in Germany. 
B.  GREAT BRITAIN 
In general, the landscape of Muslim organizations in Britain is as diverse and 
inconclusive as it is in Germany, making the development of a new, widely accepted 
Euro-Islam difficult. By contrast to Germany, Muslim organizations in the UK are 
mainly influenced by Muslims from Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Turkish 
organizations, like Milli Görüs and diyanet-affiliated organizations are active in the UK, 
but less influential. Moreover, ―liberal‖ Muslim organizations are more influential in 
Britain than in Germany.381 The increasing influence of liberal organizations occurred as 
the British government began to understand the differences among Islamist and Islamic 
organizations and consequently shifted policies.382 Since 2005, the British government 
has distanced itself from Islamist groups like the MCB, and started to cooperate with 
non-Islamist groups. While this is good news for Euro-Islam, unfortunately, less 
promising observations can be made in Britain, too. The number of radical groups and 
those willing to use violence is significantly higher in the UK.383 The role of Muslim 
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youth, in this respect, has been analyzed in Chapter III. But, there are additional 
differences from the situation in Germany. Islamist organizations have shown a higher 
degree of flexibility than their German counterparts and, in one case, even participated 
in national elections. Moreover, foreign policy plays a more important role in the goals 
of Muslim organizations in the UK. The overall influence on the development of Euro-
Islam, however, is similar. Umbrella organizations, led by older-generation Muslims, 
dominate the landscape of Muslim organizations, promoting an understanding of Islam 
that varies from conservatism to Islamism. 
As in Germany, most of the time umbrella organizations have played the 
dominant role in dialogue with the state. Thus, this analysis will focus on these umbrella 
organizations as well as on some UK-wide organizations. The most relevant of these are 
the MCB, the BMF and the SMC. Analogous to the assessment of German Muslim 
organizations, analysis of these umbrella organizations will serve as a starting point with 
analysis of their member organizations if necessary. Additionally, some of the liberal 
Muslim organizations that recently have come more influential will be analyzed. 
The organization of Muslims in the UK started in the 1960s. As in Germany, 
mosques have been the most important institutions. Thus, organization at that time 
evolved mainly locally, around ethnic groups, and was often intended to provide 
practical help and support in terms of housing, employment, immigration, or welfare. 
Leaders of these local communities were largely self-appointed, with limited legitimacy 
in reflecting the real needs and interests of local Muslim communities. Thus, their role in 
these communities was a matter of influence rather than actual power.384  
With the Muslim presence in Britain becoming permanent, the government 
started supporting un-elected Muslim bodies such as councils of mosques and, thereby, 
provided these groups with some form of legitimacy through consultation and the 
channeling of resources.385 In 1970, the Union of Muslim Organizations of the UK and 
Eire (UMO) emerged as the first umbrella organization of Muslims on the national level, 
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but essentially remained irrelevant.  Subsequently, the UK Action Committee on Islamic 
Affairs (UKACIA) as a more moderate, and the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain as a 
more confrontational, organization took up the objective of establishing a representation 
of Muslims in Britain on the national level.386 The initial objective of the UKACIA, 
established in 1988, was to coordinate a response to the publication of Salmon Rushdie‘s 
―Satanic Verses.‖ The members of this committee were then supported by the 
government in establishing a more representative body of Muslims in Britain. This led to 
the foundation of the MCB in 1997. In the period immediately following the invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2001, the government expected the MCB to manage British Muslim 
anger at the ―war on terror,‖ but instead the MCB eventually opposed British foreign 
policy. As a result, the government turned to the new BMF and SMC because ―they 
were regarded as less openly critical of government for foreign policy.‖387 
1.  The Muslim Council of Britain 
Since its establishment in 1997, the MCB emerged as the dominant Muslim 
organization in response to the government‘s demand for a single point of contact 
among Muslims in the UK.388 With the establishment of the MCB, for the first time, a 
large number of Muslims were represented by an umbrella organization covering a 
variety of different Muslim strains, but mainly Deobandi and Jama’at-I Islami -related 
organizations, including the UK Islamic Mission (UKIM), the Islamic Foundation (IF), 
Young Muslims UK (YMUK) and the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB).389 The 
leadership has traditionally been dominated by individuals from Mawdudist networks.390  
However, the MCB cannot be regarded as an organization representing all 
Muslims in Britain. Even more important, its representative function is rather limited. 
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According to recent surveys, less than 10% of Muslims in Britain feel represented by the 
MCB.391 This puts the MCB in position similar to Muslim umbrella organizations in 
Germany. Other Muslim organizations also frequently criticized the MCB‘s tendency to 
dominate the landscape of Muslim organizations in Britain and to utilize this dominance 
for its organizational interests, rather than the interests of Muslims in Britain.392 Despite 
this criticism, the support of the MCB—which comprises approximately 500 local, 
regional and national Muslim organizations—increased on the national level.393 
McLoughlin argues that it was the MCB that created ―a space for multiethnic, cross-
sectarian alliances which prioritized an overarching Muslim politics of identity.‖394 
The initial objectives of the MCB were a more enlightened appreciation of Islam 
and Muslims in the wider society and better community relations.395 The main aim and 
objective of the MCB, as defined in the organization‘s constitution,396 are to ―promote 
cooperation, consensus, and unity on Muslim affairs in the UK.‖ The MCB views itself 
as a nonsectarian body that bases its decisions and policies on consensus and the largest 
practicable measure of common agreement.‖397 This, however, sounds contradictory and 
offers at least some room for speculation whether specific, affiliated, member 
organizations can actually dominate the MCB. One of the main points of interest for the 
MCB is the opportunity for Islam to conform to education in the UK. Stopping 
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suspension of vaccination programs for children repeatedly were on the agenda of the 
MCB.398  Furthermore, the MCB seeks to counter a perceived discrimination against 
Islam and Muslims, especially by the media.399 
After 9/11, however, the MCB, which had become the preferred partner for the 
British government, failed in meeting the expectation that it would back the ―war on 
terror.‖ The British government assumed that it was more likely to reach violent 
Islamists through nonviolent Islamist organizations that enjoyed some form of respect 
among potential terrorists.400 The Islamist heritage of some MCB activists, however, 
added to growing suspicion among government officials. In 2009, the government 
suspended its formal relations with the MCB after senior members of the MCB endorsed 
attacks on foreign troops intercepting arms destined for Gaza.401  
Although Muslim organizations in Germany frequently criticize Israel, the role 
of foreign policy is much more visible in the policies and objectives of Muslim 
organizations in Britain. In 2006, the British government was repeatedly criticized by 
the MCB for its foreign policy, which allegedly would contribute to the radicalization of 
Muslims in Britain and abroad.402 While this criticism cannot be totally rejected, it also 
shows that tensions exist between the British government and the MCB. The reaction by 
the MCB on Prime Minister Cameron‘s recent speech at the Munich Security 
Conference in February 2011, allegedly focusing on security rather than on real 
integration, gives further evidence for this tension.403 
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Thus, besides strong criticism from British foreign policymakers, there are 
almost no indications concerning the MCB‘s view of Euro-Islam—which requires a 
closer look at some of its affiliated organizations. 
a. The Islamic Society of Britain (ISB) and the Muslim 
Association of Britain (MAB) 
The ISB was founded in 1990. It was the first Islamist organization in the 
UK that was heavily influenced by Egyptian and Palestinian Muslim Brother 
activists.404 The similarity in the name to the IGD in Germany is just one indicator of 
the common roots both organizations share and their linkage on the European level. 
Kemal el-Helbawy, a former member of the Central Guidance Bureau of Egypt‘s 
Muslim Brotherhood, was the first leader of the ISB. He understood the opportunities 
available to Islamists in the open societies of the West. After Helbawy clashed with the 
Muslim Brotherhood‘s leadership in Egypt in 1997 he, together with other Brothers in 
Britain, founded the MAB, which has come to be regarded as the British branch of the 
Brotherhood.405  
The ISB, nevertheless, is still in existence with fourteen branches all over 
the UK and its own youth wing, the ―Young Muslims.‖ On its home page406 the ISB 
expresses a clear commitment to values that are in line with the definition of Euro-Islam:  
democracy, the rejection of violence, equality of men and women, no polygamy or 
forced marriage, adherence to the British legal system, and a notion of shari‘a that 
rejects tradition-based punishment. Over time, the ISB has successfully developed a 
number of innovative projects to try to engage both Muslims and others. These include 
the Islamic Scouts of Britain and Islam Awareness Week.407 With these activities and the 
organization ―The Young Muslims,‖ the ISB has some valuable tools to reach young 
Muslims. Organizations and projects like this can be of high importance in the 
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development of young Muslims‘ identity as European or British citizens. Thus, 
approaches as chosen by the ISB could be utilized. Its understanding of Islam, by 
contrast, follows a more conservative path and it might be unenthusiastic about the 
establishment of a more liberal form of Islam. 
After its split from the ISB, the MAB became the more publicly visible 
organization. There are currently about eleven MAB branches around the UK. The 
MAB‘s aim is to ―project and convey the message of Islam in its pure and unblemished 
form.‖408 Although this does not necessarily contradict the elements of Euro-Islam, such 
as democracy, pluralism etc., it is a clear indicator that the MAB does not seek to 
develop a new form of Euro-Islam that addresses the life of Muslims in a secular, 
European context. 
After 9/11 and the consequent invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
MAB was able to extend its influence on the MCB.409 While the MCB wanted to keep 
its good relationship with the British government, the MAB seized the initiative, 
opposing the war in Afghanistan and taking the lead in organizing Muslim opposition to 
Israel. Subsequently, however, they took the MCB with them. The first time the MAB 
attracted public interest was in 2002, when it organized a large pro-Palestinian rally in 
London.410 In 2003 they entered a kind of partnership with the leftist ―Stop the War 
Coalition,‖ a new organization formed to oppose the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Despite the differences of emphasis, anti-Zionism and opposition to Western foreign 
policy were the founding principles of the leftist–Islamist alliance.411 MAB leaders 
openly acknowledged the ideological differences between the two parties but referred to 
the ―greater objectives‖ to be achieved.412 
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The MAB‘s role as the Muslim organizer of anti-war demonstrations 
pushed it into a leading position in the Muslim community in Britain without enlarging 
its grassroots base. Although the MAB‘s position with regard to the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq reflected that of many Muslims, by 2003 the MAB still counted only about 
1,000 members.413  
Over time, the MAB shifted to a more and more anti-Western, anti-
Israeli, anti-Semitic outlook.414 The MAB, for example, promoted support for 
Palestinian suicide bombings, and its leadership repeatedly echoed the views of al-
Qaradawi that Israeli civilians are different from the civilians of other countries because 
all Israelis are past, current, or future soldiers; and that suicide bombings in Israel should 
not, therefore, be thought of as terrorism.415 While opposition to the foreign policy of 
Great Britain in general cannot be taken as evidence of a rejection of Western values, the 
justification of suicide bombings against Israeli civilian targets cannot be accepted by 
any European political leader and strongly rejects the spirit of Euro-Islam. Therefore, it 
is not the MAB‘s opposition to Israel that matters, but its justification of any means that 
promise success. 
Despite these anti-governmental and anti-Israeli positions and activities, 
the MAB became increasingly involved in cooperation with the government. This was 
the result of a change in governmental policies in Britain to shift from dealing with the 
MCB as a kind of monopoly to dealing with a wider range of Muslim organizations.416 
In December 2005, for example, the MAB was drawn into efforts to secure the release 
of a British hostage in Iraq.417 Also, the police used the MAB in its efforts to take 
control of the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, which, under the leadership of al-
Masri, supported several convicted and suspected terrorists. The Muslim Contact Unit of 
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the Metropolitan Police in London valued this cooperation and claimed that it had 
helped to reduce the threat of terrorist recruitment. In return, the MAB derived a level of 
acceptance and recognition from the cooperation with the police.418  
Due to divergent opinions about the degree to which the organization 
should engage in high-profile political activities, by February 2006 the British Muslim 
Initiative separated from the MAB to maintain the political activities of the anti-war 
campaigns. Other initiatives that sprang from the MAB were the Cordoba Foundation 
and Islamicpeace.org.uk, which seeks to improve perceptions of Islam among the 
general public. A theme that still unites these organizations is their opposition to current 
Western policies and military operations in Muslim countries.419 Although the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are on the agenda of Muslim 
organizations in Germany, they play a less prominent role than they play in the UK. 
The fact that former leaders of the MAB like el-Helbawy do not deny 
their membership in the Muslim Brotherhood leaves no doubt that the MAB represents a 
British branch.420 To analyze whether the MAB‘s aims and objectives are in line with 
Euro-Islam, however, is more complicated. A view of the organization‘s webpage 
provides a rather vague definition of its goals and objectives.421 Here, the MAB states 
that it is ―dedicated to serving society through promoting Islam in its spiritual teachings, 
ideological and civilizing concepts, and moral and human values.‖ The overarching 
objective, thereby, is ―to achieve the positive integration of Muslims in the wider British 
society.‖ Most important issues to tackle are drug addiction, rising crime, failure in 
education, the spread of racism, and Islamophobia. Moreover, the MAB states, it wants 
to encourage dialogue and cooperation between religions. This sounds promising. 
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On the other hand, certain statements by MAB officials raise doubts 
about the MAB‘s objectives. In this respect, the positions of Sheik al Qaradawi are of 
high importance. The MAB warmly welcomes and supports the teachings and fatwas of 
al Qaradawi.422 This, in general, does not sound threatening, taking al Qaradawi‘s 
presumably moderate stance into account. In an article on the MAB‘s webpage, al 
Qaradawi praises democracy as ―the simplest and proper way to achieve the aims of a 
noble life.‖ At the same time, he clearly states that democracy may be only adopted if it 
benefits Muslims‘ purpose and only as long as it does not contradict clear Islamic edicts 
and the rules of shari‘a. His statement that ―we do not relinquish or compromise what is 
ordained or compulsory,‖423 moreover, cannot be considered a full-hearted commitment 
to the concept of Western democracy and the principle of one law for all. His position 
on Israel has already been mentioned above. 
In summary, this analysis shows that the MAB is not a radical Islamist 
organization trying to overthrow the current system. Much more, the MAB has proven 
to be a valuable partner for state officials when it comes to countering recruitment of 
terrorists or to de-radicalizing Muslims in Britain. Also the MAB‘s engagement in the 
2004 and 2005 elections as partners in the Islamist-leftist formation RESPECT show the 
flexibility the MAB shows when it serves its interests.424 However, the MAB pursues a 
very conservative understanding of Islam, if not to say an Islamist understanding. The 
prominent role of al Qaradawi and the MAB‘s membership in the FIOE provide some 
evidence for the organization‘s Islamist nature. Therefore, at least, some doubts might 
be justified as to whether the MAB might be a reliable partner in the promotion of Euro-
Islam, and the British government‘s decision to choose other partners among Muslim 
organizations seems reasonable. 
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b. The UK Islamic Mission (UKIM) 
While the UKIM was praised for its valuable multicultural activities by 
Tony Blair when he was prime minister, recent reports have called it an organization 
that supports the ideas of the Afghan Taliban and calls for armed jihad.425 The UKIM, 
founded in 1962, has over forty branches around Britain. Most of these branches 
administer a mosque, usually staffed by imams recruited from overseas. The UKIM 
works in the fields of education and welfare. Its educational work includes seminars, 
exhibitions, and courses about Islam for young people and community groups.426  
The UKIM views itself as an ideological movement with the aim of 
reviving Islam ―in its comprehensive form,‖ meaning that all dimensions of human life 
must be guided by appealing to Islam. The Qur‘an offers the required guidance. In its 
publications, the UKIM proclaims a rather missionary approach. Statements like 
―developing an outreach to the society at large in order to share Islam,‖ and ―taking a 
lead in changing individuals and society with all its dimensions‖ are just two examples 
that suggest the missionary motivation of the UKIM, although it denies such 
intentions.427 
Even if a peaceful struggle over ideas is at the core of modern 
democracies, the statements by the UKIM do not allow one to conclude that the UKIM 
can become a promoter of Euro-Islam. Much more, it seems, the UKIM‘s understanding 
of Euro-Islam is one of Islamization, although through ideas and discussion.  
c. The Islamic Sharia Council (ISC) 
The organizations that have been analyzed so far have to be viewed as 
interest groups that represent the interests and objectives of their constituencies. The role 
of the ISC is different. The ISC considers itself a stabilizing influence within the UK 
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Muslim community, an institution that is essential for the survival of Muslim 
communities.428 The ISC claims to be accepted by the UK Muslim community as an 
authoritative body, issuing fatwas, especially in the field of family law, but also more 
general aspects of life. The council is composed of Sunni Muslim scholars, often 
members of MCB affiliated organizations.429  
If the claim of the ISH to be an accepted and its role as an authoritative 
institution among Muslims in Britain is correct, the ISH could play a crucial role in the 
promotion of Euro-Islam. If the ISH interprets Islamic law in the temporal context of 
modern Europe, it could convince Muslims of the compatibility of Islam and modern, 
secular, European societies and contribute thereby to the development of Euro-Islam. A 
look at the ISH‘s fatwas, unfortunately, is rather disappointing. Fatwas on 
homosexuality,430 Muslim women who want to convert and marry a Christian,431 or the 
consequences of education in co-educational curricula432 express a worldview 
dominated by a hardline interpretation of Islam rather than an enlightened, modern one. 
In these fatwas, homosexuality is condemned as diabolical, women working in male-
dominated jobs are assessed as unlawful, and Muslims, in general, are forced to adhere 
to Western rules. An institution promoting such an understanding of Islam has to be 
regarded an obstacle for Euro-Islam. 
This is only a small extract of the MCB-affiliated organizations. The 
nature of member organizations varies widely and includes nationwide as well as more 
regional organizations. Moreover the MCB includes Sunni, as well as Shi‘a 
organizations. The analysis of the Sunni organizations, however, has shown a rather 
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Islamist interpretation prevailing among these groups. Moreover, MSB affiliated Shia‘a 
organizations frequently complain about anti-Shia resentments of the MCB 
leadership.433 This clearly violates the acceptance of pluralism as an essential element of 
Euro-Islam. Therefore, overall, the MCB does not seem to be a valuable partner in 
promoting Euro-Islam. 
However, as a study by the RAND Corporation points out, ―Britain is 
also home to moderate Muslim organizations … supportive of liberal Western values 
and institutions.‖434 This, again, is good news for the promotion of Euro-Islam. In 
contrary to the organizations described above, these moderate or even liberal 
organizations are often not representative bodies, but think tanks that seek to advise 
British government organizations and initiate discussion among Muslim intellectuals. 
Their influence on the wider Muslim community in the UK, currently, is limited, but 
seeming to grow. 
2. The Progressive British Muslims (PBM) 
The PBM, founded in 2005, is supposed to be the most liberal group among 
Muslim organizations in Britain. The group aims at combating violent extremism, 
promoting Muslim integration, and advancing liberal values, such as gender equality, 
freedom of speech, respect for all faiths, human rights, and democracy.435 Thus, the 
PBM seems to be a potential candidate for promoting Euro-Islam.  
The organization evolved from a feeling of misrepresentation by then-existing 
Muslim organizations. The PBM views itself not as a representative body, but as a body 
whose members‘ views reflect those of a significant number of Muslims in Britain.436  
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The members of the PBM consider themselves to be ―British, integrated into mainstream 
society, and to have a cultural identity as Muslims.‖ The PBM does not claim to have 
any religious scholarship and declines to judge others.437 
The PBM stands for a variety of rather new Muslim groups that feel 
unrepresented by organizations like the MCB and seek to channel a liberal 
understanding of Islam to the British public. These organizations could play a very 
supportive role in the development of Euro-Islam. The members of these organizations 
could lead the respective development process by example: they are integrated, 
successful in business, feel British, respect democracy and pluralism, and still embrace a 
Muslim identity. Whether the message of these groups is received and understood by the 
broader Muslim community in Britain is hard to assess. A lack of interest by the media 
in organizations like the PBM and the limited access that members of the PBM have to 
mosques limits, to a certain extent, the effectiveness of PBM ideas and messages. 
Nevertheless, there are clear indications that liberal Muslims in Britain also organize. 
3. The Sufi Muslim Council (SMC) 
The SMC is another example of a new Muslim organization resulting from 
disappointment with established organizations. In 2006, the SMC was launched with 
government support to challenge the dominance of the MCB among British Muslim 
organizations. 438 The organization strives to promote an interpretation of traditional 
Islamic thought in the context of contemporary Britain.439 It claims to provide a voice 
for the 80% of UK Muslims who are Sufis440 and sees itself as a representative of the 
silent majority of moderate Muslims in Britain.  
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From its very beginning, the SMC was criticized by the MCB as 
unrepresentative and divisive.441 Members of the SMC rejected the MCB critique and 
pointed to the SMC‘s partnership with the BMF as evidence for the importance of the 
SMC. The BMF was established a year earlier to give Barelwi Muslims a voice. 
Recently, the organization has been mainly inactive in public, and its website shows no 
evidence of new activities, too. 
As an organization in the tradition of Sufi thought, the SMC can be regarded as 
largely apolitical.442 Whether the SMC would support an interpretation of Islam as 
defined in the concept of Euro-Islam is hard to assess. By contrast with organizations 
like PBM, the SMC and BMF have control over mosques, which provides them with an 
opportunity to reach a larger group of Muslims. Despite its apolitical nature, the SMC 
seems to stick to the roots of its school of thought, which would leave only limited space 
to engage in a discourse on a Euro-Islam that would accommodate the majority of 
Muslims, not only in Britain, but also in Europe. 
This analysis of Muslim organizations has proven the diversity of Muslim 
organizations that is just a reflection of Muslims living in the UK. This is similar to the 
situation in Germany. What makes the UK different is that Muslims who reject the 
notion of Islam as represented by the established organizations (MCB, MAB, etc.) have 
come to the forefront, seeking to inform Muslims, as well as others, and to promote 
integration into the self-perception of British Muslims. In addition to organizations like 
the BPM, Islamic think tanks—for example the Quilliam Foundation (QF)—have been 
established. QF not only invests in research, but also in media activities, training of 
government personnel, community events, and outreach activities at universities and 
schools.443 In this role, QF and alike have replaced the MCB and MAB as the primary 
partner in cooperation with government officials and also become credible partners for 
young Muslims. Even the MCB has meanwhile recognized that it has to engage in 
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dialogue with organizations like the QF to avoid becoming irrelevant.444 This fear of the 
MCB might not be without reason, taking into account that especially young Muslims 
think that the MCB is dominated by older men who cannot speak for the young.445 
All this gives hope for a new form of Islam developing in Great Britain. 
Unfortunately, there are still organizations at work with contradicting intentions. Also 
individuals, like Anjem Choudary, repeatedly seek to publicly promote their radical 
interpretation of Islam.446  
C. THE NETHERLANDS 
The landscape of Muslim organizations in the Netherlands is similar to that in 
Germany and Britain. Thus, the analysis of Muslim organizations in the Netherlands will 
focus on the major differences. This is not to undervalue the importance of Muslim 
organizations in the development of Euro-Islam. However, due to the fact that Turkish 
Muslims are the majority Muslim group in the Netherlands, the structure of Muslim 
organizations—as in Germany—can be observed. The strong influence of the Turkish 
and Moroccan government, a definition of identity along national and ethnic lines, and a 
certain degree of separation among the organizations are characteristics of the landscape 
of Muslim organizations that have already been observed in the countries analyzed 
above. In general, these characteristics have a rather hindering influence on the 
development of Euro-Islam. 
What makes the Netherlands different is the degree of recognition and 
responsibility the Dutch government has offered to leading umbrella organizations.  
Giving these organizations a more prominent status and specific rights clearly makes 
these organizations feel superior to other groups. This can be an important step in  
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leveraging the identification Muslims have with their country of residence, and can also 
be a valuable way to leverage the development of the new form of Muslim identity that 
is so essential to establish Euro-Islam. 
Traditionally, organizations have played an important role in Dutch society. A 
widespread network of nongovernmental organizations serves as a layer between 
government and citizens. These organizations engage in consultation and cooperation 
with the government and, thereby, have become powerful institutions. This is a leftover 
of the former system of pillarization. When it comes to religious, non-Christian 
organizations, however, Dutch authorities have been reluctant to grant a role in such 
negotiations, because this would presumably infringe upon the separation of Church and 
State.447  
The mosque is the focal point of Muslim communities in the Netherlands, and 
mosques are still attended along ethnic lines, although the number of nonethnic mosques 
is growing.448 About 500 mosques can be found in the Netherlands. Approximately half 
of them are Turkish influenced and another 100 to 150 can be called Moroccan 
dominated.449 A hundred and forty of the Turkish mosques are controlled by the diyanet, 
35 by Milli Görüs and 38 by Suleymancis. The 25 Surinamese mosques are controlled 
by the World Islamic Mission, which is located in Great Britain but of less influence 
than the organizations analyzed before.450  
Initially Muslims of different nationalities molded together, but later cooperation 
among Muslim evolved mainly among national entities. This was mainly a consequence 
of language barriers, but also of identity and loyalty, which, as pointed out in Chapter 
III, was mainly based on nationality and ethnicity. Until recently, the desire to form 
nationwide organizations as representative bodies in the dialogue with the Dutch 
government was hindered by national, ideological, ethnic differences.  
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As in Germany and Great Britain, there is no single representative Muslim body 
in the Netherlands, despite strong Muslim and Dutch attempts.451 Currently, the Muslim 
Contact Organ Muslims and Government (Contact Orgaan Moslims Overheid, CMO) 
and the Contact Group Islam (Contactgroep Islam, CGI) function as representative 
bodies and take part in regular meetings with the Dutch Ministry of Housing, 
Neighborhoods and Integration, which has recognized both organizations as official 
contact platforms.452 As will be laid out later, these organizations have also been granted 
official status by other ministries, which makes the legal status of the CMO and CGI 
superior to other Muslim organizations, not only in the Netherlands, but also in 
Germany and the UK. However, these organizations share a lack of wide acceptance and 
credibility among young Muslims with their counterparts in Germany and the UK. First, 
they are regarded as cliques of first-generation men, out of touch with youth. Second, 
they are accused of being too compliant with the Dutch government and anti-Islamic 
politicians.453  
The specific status the CMO and CGI enjoy, however, make them a valid 
starting point for an analysis of the role that Dutch Muslim organizations can play in the 
promotion of Euro-Islam. 
1. Contact Organ Muslims and Government 
The CMO represents five Turkish, a Moroccan, a Surinamese and a Shi‘a 
organization. The Turkish organizations are the Islamic Foundation Netherlands 
(Islamitische Stichting Nederland, ISN) the Turkish Islamic Cultural Foundation 
(Stichting Turks Islamitische Culturele Federatie, STICF), two sections of Milli Görüs 
affiliated organizations and the Foundation of Islamic Centre the Netherlands (Stichting 
Islamitisch Centrum Netherlands, SICN). Also Surinami Muslims are represented 
through the World Islamic Mission (WIM). The CMO claims to represent 500,000 
Muslims and 369 mainly Sunni mosques.454 
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In 2007 and 2008, the CMO gained additional importance after the Dutch 
Ministry of Security and Justice and the Ministry of Defense temporarily appointed the 
CMO as a so-called missionary organization (zendende instantie), which has the right to 
provide spiritual counselors for the justice department and the military.455 In March 
2011, the Ministry of Security and Justice granted the CMO a permanent status as 
zendende instantie.456 This special status seems to make the CMO also a promising 
candidate for the promotion of Euro-Islam. However, as the analysis of umbrella 
organizations in Germany and Great Britain has shown, the affiliated member 
organizations often have an agenda that does not keep up with the promises the parent 
organization makes. Therefore, some of the CMO affiliated organizations have to be 
analyzed. 
a. The Islamic Foundation Netherlands (Islamitische Stichting 
Nederland, ISN) 
With more than 140 mosques and founded in 1982, the ISN is the largest 
Muslim organization in the Netherlands. This organization, like the DITIB in Germany, 
is linked to the Turkish diyanet. As in Germany, this makes the organization, for many, 
an extended arm of the Turkish government.457 But, the activities of the organization are 
manifold, ranging from issuing fatwas to the arrangement of sports and youth 
activities.458 Like his counterpart in Germany, the president of the ISN is associated 
with the Turkish embassy. He holds the position for a maximum of four years.459 
Comparable to the DITIB, the staff and imams of the ISN are Turkish civil servants.  
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Due to its governmental character, the ISN has a special relationship with 
other Turkish-Islamic organizations. Besides the STICF—an organization with close ties 
to the ISN—the relationship between these organizations in the Netherlands is less tense 
than in Germany. On certain occasions the ISN cooperated with the Alevi organization 
HAK-DER, but kept this kind of activity in low profile because of the situation Alevi 
face in Turkey and the position of the Turkish government.460  
Overall, however, an analysis of the ISN‘s possible role in the promotion 
of Euro-Islam has to come to the same result as for the DITIB in Germany. The control 
by the Turkish governments is most likely a guarantee against radical Islamist trends, 
but it is also an obstacle to establishing Euro-Islam. 
b. The Foundation of the Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation 
(Stichting Turks-Islamitische Culturele Federatie, STICF) 
The STICF was founded in 1979. Originally, the ISN and STICF sought 
to operate under a division of labor, although the STICF has no formal relationship with 
the Turkish state. While the ISN was supposed to be responsible for theological issues, 
the STICF would organize cultural and social events at the grassroots level. The STICF 
shares mosques with the ISN as a consequence of the division of labor. The ISN 
manages the facility and runs the religious services. The STICF organizes community 
activities.461 This relationship between the ISN and the STICF also limited the activities 
of the STICF on the national level, which is more or less the sole arena of the ISN.462 A 
report for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs even argues that the STICF ―has 
gradually been brought under the control of the ISN.‖463 Therefore, its role in the 
development of Euro-Islam is determined by the ISN. 
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c. Milli Görüs 
Outside the scope of diyanet-dominated Turkish Muslim organizations, 
Milli Görüs has become the major organization in the Netherlands. The Dutch Milli 
Görüs is part of a European network controlled from the headquarters in Cologne. In the 
Netherlands, Milli Görüs is divided into a northern part (Milli Görüs [Noord] 
Nederland) and a southern part (Nederlandse Islamitische Federatie). Especially the 
northern group has chosen an approach of dialogue and pluralism and intensively 
engaged in discussion over the role of Islam in the Netherlands. Thus, the Dutch branch 
of Milli Görüs is, in general, thought to be more moderate than its German counterpart, 
and some argue that nowadays, modernist tendencies can be observed within Milli 
Görüs.464  
Which role Milli Görüs will finally take in the development of Euro-
Islam is hard to assess. Currently, it seems that it has chosen a path consistent with the 
ideal of Euro-Islam. However, the ideas and objectives of the Milli Görüs headquarters 
may still prevail. The approach of the Dutch government, to grant the Christian churches 
and Muslim organizations equal rights, could ensure that Milli Görüs in the Netherlands 
will follow its current path. 
d. The Union of Moroccan Mosque Organizations in the 
Netherlands 
The Union of Moroccan Mosques Organizations in the Netherlands (Unie 
van Marokkaanse Organisaties Nederland, UMMON) is the largest organization of 
Moroccan Muslims in the Netherlands and also a member organization of the CMO. The 
UMMON was founded in 1978. Its initial objectives included the uniformity of the time 
of Ramadan, the establishment of abattoirs under Islamic law, and the creation of 
Muslim cemeteries, and its main objective was to build new mosques. Today it is 
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responsible for more than a hundred mosques.465 The UMMON is supposed to represent 
the ―official Moroccan Islam.‖466 This position of the UMMON has provoked the 
establishment of opposing organizations. With the inauguration of King Mohammed VI 
in 1999 and changes in the political situation in Morocco, criticism of the UMMON by 
other Morroccan organizations, moreover, vanished.467 The education of imams at 
UMMON mosques has often been subject to criticism. Turkish organizations criticize 
the low level of education of imams in Moroccan mosques and in the Netherlands in 
general.468 Here, it is important to note that these imams, unlike the imams in the 
mosques of the ISN, are not provided by a Moroccan governmental organization. Imams 
in UMMON mosques are often recruited through informal networks. Some are even 
educated in the institutes of other Muslim organizations, for example the WIM.469 
The role of the UMMON in the development of Euro-Islam is an 
interesting subject for future research. While the UMMON, so far, has promoted the 
preservation of the national identity of Moroccans in the Netherlands, the current 
changes in the Middle East might change Middle-Eastern governments‘ outreach to 
expatriates and immigrants.   
2. Contact Group Islam 
Contact Group Islam (CGI) has evolved as a matter of protest against the 
exclusion of Shi‘a in the CMO. The CGI consists of Shi‘a, Sunni, Ahmadiyya and Alevi 
organizations, as well as a Turkish umbrella organization.470 When the CGI was formed 
in 2004, it criticized the CMO for being intolerant and unwilling to accept liberal trends 
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within Islam.471 Today, the CGI has about 115,000 members. In the media, the CGI, 
however, is less visible than the CMO, which makes an assessment of their objectives 
and aims without inside knowledge difficult. 
In summary, the situation of Muslim organizations in the Netherlands is not 
significantly different from that in Germany and Great Britain. Turkish Muslims are 
much better organized and represented than other entities. Some groups, like Moluccans 
and Indonesians, show only a very low degree of organization.472 Additionally, 
organizations like Al Nisa (an organization of Muslim women) and Muslim student 
organizations address very specific interests among Muslims in the Netherlands. The 
World Islamic Mission (WIM) in the Netherlands is part of the wider network of the 
WIM, representing Hindustanie Sunni Muslims, and a variety of other smaller 
organizations addressing very specific groups and issues. 
Despite their different objectives and characteristics, these organizations 
unanimously condemn radical Islamists like Hizb ut-Tahrir. In 2010, UMMON and 
other Muslim organizations condemned an initiative of Hiz ut-Tahrir members in the 
Netherlands, calling Muslims to boycott the elections in 2009.473 Thus, despite the 
current tensions between Muslims and others in the Netherlands, as described in Chapter 
III, there is also some reason for hope. 
Overall, the role Muslim organizations in the Netherlands can play in the 
promotion of Euro-Islam is totally comparable to the situation in Germany and the UK, 
despite the fact that the CMO and CGI are much more privileged than other Muslim 
organizations in Europe. 
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D.  MUSLIM ORGANIZING ON THE EUROPEAN LEVEL 
The analysis of Muslim organizations on the national level has shown that 
organizing is in an early stage and that, so far, no country has seen an organization that 
speaks for all Muslims in the country. Therefore, it is no surprise that organizing 
Muslims on the European level is less visible. The analysis, however, has also shown 
that, for now, it might be more important for Muslim organizations to focus on the 
national level. National governments are still the main source of the rights they demand. 
Thus, Euro-Islam is currently not about institutionalization on the European level, but 
the promotion of core European values. As discussions in Europe show, this might be 
where the discourse on Euro-Islam can also significantly benefit Europeans themselves. 
Organizations that facilitate a European conversation on the role of Islam are 
almost absent. Those organizations that form a European network belong to Islamist 
networks, like the Muslim Brotherhood and Milli Görüs. Their aims and objectives, as 
the analysis shows, will not contribute to the development of Euro-Islam as understood 
in this thesis. Other organizations like the European Muslim Network (EMN) suggest a 
wider representation of Muslims in Europe and already have signaled their willingness 
to facilitate a European-wide discussion. However, the EMN views itself as a think tank 
and its influence is limited. Among the members of the EMN, El-Zayat and Tariq 
Ramadan can be found, which suggests a rather Islamist orientation of the EMN.474 The 
European Muslim Union (EMU) and the European Muslim Initiative for Social 
Cohesion are some other organizations that are active on the European level, but have 
only minor influence. The latter even views itself as a nonreligious group.475 Another 
type of European-wide coordination of Muslim organizations comes in the forms of 
government-sponsored organizations. Here, Turkey maintains the best-developed 
network of Muslim organizations. But, as the analysis of the respective organizations on 
the national level has shown, this network will not necessarily be supportive in the 
development of Euro-Islam.  
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The Alevi community in Europe maintains its own network. The Confederation 
of Alevi Communities in Europe (Arrupa Alevi Birliklevi Konfederasyona, AABK) was 
founded in 2002 as an Alevi umbrella organization and was legally registered in 2006. It 
defines itself as a democratic faith organization and calls for dissociation from the 
diyanet in Turkey. Moreover, the organization seeks to utilize the EU-Turkish 
association process to leverage change in Turkey in their favor. The similarity in the 
name with the AABF suggests a close relationship between both organizations, and, 
indeed, the AABF forms the organizational core of the AABK.476 Taking the moderate 
and liberal nature of the AABF into account, the AABK could become a valuable 
partner to promote Euro-Islam throughout Europe. Its specific role as an organization of 
Alevi, however, limits its influence on the wider Muslim community in Europe. 
Otherwise, cooperation of Muslims on the European level is limited to specific 
projects. Currently, for example, Muslim organizations have launched an initiative to 
establish a European standard for halal food and the right to ritual slaughtering.477 
Initiatives by the European Union itself are hard to find. It seems that the responsibility 
for dialogue lies exclusively with national governments. 
Under these circumstances, an in-depth analysis of Muslim organizing on the 
European level will add little value to this thesis. However, to illustrate the kind of 
networks that have been established, the role of the FIOE—one of the more prominent 
Muslim organizations on the European level—will be analyzed in some more detail. 
1. The Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe 
In 1989 an international forum, the FIOE, was created in order to maintain links 
between immigrated Brotherhood leaders. Leading members of the German IGD as well 
as of the British MAB and MIB, have been founding members of the FIOE and ECFR, 
and the IGD and the MAB are still members of the FIOE. Dutch organizations cannot  
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currently be found among the FIOE-affiliated organizations. The FIOE claims to be the 
largest Islamic organization on the European level, which, as the previous analysis has 
shown, and a recent study confirms, does not mean much.478 
Central to the efforts of the FIOE is Sheikh al Qaradawi, who is also the main 
driving force behind the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR).479 Another 
FIOE-linked organization is the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student 
Organizations (FEMYSO). Consequently, the IGD- and MAB-affiliated youth 
organizations, Muslimische Jugend in Germany and Young Muslims in the UK, are 
member organizations of the FEMYSO.  
In addition to the agenda and objectives of FIOE member organizations, a 
reflection on the previous mentioned statements of Qaradawi suggests an Islamist nature 
of the ECFR and FIOE. The official statements of the FIOE, however, come in a 
moderate tone,480 but the statements of the FIOE-affiliated ECFR shed more light on the 
ideology of both organizations. 
The ECFR center seeks to provide guidance to Muslims in Europe in order to 
enable them to live their lives according to the Qur‘an and sunna in a European context. 
The language of the fatwas issued by the ECFR is composed in the same form of 
moderate language used by the FIOE. As a recent study points out, the fatwas often 
reflect fundamentalist intolerance and represent a ―dangerously separatist attitude.‖481  
Despite its membership in the FIOE and adherence to an ostensibly same 
ideological basis, Leiken and Brooke argue that the Brotherhood in Europe is a 
collection of national groups with different outlooks, and the various factions disagree 
about how best to advance the Brotherhood‘s mission.482 As Sarah Silvestri argues, the 
FIOE is primarily a public relations and political organization concerned with raising the 
                                                 
478 Al-Alawi et al., A Guide to Sharia Law, 130. 
479 Whine, ―The Muslim Brotherhood in the UK,‖ 32. 
480 FIOE, ―Our Mission,‖ accessed February 12, 2011. http://www.euro-muslim.com/eu_our-
mission.aspx. 
481 Al-Alawi et al., A Guide to Sharia Law, 127. 
482 Leiken and Brooke, ―The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,‖ 108.  
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profile and enhancing the participation of Muslims in Europe.483 The FIOE is thus a 
kind of forum rather than a central authority. This opinion is shared by the Pew Research 
Center. In a recent study, it is argued that the national entities of the Brotherhood are 
best understood as loose affiliates rather than as formal branches of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. That not all representatives of the Brotherhood are satisfied with this 
situation shows in a statement by Helbawi. In an interview with Le Monde 
Diplomatique, he complained, ―the international organization is not an organization at 
all. It is just a coordinating body …  We need to create a global forum for dialogue and 
to increase our activities.‖484  This sounds like a call for deeper integration. Deeper 
integration and cooperation of Muslim organizations on the European level, however, is 
still to come and, as stated above, it might be more important for Muslim organizations 
to focus on the national level to facilitate the discourse on the role of Islam. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of Muslim organizations in the studied countries emphasizes the 
proposition that the development of Euro-Islam is mainly an exercise of a small group 
rather than an effort supported by a wide group of Muslim organizations. The landscape 
of Muslim organization can be characterized as follows: 
- A high degree of diversity 
- Influence of foreign governments and foreign movements  
- Partial animosities between organizations  
- Differing perceptions of the future role of Islam in Europe  
- Only limited representative function 
The high degree of diversity does not surprise, taking the diversity of the Muslim 
communities in the studied countries into account. Moreover, it is an expression of the 
                                                 
483 Silvestri, ―Moderate Islamist Groups in Europe,‖ 4–7. 
484 ―A row in the family,‖ Le Monde Diplomatique, April 2000, in Whine, ―The Muslim 
Brotherhood in the UK,‖ 37. 
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diversity that lies implicit in the decentralized nature of Islam. With a specific form of 
Euro-Islam not existing, Muslims consequently will organize along their ethnic, 
national, and ideological lines. 
Overall, the majority of Muslim organizations seek rather to utilize existing 
identities and to maintain their traditional and conservative understanding of Islam. 
Often their aims and objectives meet the definition of Islamist organizations as defined 
in Chapter II. Sometimes, they follow nationalist lines. Therefore, they play a more 
separating than unifying role. In this respect, the role of the elder generation, which still 
obtains leading positions in many Muslim organizations, is of high importance. The 
analysis of Muslim organizations in the UK, however, has shown that a new string of 
Muslim organizations and think tanks is coming to the forefront and gaining more and 
more influence, even within the established umbrella organizations. 
The case of the Netherlands will be interesting to observe in order to determine 
the influence equal treatment of religious groups and the provision of a certain status for 
Muslim organizations can play. Here, the Netherlands is a step ahead of the 
governments in Germany and the UK. 
On the European level, the organizing of Muslims is currently less significant 
and does not contribute to the promotion of Euro-Islam. Those organizations founded on 
the ideology of Islamist movements or controlled by foreign governments are best 
organized. Otherwise, activities by a wider Muslim community are mainly limited to 
specific projects. Thus, Euro-Islam is more about the discussion of values that are 
compatible with core European values than about an institutionalization of Islam 
through organizations on the European level. 
It seems that the most promising option for Euro-Islam to become mature lies in 
the daily struggle for equality, social inclusion and political participation of Muslim 
individuals rather than in concerted action of Muslim organizations. This concerted 
action, currently, seems to be nothing more than wishful thinking.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
 This thesis sheds light on the potential of Euro-Islam as a new concept that is 
sought to contribute to successful integration of Muslims in Western Europe, by 
reference to the cases of Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands.  
The way European Muslims might take is unclear. It can vary from integration, 
which would benefit all, to assimilation, or—in an extreme, but not very likely case 
Islamization. If the aim of Western European societies is to respect religious freedom 
and ensure equality, integration has to be understood as a process of accommodating 
immigrant minorities and enabling them to participate equally in the social, political, 
cultural, and economic processes of society, while simultaneously enabling them to 
preserve their cultural and religious identity as European Muslims. Euro-Islam could 
contribute to this form of integration.  
The concept of Euro-Islam is not mature. It is under negotiation, and the 
proposals vary from a pure embrace of secularism to new forms of Islamism. Many 
Muslim scholars—like Bassam Tibi and Tariq Ramadan—agree on the need to reform 
Islam in a European context, but their proposed ways forward and their definition of 
Euro-Islam differ. For Europeans, the acceptance of core European values like 
democracy, tolerance, and pluralism must be an essential prerequisite if Euro-Islam is to 
play a successful integrative role. But, Europeans have to overcome their prejudices and 
stereotypes of Muslims and Islam. The aim is to enable Muslims to maintain a Muslim 
identity, which has to be developed in the specific context of secular, Western countries. 
The necessary debate among Muslims, however, occurs only within an intellectual 
minority. The involvement of a wider group is missing, though it is of high importance 
in achieving wide acceptance.  
The construct of an identity based more on common values and less on national, 
religious, and ethnic roots is a key objective. Identity in Europe, however, is still 
predominantly based on ethnicity, history, and tradition, whether for Muslims or others. 
Thus, the development of Euro-Islam has to go in hand with all groups redefining their 
identities. 
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The chances of Euro-Islam evolving as a new form of Islam that facilitates the 
integration of Muslim citizens and immigrants into Europe‘s civic and political fabric, 
are partly determined by the Muslim communities and organizations themselves. 
Opportunities to define their role, however, are determined by the policies and attitudes 
of their countries—in this case, Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. Many 
Muslims view themselves as victims of exclusion, characterized by poor education, high 
unemployment, and societal and religious discrimination. They form their identity 
mainly along national, ethnic, and ideological lines and find themselves caught between 
the country they live in and the country of their forefathers. Young Muslims are of 
especial importance because they are the future, and their identity is still in flux. For the 
young, religion serves as a compensation for being excluded. It is a public identity that 
differentiates them from the rest of society—a society they perceive as discriminatory. 
This observation can be made equally in Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. 
Perceived discrimination and exclusion can be a significant obstacle to Euro-Islam. So 
long as the feeling of discrimination prevails, anything new that may change their 
identity in any way may be perceived as attempted assimilation, and rejected.  
Integration policies and legislation concerning religious groups often reinforce 
the feeling of discrimination. German legislation gives a perfect example. If the right to 
teach classes in Islam in German public schools is denied because Muslim communities 
do not show the necessary degree of organizational structure that is common in Christian 
communities and requested by German law, Muslim feelings of discrimination will be 
intensified. To force a religious minority into the bureaucratic framework preferred by a 
special set of legislation is an act of assimilation, while real integration would suggest a 
change in legislation in order to retain the state‘s credibility in dialog with Muslims.  
The dialogue all three studied countries have initiated is a valuable tool for 
exchanging experiences, ideas, and concepts of future coexistence and cooperation. The 
high diversity among Muslim communities in Europe makes this dialogue more 
complicated. However, to enforce uniform structures upon a heterogeneous construct 
only causes resistance.   
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What is surprising is that Muslims find themselves in very similar situations in 
the countries studied, although immigration and integration policies initially differed 
significantly. Over time, immigration and integration policies have become more and 
more alike. One might expect that those countries that offered more space and equal 
rights would find their Muslim communities more integrated. But this is not the case, 
and therefore other factors must be more important. To identify these factors could serve 
as basis for future research, which findings would be of high importance for the 
promotion of Euro-Islam.  
Other fields of government policies, however, seem of less importance to 
Muslims in building up their perception of themselves as discriminated against because 
they are Muslims. A look at the Internet home pages of Muslim organizations shows that 
the situation of the Palestinian people and the military engagement of the West in the 
Islamic world are of interest, but do not dominate. The only exception might be in Great 
Britain, perhaps as a consequence of British integration policies, which granted Muslims 
more freedoms and rights, and the UK‘s special alliance with the U.S. 
In general, however, Muslim organizations that could leverage the situation of 
their constituencies have only limited influence. These organizations naturally reflect the 
diversity of the community they represent. While mosques and other local organizations 
serve as forums in Muslim community life, national organizations evolved mainly as 
umbrella groups in response to the need to organize government—Muslim interaction 
and institutionalize a forum for dialogue. These umbrellas, however, often suffer from a 
lack of support by the wider Muslim community and cannot be assumed to speak for all. 
Even more important, these organizations tend to be more willing to mobilize the state 
to intervene on their behalf—for example, by funding educational and cultural activities 
that endorse their ideology—than they are willing to bring the real interests of Muslim 
grassroots forward.485 Although their representative role is limited, the majority of these 
organizations has an influence on the wider Muslim community through the education 
and provision of imams, who often come from abroad and stay for a limited time. 
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Without knowledge and experience in a foreign environment, their role in the promotion 
of Euro-Islam is counterproductive. National initiatives to establish imam education in 
public universities may be the right approach to ensure the distribution of a reformed 
Islam. The acceptance of these new imams by Muslim communities, however, remains 
in doubt and should be the subject of future research. 
In general, the majority of Muslim organizations propagate a more rigid, 
sometimes Islamist, understanding of Islam. The analysis of a distinct selection of 
organizations has shown that their agenda is defined mainly by the interests of the 
organizational leadership and the ideology of foreign movements and governments. 
Networks of Muslim organizations exist mainly along these ideological lines or in the 
form of a government-sponsored network, like the Turkish diyanet. These networks 
have more than national reach-out, but organizing Muslims on the European level, in 
general, is less advanced. Taking the current situation into account, the focus of Muslims 
organizing should be put on the national level. Despite the legislative power of the 
European Union, national governments are responsible and empowered to change the 
situation of Muslims in their country of residence. Only in the second instance might it 
be useful for Muslim organizations to organize throughout Europe and appeal to the 
European Union when a government obviously violates the rights of minorities. 
Overall, Muslim organizations seem to play only a limited role in the 
development of Euro-Islam. But recently new, more liberal, Muslim organizations and 
think tanks have come to the forefront, which is a good sign. To make the concept of 
Euro-Islam a success, rethinking by all involved is required:  
- Governments have to reconsider their immigration and integration policies. 
While the demand that residents learn the native language is legitimate, other requests 
look exaggerated. The banning of headscarves, for example, is an example of 
inconsequential secularism, although it has to be pointed out that none of the countries 
studied has implemented a nationwide ban on headscarves.   
- Governments have to ensure that Muslims enjoy the same rights as other 
religious groups. Discrimination against Muslims because they are a diverse religion 
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without clear hierarchical structures and central authority contradicts the European claim 
of supporting pluralism. Europeans have to accept the diverse nature of Islam and adapt 
their legal system accordingly.   
- Muslims have to intensify their discussion of Euro-Islam, and this discussion 
needs to be taken out of the obscurity of intellectual debates into the wider Muslim 
community. Muslims born, educated, and living in Europe should lead the process and 
push back the influence of foreign governments and movements.   
- The entire process requires increased dialogue between Muslims and others. No 
one should be excluded from the conversation because of prejudice or unfounded 
reservation on either side. Just because someone‘s opinion is critical or promotes ideas 
that do not reflect the mainstream does not disqualify him. On the contrary, to make the 
dialogue open to all voices to the greatest extent possible will increase credibility. 
- A mainly theoretical discourse over Euro-Islam, however, will not 
automatically improve the economic and social situation of Muslims in Europe. Here, 
youth education and job programs are required. Only if young Muslims feel accepted 
and included might they be open to the changes in identity that are essential to 
internalizing Euro-Islam. 
While this thesis has focused on the identity of Muslims, the role of European 
identity—whether German, British or Dutch—has only been touched upon. But 
European identity is subject to change as well. The fact that the issue of Islamophobia, 
the integration of Muslims, and the definition of a future role for Islam have come up at 
a time when Europeans themselves are searching for identity might be an additional 
obstacle to successful integration. It is incumbent upon Western Europeans to define 
their own identity and the role they want religion to play in this definition and in their 
society.  
It seems that the most promising option for Euro-Islam to become mature lies in 
the daily struggle for equality, social inclusion and political participation of Muslim 
individuals rather than in concerted action of Muslim organizations. This concerted 
action, currently, seems to be nothing else than wishful thinking. If the daily struggle 
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comes in the form of an open and fair dialogue between Muslims and others, Muslim 
individuals will play a much more powerful role in the promotion of Euro-Islam than 
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